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Summary 
 
 
John Berryman, Sylvia Plath and W. D. Snodgrass are each commonly associated with 
the poetic movement known as ‘confessionalism’ which emerged in the USA in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. They did not, however, write works of undiluted autobiography; 
through close readings of their Holocaust verse, I take the poetry, rather than the lives of 
the poets, to be the ultimate authority on what they had to say about history, about the 
ethics of representing historical atrocity in art, and about the ‘existential’ questions that 
the Nazi genocide raises. 
 Chapter 1 offers the first sustained analysis of Berryman’s unfinished collection 
of Holocaust poems, The Black Book (1948 - 1958) - one of the earliest engagements by 
an American writer with this particular historical subject. In my second chapter I look at 
some of Plath’s fictionalised dramatic monologues, which, I argue, offer self-reflexive 
meditations on representational poetics, the commercialisation of the Holocaust, and the 
ways in which the event reshapes our understanding of individual identity and culture. 
My third chapter focuses on W. D. Snodgrass’s The Fuehrer Bunker (1995) - a formally 
inventive cycle of dramatic monologues spoken by leading Nazi ministers, which can be 
read as an heuristic text whose ultimate objective is the moral instruction of its readers. 
Finally, I suggest that while all three poets offer distinct responses to the 
Holocaust, they each consider how non-victims approach the genocide through acts of 
identification. For Snodgrass, it is important that we do identify with the perpetrators, 
who were not all that different from ourselves; for Berryman and Plath, however, the 
difficulty of identifying with the victims marks out the limits of historical 
understanding. 
 
 2 
Introduction 
 
 
Interpretation of Holocaust poetry, including the imaginative works which form the 
subject of this thesis, is inflected by the way that we read Holocaust testimony - 
something which typically involves a response to a perceived authority. As readers of 
testimony, we don’t so much ask ourselves what we think, as what should we think, or - 
more strongly - what are we required to think. This is not simply a corollary of 
Holocaust piety: a sentimental inclination to regard the Nazi genocide as a case apart - 
even one which we have no right or ability to form opinions about. It is more a sense 
that the subject matter, especially when presented in firsthand accounts, challenges the 
foundations on which literary judgements are based (for example, undergraduates who 
make forthright contributions to seminars on, say, Romantic poetry or the Victorian 
novel, are often more reticent as they begin a course on Holocaust representation). This 
is largely because the reading of testimony is influenced by meta-textual criteria in a far 
more obvious way than with other kinds of literature: above all, the knowledge that the 
narrative is a record of, and part of an ongoing response to, traumatic events in the 
author’s own life, shapes a sense of the human fate which lies behind the writing. These 
narratives rarely allow us to lose sight of this fact: the author and the process of 
authoring are frequently foregrounded, as in Primo Levi’s present tense interjection in If 
This is a Man (1958), ‘Today, at this very moment as I sit writing at a table, I myself am 
not convinced that these things really happened’, or Charlotte Delbo’s epigraph to None 
of Us Will Return (1965), which expresses an almost identical sentiment: ‘Today, I am 
not sure that what I wrote is true. I am certain it is truthful.’1 In making such statements, 
survivor-writers question their own hold on the past, and even the legitimacy of the 
methods they use to represent it; but rather than freeing readers to interpret their texts in 
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whatever way they like, these admissions actually bring to the fore the author’s 
authority in what is the mainstay of interpretive activity: the struggle to establish 
meaning. 
The experience of reading testimony (for both students and academics) does 
not, therefore, tally with those approaches to literature, popularised over the last few 
decades, which hold that textual interpretation is open and ungovernable, freeing and 
free. For example, this is Peter McDonald in Serious Poetry: Form and Authority from 
Yeats to Hill (2002) discussing responses to literature in general: 
 
‘Authority’ is a chilly word, at least in literary criticism: it suggests all kinds of 
unwelcome things, and makes far too many assumptions. On its own, it seems to 
be in need of an adjective - ‘monolithic’, perhaps, or ‘overbearing’, even 
‘academic’. ‘Authority’ is something that tries to tell you what to read, or what 
to think, and has views about that; ‘authority’ says one thing is better than 
another, and that some things take more work than others; ‘authority’ is on your 
case.
2
  
 
McDonald ironises the laissez-aller approach which characterises certain strands of 
literary criticism; but the same could hardly be said of responses to texts written by 
Holocaust survivors, where a sense of the legitimate authority of the author-witness 
grows precisely out of the fact that he or she very often does tell readers ‘what to read, 
or what to think’. Again, If This is a Man is a case in point, with the poem - variously 
titled ‘Shem’ or ‘If This is a Man’ - which introduces the novelised testimony 
outlining the demands the text will make on its readers in an even more direct fashion 
than the testimony itself. After describing the dehumanisation of victims in the Lager, 
the narrator asks us to ‘engrave’ the words of the poem (or even the testimony as a 
whole) onto our hearts, promising catastrophic consequences for our houses, our health 
and our children if we fail: a claim to authority if ever there was one.
3
 
It is not only literary criticism which, in regarding authority as a ‘chilly word’, 
finds itself at odds with writing such as this. In the Introduction to their anthology The 
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Holocaust: Theoretical Readings (2003), Neil Levi and Michael Rothberg point out 
some of the differences which have emerged between Holocaust studies and theory: 
 
Many scholars demand respect, even piety, towards the Holocaust and the 
Nazis’ victims, while some theorists are preoccupied with transgression, play, 
and jouissance. Historians of the Holocaust understandably insist upon the 
distinction between fiction and reality; theory, especially poststructuralism, 
questions our ability to know a reality existing independently of our 
representations of it.
4
 
 
Poststructuralist models of literary interpretation have had a pervasive influence across 
academia, especially in reformulating the question of authority in literary interpretation; 
in its critique of logocentricism, poststructuralism holds that all language - whatever 
context it is used and interpreted in - lacks a foundation (author/ origin/ referent) on 
which a hierarchy of meaning can be constructed. Yet such theorising frequently fails to 
take into account the more urgent questions about truth and memory posed by the likes 
of Levi and Delbo in light of the Holocaust; at its worst, it can seem like a complete 
evasion of the horrific reality of a genocide which, as Holocaust scholars insist, 
certainly did exist independently of literary representations of it. Additionally, as Levi 
and Rothberg note, there is 
 
the problem of the intellectual heritage of theory, especially in the French form 
that dominated American understandings of the term in the 1980s: 
poststructuralism and American deconstruction are unimaginable without the 
influence of Martin Heidegger, Paul de Man, and Maurice Blanchot - each of 
whom, in one way or another, either endorsed the Nazi party or produced 
writings complicit with antisemitic currents of the pre-Holocaust period.
5
 
 
In a recent interdisciplinary study, The Holocaust and the Postmodern (2004), 
Robert Eaglestone attempts to re-evaluate this traditional understanding of theory’s 
problematic relation to the Nazi genocide, arguing that the authority of the witness (or, 
as he sometimes phrases it, ‘the other’) actually underpins the intellectual developments 
of the postmodern period. For Eaglestone, poststructuralism is the central instance of 
postmodern thought - ‘a still developing tradition of post-phenomenological philosophy’ 
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which, through the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida in particular, 
‘begins with thinking about the Holocaust’.6 Taking his lead from Derrida’s assertion 
that ‘“Auschwitz” has obsessed everything I have ever been able to think’, Eaglestone 
holds that the poststructuralist critique of logocentricism can only be understood with 
reference to the Holocaust (even if it doesn’t seek to explain it). The fact of Auschwitz 
is, he suggests, ‘all-pervasive’ in this branch of philosophy.7 
Eaglestone’s analysis of poststructuralist thought as post-Holocaust thought 
begins by highlighting how the process of ‘identification’ forms ‘a central and major - 
but not always necessary - part of our experience of reading’.8 Survivor accounts, 
however, open up a problem: 
 
We who come after the Holocaust and know about it only through 
representations are frequently and with authority told that it is 
incomprehensible. However, the representations seem to demand us to do 
exactly that, to comprehend it, to grasp the experiences, to imagine the 
suffering, through identifying with those who suffered.
9
 (My emphasis.) 
 
Ultimately, for Eaglestone, authority rests with the former, and not the latter, premiss - 
not because the latter is somehow less significant than the former, but because there are 
certain ways of reading that are prohibited by the genre of testimony. Drawing on Elie 
Wiesel’s famous claim that the Holocaust ‘invented a new literature, that of testimony’, 
Eaglestone argues that this genre offers a distinct ‘horizon of understanding where 
interpretation, text, and readership come together’: one which legislates against the ‘sort 
of reading as identification, as comprehension’ which consumes, and thus normalises, 
the experience of the other.
10
 This prohibition against identification does not mean that 
the experience of victimhood, or otherness, is totally lost to us. If nothing else, it 
persists in the form of that authority which tells us that the event ‘is incomprehensible’. 
Eaglestone examines the nature of this authority by way of the concept of ‘the 
trace’. For Levinas, this term describes the ethical responsibility of facing another; for 
Derrida, it marks the unutterable place where the outside of philosophy is interred 
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within philosophy, where reason meets with that which is outside reason.
11
 Eaglestone 
defines it as ‘that otherness which escapes the limits of systems of thought and language 
but is made manifest in them’.12 In an interview, Derrida remarked:  
 
The thought of the incineration of the holocaust, of cinders, runs through all my 
texts […] What is the thought of the trace, in fact, without which there would be 
no deconstruction? […] The thought of the trace […] is a thought about cinders 
and the advent of an event, a date, a memory.
13
 
 
Without imposing a false ‘metaphysics of comprehension’ on language (which 
poststructuralism identifies as the way that ‘Western thought […] comprehends, seizes, 
or consumes what is other to it and so reduces the other to itself, to the same’), the 
manifestation of the ‘trace’ in testimony is a manifestation of ‘an event, a date, a 
memory’.14 For Derrida, the experience of the author-witness (of ‘the fundamentally 
fragile corporeal existence’) thus constitutes an authority which is made known to us, 
but which cannot be schematised as it exceeds the limits of representation, of thought 
itself.
15
 Clarifying his relation to the ‘linguistic turn’ in twentieth-century philosophy, 
Derrida explains how the authority of the trace forms the bedrock of his thought: ‘there 
is a point where the authority of final jurisdiction is neither rhetorical nor linguistic, nor 
even discursive. The notion of the trace or of the text is introduced to mark the limits of 
the linguistic turn.’16  
The broad centring of authority in personal experience (or in the trace of that 
experience) which characterises diverse methodological approaches to testimonial 
literature, from humanism to postmodernism (which Eaglestone anyhow regards as ‘a 
humanism beyond humanism’), has increasingly come to extend, as Sue Vice notes, to 
all areas of Holocaust writing: ‘“Authority” appears to be conferred on a writer if they 
can be shown to have a connection with the events they are describing’.17 In a sphere 
where readers are ‘suspicious of the motives of outsiders, who might have improper 
reasons for choosing this subject’, authority has therefore tended to be withheld from 
writers with no direct biographical connection to events, such as those whose work 
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forms the focus of this study: John Berryman, Sylvia Plath and W. D. Snodgrass.
18
 This 
perceived lack of authority does not simply relate to matters of interpretation; it extends 
to the author’s very right to write. In Elizabeth Costello (2003), J. M. Coetzee’s 
protagonist gives a lecture which begins by covering the ‘familiar ground’ of 
‘authorship and authority’, and in particular the 
 
claims made by poets over the ages to speak a higher truth, a truth whose 
authority lies in revelation, and their further claim, in Romantic times, which 
happen to have been times of unparalleled geographical exploration, of a right 
to venture into forbidden or tabooed places.
19
 
 
It is this latter right to explore that many, including Elizabeth Costello, question in the 
light of the Holocaust; for these real and fictional critics, the landscapes of atrocity 
cannot, or should not, be imagined by those who were not there. Thus the now canonical 
Holocaust verse of Plath, for example, was repeatedly criticised during the 1960s and 
70s, not only for what it itself said, but equally for what its author lacked by way of the 
necessary biographical and experiential credentials: ‘Does any writer, does any human 
being other than an actual survivor have the right to put on this death-rig?’, asked 
George Steiner.
20
 
Vice observes that the tendency to source authority in the Holocaust writer’s 
biography has had the knock-on effect of turning the relation between author and 
narrator into ‘a central literary category’ of Holocaust writing, even in works that are 
self-evidently fictional (in the sense that they invent narratives about actual events).
21
 In 
the case of my three authors, the critical over-determination of this relation has been 
heightened by the theories of ‘extremist poetry’ and ‘confessionalism’ that were linked 
to their poetry when it was first published - theories which also sought to elide the gap 
between author and narrator. Responding to the new forms of Anglo-American poetry 
being written in the 1950s and 1960s by poets such as Robert Lowell and Anne Sexton, 
as well as Berryman, Snodgrass and Plath, which enacted a dramatic stylistic and 
emotional break with the dominant ‘impersonal’ style of modernists such as Ezra Pound 
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and T. S. Eliot, critics were quick to praise these authors for transmitting what they saw 
as the ‘pathos of absolute sincerity in extremis’.22 In his Prologue to The Savage God 
(1971), an account of the events leading up to Plath’s suicide, Al Alvarez argued that 
Plath was able to tap into her psychic life to such an extent that in her verse ‘she felt she 
was simply describing the facts as they happened’.23 As the ‘extremist’ poem followed 
from the bringing together of the writer’s self with the imminent possibility of its own 
annihilation, Alvarez further suggested that Plath’s poems and her suicide had their 
origins in the same elemental self-destructiveness that had turned writing itself into a 
life-threatening risk. In a memorial address, he famously opined that ‘the achievement 
of her final style is to make poetry and death inseparable. The one could not exist 
without the other […] Poetry of this order is a murderous art.’24 
For critics such as M. L. Rosenthal, this newly conceived poetic ‘I’ was also a 
kind of cultural seismograph that could register the aftershocks of the destructive events 
of the modern era. He argued that the genuinely ‘confessional’ poet placed him or 
herself ‘in the centre of the poem in such a way as to make his [sic] psychological 
vulnerability and shame an embodiment of his civilization’.25 Such theories, where 
subjective, psychological truths were postulated as the ultimate indicators of historical 
breakdown, understandably exacerbated the worries of those who wished to prohibit the 
use of the Holocaust as subject matter by those who had not personally lived through it. 
If the relation between the author and narrator was thought to be real, as Alvarez and 
Rosenthal claimed, but the connection between the author-narrator and events 
manifestly was not, then critics were clearly going to ask whether poets such as Plath 
were simply equating their own suffering with that of Holocaust victims. 
Theories of confessionalism, which pay scant regard to the self-conscious 
artistry of poetry such as Plath’s, no longer carry much critical weight. As Antony 
Rowland points out, since the beginning of the 1990s it has become widely accepted 
that many of Plath’s famous Ariel poems from October 1962 are ‘dramatic monologues 
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primarily concerned with the proclivities of different speakers’, rather than self-
aggrandising outpourings.
26
 However, the question of authority in Holocaust writing 
remains relevant to discussions of Plath’s work, as it had, I will argue, a significant 
influence on her indirect style of Holocaust representation. Moreover, the question of 
how best to read the poems has never really been satisfactorily resolved, even as the 
poetics of ‘confessionalism’ have been broadly rejected; if anything, it is the ongoing 
problem of Plath studies. Her work has been approached from any number of angles: 
biographical, mythical, psychoanalytic, feminist, existential and political, to name but a 
few. As Neil Roberts puts it: ‘Sylvia Plath’s poetry is beset by narratives, mostly not her 
own.’27 And so, while in some senses I will simply suggest, as do Rowland, Susan 
Gubar, and others, that historical readings of her work are also viable, and that Plath has 
interesting things to say about the Holocaust, I will also, of necessity, try to formulate a 
way of reading Plath, arguing that the only way to take Plath and her contemporaries 
seriously as Holocaust poets (and indeed as poets per se) is, following McDonald, to 
take poetry seriously as an authority.
28
 
This does not simply involve doing away with confessionalism. More 
fundamentally, it means detaching fictional forms of Holocaust writing, such as poetry 
by non-victims, from factual forms such as testimony, of which, as Vice points out, ‘one 
might more reasonably demand an authentic connection between the author-narrator and 
the events described’.29 Here Eaglestone’s work is again instructive, for he locates 
testimony’s authority in its specific genre (it is only by way of this genre that the 
writer’s biography, or rather the fragile ‘trace’ of his or her experience, is made 
manifest), with genre being not simply a pigeon-hole for texts, but a way of ‘connecting 
texts with contexts, ideas, expectations, rules of argument’, and thus ‘a way of 
describing how reading actually takes place’.30 Eaglestone’s sense of authority being 
something that pertains to the laws of genre can be extended to Holocaust verse by non-
victims - only this genre is wholly distinct from the ‘new genre’ of testimony; for as 
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fiction, the life of the person who produced the work is an irrelevance, and as poetry, it 
demands that we ask specific questions about its uses of history, its connections with 
documentary texts, and, above all, its form, which is, in McDonald’s resonant phrase, 
‘the serious heart of a poem’ where ‘such “authority” as poetry bears must reside’.31 
This focus is, after all, something that the so-called ‘confessional’ poets were 
themselves always keen to encourage. Eliot’s influential essay, ‘Tradition and the 
Individual Talent’, and its concept of a poem’s ‘significant emotion’ that ‘has its life in 
the poem and not in the history of the poet’, can be detected behind Robert Lowell’s 
contention that ‘a poem is an event, not the record of an event’, and Plath’s exasperation 
with critics who did not treat ‘the poem as poem’.32 Berryman also addressed the 
question in his own inimitable manner: asked by an interviewer how he reacted to the 
‘confessional’ tag, he replied: ‘With rage and contempt! Next question.’33 So, engaging 
with what these poems have to say about history and the Holocaust will centrally 
involve refuting the idea that they ‘seem to call for biographical rather than poetic 
explanations’.34 Any poem, whatever its subject, produces meaning as poem: a point 
which tends to get lost in those readings which seek to uncover some region of ultimate 
authority lying beyond the work itself. As McDonald observes: ‘In the end, there is 
nothing a good poem would rather be than the words it is.’35 
This simple but fundamental idea informs almost everything I write in this 
thesis, from individual passages to the structure of the work as a whole, which takes the 
form of a series of close readings, and avoids literary analysis based on thematic 
groupings: a format which often obscures primary texts by squeezing them into 
predetermined interpretative frameworks. Indeed, beyond the evident fact of its subject 
matter - and in spite of editorial attempts to schematise the genre in anthologies such as 
Hilda Schiff’s Holocaust Poetry (1995) - I have no real sense of ‘Holocaust Poetry’ as a 
particularly coherent or unified movement whose constitutive features can be prised 
apart and analysed, as Gubar, for example, attempts to do in Poetry after Auschwitz: 
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Remembering What One Never Knew (2003), the most comprehensive study of 
Holocaust poetry to date. Hoping to produce a taxonomy of what she regards as a 
‘unique tradition’, Gubar is aware of the risks involved, as she herself puts it, in 
‘lumping together literary men and women with quite diverse backgrounds and 
projects’.36 Nevertheless, this critical self-awareness does not offset the fact that her 
study creates an artificial sense of homogeneity through devoting chapters to 
generalised themes, and then, of necessity, focusing only on those poems which fit its 
presiding schemas. The result is that established poets, such as Berryman and Geoffrey 
Hill, for example, receive virtually no attention, while pages and pages are devoted to 
the work of minor, even unpublished, authors. There are well-intentioned reasons for 
this: ‘If no one knows about these texts, I worried, would they simply slip into 
oblivion?’37 Yet how a nascent ‘tradition’ is formed by the least well-known, the least 
read, of its practitioners remains open to question, as does the value of writing literary 
analysis based on subject matter, rather than on artistic merit. 
Through the alternative approach of close reading, I do not pretend to produce a 
pure, immanent critique of each poem; and of course I also come to these artworks with 
certain questions in mind, above all those concerning the representation of the 
Holocaust. Close reading does, however, enable a sustained attentiveness to the 
dynamics of the poems themselves: to their words and narratives, the interplay between 
their form and content, their imagery, rhythms and sounds, their cross-references and 
allusions. It clarifies their relationships with their literary antecedents - which arguably 
inform their style and content just as much as their historical subject - revealing the 
impact of modernism, and also how specific links began to develop in the 1940s, 50s 
and 60s between survivor texts and the verse of non-victims. Close reading also shows 
how the work of different poets writing in the same literary culture came to share 
similarities of focus and technique: for example, I compare Berryman’s ‘from The Black 
Book (iii)’ to Anthony Hecht’s widely anthologised ‘“More Light! More Light!”’. This 
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said, I make no broad claims about the ‘Americanness’ of their work, or about the 
‘Americanization of the Holocaust’ (other than where the poems seem to demand it, as 
is the case with the faux Hollywood glamour of ‘Lady Lazarus’, and the Americanised 
vernacular of The Fuehrer Bunker). These poets were all fairly familiar with each 
other’s literary output, they were all versed in the same poetic tradition, and their 
knowledge of history came from similar sources. But their being American is only really 
of relevance in as much as it links to the sense of ‘separateness’ from the Nazi genocide 
that one finds in their writing. In this, these authors are no different from poets working 
in any number of countries after the war (and so it matters little that Plath produced her 
best work while living in England), and I will draw on the writing of many non-
American poets throughout my analyses and in my conclusion. 
The dominant concerns of these particular poets, when it comes to the question 
of Holocaust representation, tend to transcend national boundaries. That is not to say 
that these three writers always share exactly the same concerns, however. The 
Holocaust poetry of Berryman, Plath and Snodgrass is very diverse; lacking more 
extensive knowledge of their work, one would be hard pushed to imagine that they are 
popularly grouped together as members of a single movement. This is to some degree 
the case because they each wrote their Holocaust poetry at very different stages in their 
careers; as such, these texts are not always that representative of their writing as a 
whole. Berryman worked on what was intended to be a long cycle of Holocaust poems 
called The Black Book during the late 1940s and, more sporadically, during the 1950s, 
but the poems for which he became celebrated, and which won him the Pulitzer Prize 
for poetry, The Dream Songs, were not published in any great quantities until the mid-
1960s. Snodgrass began writing poems for The Fuehrer Bunker in the 1970s, even 
though it was not published in its full form until 1995; but his most important 
‘confessional’ cycle, Heart’s Needle, for which he also won the Pulitzer Prize, was 
published in 1959. It is only Plath whose main output of Holocaust poetry coincided 
 13 
with a creative peak, with ‘Daddy’ and ‘Lady Lazarus’, in particular, being key works 
from the important October 1962 period. 
Despite the evident differences in the writing of these poets, there are certain 
recurrent traits or themes that are common to each. And so, without going so far as to 
endorse Gubar’s sense of Holocaust poetry as a coherent ‘tradition in the making’, 
smaller claims can be made about those aspects of their verse which illuminate how the 
genre of fictional Holocaust poetry works - or at least how it worked as it was 
approached and then imaginatively reformulated in the poetry of these writers, from the 
late 1940s to the mid-1990s (as Peter Middleton and Tim Woods point out, genre is a 
fluid concept, ‘a code of practice constantly under negotiation between texts and their 
readers, listeners, publishers, academics and reviewers’).38 Firstly, the poetry I will look 
at wholly resists the kind of conflation between author and narrator that has, as Vice 
notes, become a standard response to Holocaust writing, and which was also a key 
concept in the poetics of confessionalism. Secondly, these poems are all concerned to 
address their distance - temporal, geographical, imaginative - from the event they 
portray (though this distance is approached and formulated in different ways). Linked to 
this, thirdly, is the confrontation with the limits of representation which is foregrounded 
in the work of each poet. Fourthly, acts of identification are central: not between authors 
and narrators, but between narrators and victims of the Holocaust in the work of Plath 
and Berryman (though this is an act that is always either resisted, or subjected to an 
internal poetic critique), and between readers and the Nazis in Snodgrass’s The Fuehrer 
Bunker. Finally, as a kind of umbrella category that encompasses all of the above, the 
poems either overtly or implicitly respond to ‘primary works’ of Holocaust literature, by 
which I mean historical studies which document events through eyewitness accounts 
and analysis of surviving evidence, and texts written by survivors (poetry, essays, 
memoirs, diaries) and even perpetrators. Indeed, contemporary Holocaust poetry is a 
genre which invariably attempts to come to terms with other forms of writing: above all, 
 14 
with the ‘new genre’ of testimony. Given that, as Peter Novick points out, early in the 
1960s ‘Holocaust delineation was virtually absent’, but ‘by the decade’s end it was ever 
present’, Berryman’s The Black Book can be regarded as a particularly precocious 
attempt to represent the Holocaust in art, and it was itself a response to some of the 
earliest historical accounts of the Nazi atrocities that were being committed in Europe: 
the so-called ‘Black Books’, after which it takes its name (and in which, I argue, its 
representative poetics are specifically grounded).
39
 The sources for Plath’s work are 
harder to establish, but prose accounts such as Eugen Kogon’s The Theory and Practice 
of Hell (1950), and poetic works by survivors, including Nelly Sachs and Paul Celan, 
seem to have influenced her. Snodgrass’s The Fuehrer Bunker was directly based on 
Hugh Trevor-Roper’s classic historical study The Last Days of Hitler (1947); it is also a 
response to written and verbal accounts given by perpetrators: in particular, Albert 
Speer’s best-selling Inside the Third Reich (1970), and Snodgrass’s personal 
conversations with Speer, influenced his portrayal of the Nazi minister and the direction 
and tenor of his verse cycle. 
This thesis works by analysing instances of the interplay between specific texts 
and all these aspects of the genre of fictional Holocaust poetry, demonstrating how 
‘works define genres, bodies of knowledge, and their rules’, and, likewise, how ‘genres, 
bodies of knowledge, and their rules define works’.40 Centrally, I will show that these 
poems rarely attempt to reproduce events themselves, or to offer detailed documentary 
accounts; even less do they seek to explain what happened (other than in the case of 
Snodgrass, whose attempts at overarching historical explanation are, I will argue, a 
weak point of his work); as such, they should not be judged by the criteria which we set 
for more ‘historical’ forms of writing. These poems actually assume, rightly or wrongly, 
that their readers know, in the broadest terms, what took place during the Holocaust; so 
rather than trying to reproduce facts, or to elucidate causes, what they offer instead is a 
critical reflection on our reception of those facts, asking how we might construe 
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meaning from them, and what kind of place they should have in art. By taking poetry 
seriously as an authority, we see how these works have an innate capacity to generate 
commentaries on their own praxis - something which was rarely exploited so regularly 
or so fully in other artistic media until at least the 1990s. Combining narrative with 
visual and sonic forms of making and breaking meaning, poems which are thought to 
abuse the Holocaust more commonly offer critiques of the forms of identification or 
appropriation that their narrators indulge in. Even themes such as commercialisation and 
the exploitation of suffering - not something from which poets, compared to, say, prose 
authors or filmmakers, have traditionally profited all that much (at least in a financial 
sense) - are constant preoccupations of artworks which are prone to intense self-scrutiny 
by virtue of their form. Before postmodernism and the rise of self-reflexive narration, 
poetry after and about Auschwitz had, in the work of these writers at least, already 
addressed the need for writing to become meta-fictional, as though talking about the 
Holocaust necessarily meant that poetry also had to talk about itself. This is not a 
testament to the self-absorbed sensibilities of poets, but rather to poetry’s double vision: 
its way of looking outwards onto history through the internality of genre, which is to say 
its own specific mode of writing and reading, even of thinking. 
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1 
The Black Book: 
John Berryman’s Holocaust Requiem 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1948 John Berryman began working on what he termed ‘a suite of poems’ about the 
Nazi Holocaust that he planned to publish as a single volume called The Black Book.
41
 
The collection was to be comprised of forty-two sections, and would be illustrated with 
water-colours or drawings by one of his former students, Tony Clark.
42
 Berryman had a 
highly ambitious, almost monumental conception of what the project might ultimately 
achieve as both a poetic and a cultural document, going so far as to call it ‘a diagnostic, 
an historical survey’.43 The very title of the collection was itself a reflection of the 
historical import that he attached to it: the many so-called ‘Black Books’ that emerged 
during and immediately after the war were written primarily as evidentiary sources. One 
such book that Berryman drew on, The Black Book of Poland (1942), published by the 
Ministry of Information of the Polish Government-in-exile, was ‘so named because of 
the black record of German barbarism from the close of the war in Poland, which ended 
October 6, 1939, until the end of June, 1941’.44 It sought to offer a comprehensive 
account of the atrocities committed in this period, bringing together ‘the most 
astounding collection of documents ever presented both in text and photographic 
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reproduction. Long after the war is over,’ the editors wrote, ‘this testimonial of 
unspeakable barbarity will stand as a monument of accusation.’45 
For his own The Black Book, Berryman hoped to create a unified poetic 
sequence; this is underscored by the extensive notes and drafts that he made, which 
suggest that many of the planned poems would be created of necessity as he sought to 
fill in the gaps of an ordering, and ever-evolving, master narrative. Hand-written sheets 
make diverse suggestions as to what this master narrative might have been: for example, 
he describes his intention to ‘parody [the] Mass of Dead’, noting that the volume could 
take a ‘Mass-form; post-Corbire style’.46 Elsewhere he suggests a ‘Requiem form’, 
and there actually exists a plan for the sequence which is based on the structure of 
Mozart’s Requiem.47 Berryman’s version, however, was to have had an extra section: in 
the plan this stands slightly adrift from the previous twelve parts, forming a kind of 
phantom coda in which the poet asks: ‘And where does horror winter? I sleep, I sleep/ If 
all my friends burned, or I turn inside out.’48 Furthermore, at its inception Berryman saw 
The Black Book as the first section of an even more ambitious poetic sequence that was 
to be based on The Divine Comedy: it would be a kind of Inferno, with Homage to 
Mistress Bradstreet and ‘Scholars at the Orchid Pavilion’ providing equivalents for 
Purgatorio and Paradiso respectively.
49
 
Four sections of the collection were published in Poetry magazine in January 
1950, and three sections were later included in the short work His Thought Made 
Pockets & the Plane Buckt (1958).
50
 However, by around 1 April 1949 Berryman had 
stopped working on The Black Book; despite sporadic attempts to return to it in the 
1950s, the sequence was never completed.
51
 In an interview Berryman ascribed his 
decision to abandon the project to the emotional strain involved in writing about such 
distressing subject-matter, conceding: ‘I just found I couldn’t take it. The sections 
published…are unrelievedly horrible. I wasn’t able at this time … to find any way of 
making palatable the monstrosity of the thing which obsessed me.’52 Berryman’s 
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inability to subject himself and his readers to unmitigated horror is wholly 
understandable; yet he spent many months planning, and writing lyrics for, The Black 
Book, and the long history of his work on the project suggests that his failure to 
complete it had procedural, as well as psychological, origins. Indeed poetic procedure 
and psychology seem to have become increasingly interfused as the project developed, 
with Berryman’s inability to settle on a definite final structure (which anticipates the 
trouble he would have ordering The Dream Songs (1969)) reflecting a preoccupation 
with the psychology and historicity of form that may have placed internal halters on his 
vast outward ambition. 
In his The Life of John Berryman (1982) John Haffenden further notes that on 
the day he abandoned the volume, ‘Berryman wept on reading about the murder of the 
Polish professors in The Black Book of Poland’.53 Berryman’s journals, on which 
Haffenden based his account, are currently unavailable to scholars, but it seems that 
Berryman was moved by a description of the murder of professors from the University 
of Cracow: a passage which would have had a striking resonance with his own life and 
work.
54
 A chapter called ‘Destruction of Intellectual Classes’ records a sequence of 
events which began on 6 November 1939, when the Cracow professors, having been 
gathered together by the Nazis for a meeting at which they believed they were going to 
discuss ‘The attitude of the German Authorities to Science and Teaching’, were 
summarily arrested. Seven of the older staff were set free, but the remaining one 
hundred and sixty-seven academics, along with five students who were arrested by 
mistake, were deported to Breslau, without being allowed to take leave of their families. 
From there they were sent to the concentration camp of Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen, 
where conditions were shocking: 
 
Their only food consisted of ersatz bread and turnip soup. The hutments were 
unheated; the windows were open all day, in spite of the severe frosts of that 
winter, 1939-40. The professors were deprived of warm clothing and compelled 
to wear ducks [a type of trouser made of linen or cotton]. They were not 
 19 
allowed books, paper or pencils. They slept in pairs on a hard wooden bed, head 
to foot. 
Every day they were subjected to tortures. One of the worst consisted in 
giving them several hot shower baths in the course of the day and then making 
them stand outside in the frost, in their thin ducks, for half an hour without 
moving. Several times a day they were summoned to roll-call and made to stand 
motionless at attention, being reviled and beaten. These beatings were 
systematic. Some professors were constantly bleeding from the blows they had 
received. Aged scholars were struck in the face, and if they were sick were not 
allowed the most elementary medical attention. Priests and professors of Jewish 
origin were shut up with criminals. Their treatment was even worse. 
Many professors were unable to endure such sufferings and fell into a 
state of nervous depression. Seventeen died, fourteen of them in the 
concentration camp, the remaining three after their return to Cracow.
55
 
 
Of the professors who survived this initial spell in Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen, the 
majority returned to Cracow in February and March of 1940: ‘all were in a lamentable 
state of health, and so changed as to be scarcely recognizable.’56 Those who were not 
released were either kept at Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen, or were transported to 
Dachau. The fate of many of the professors was unknown when The Black Book of 
Poland was published. 
One can easily appreciate why these particular crimes would have made such a 
strong impression on Berryman; when he read about them he was himself working as an 
academic, teaching at Princeton University and writing a book on Stephen Crane. 
Reading of the deaths of these professors in the historical work after which his own was 
named, Berryman would also have come across, on a page facing a list of the names of 
172 members of the University who were deported to Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen, a 
large facsimile reproduction of a poster advertising ‘A REQUIEM MASS for the 
seventeen Professors of the University of Cracow, who died in the German 
Concentration Camp at Orarienburg [sic] or as a result of their treatment there’.57 The 
dates given by Haffenden suggest that this poster may have presented Berryman with 
evidence of a real historical requiem that caused him doubts about his ability to produce 
a valid or lasting imaginative equivalent. And while this poster alone is certainly not a 
categorical explanation for his abandonment of the cycle (he may, of course, have read 
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this section more than once, and the poster might even have served as a literary 
inspiration), it highlights a root conflict between history and poetry, between factual 
occurrence and aesthetic form, that was a central concern of Berryman’s when he was 
writing The Black Book. 
 
 
‘The Imaginary Jew’ and the Real Recovery 
  
Although The Black Book was Berryman’s only attempt to devote an entire book to the 
subjects, Judaism and the Holocaust preoccupied him for the duration of his writing 
career. It is striking that both his very first success in prose, ‘The Imaginary Jew’ 
(1945), which won first prize in the annual Kenyon Review short story competition, and 
one of Berryman’s final works, the novel Recovery (1973), which he abandoned shortly 
before his suicide in 1972, each take Jewish identity as a central theme, exploring what 
it means to be - and, indeed, what it means not to be - a Jew, through focusing on 
figurative and literal processes of identification and conversion. These two prose works 
evidence an abiding interest in Judaism - and not only in terms of an ‘obsession’ with 
the Jews who died in the Nazi Holocaust, but also through references to Jewish religious 
practice and literature, and to postwar American antisemitism - that compounds the 
sense in which the failure of The Black Book can be regarded as a definitive lacuna in 
Berryman’s poetic oeuvre. 
 ‘The Imaginary Jew’ is narrated by a young writer from the American South, an 
ex-Catholic, who goes to live in New York in the summer of 1941. Early in his narrative 
he recalls how, having been born in a part of the country where there were no Jews, he 
arrived at university ‘without any clear idea of what in modern life a Jew was, - [sic] 
without even a clear consciousness of having seen one’.58 He continues: ‘I had not 
escaped, of course, a sense that humans somewhat different from ourselves, called 
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“Jews,” existed as in the middle distance and were best kept there, but this sense was of 
the vaguest.’59 However, on learning that some of his new college friends were Jews, 
and that they suffered social exclusion as a result, he revised his opinions; realising that 
antisemitism was ‘deeply established, familiar, and acceptable to everyone’, he thus 
began his ‘instruction in social life proper’.60 He adds that in later years he even 
developed ‘a special sympathy and liking for Jews’, although he remained 
‘spectacularly unable to identify Jews as Jews’, either by name or by physical 
appearance.
61
  
The main narrative then recounts a recent argument which took place between 
the narrator and a rabidly antisemitic Irishman, directly recalling an incident from 
Berryman’s own life, when he was accosted in Union Square in New York by an 
Irishman who mistook him for a Jew.
62
 The narrator of ‘The Imaginary Jew’ recollects 
how late one evening he walked to that same square, where a crowd had gathered to 
watch two men debating American intervention in the ongoing World War. One of the 
men, a young Irishman, ‘claimed that Roosevelt was a god-damned warmonger whom 
all the real people in the country hated’ (here Berryman introduces an opposition 
between the ‘real’ and the ‘imaginary’ that is developed throughout the story).63 When 
he argues that Roosevelt had wanted to involve America in the Spanish Civil War to 
help ‘the Reds’ the narrator interposes, pointing out that the American policy of non-
intervention had in fact benefited Franco. To this, the Irishman contemptuously replies: 
‘“What’s that? What are you, a Jew?”’64 He continues: 
 
You know why Germany’s winning everything in this war? Because there ain’t 
no Jews back home. There ain’t no more Jews, first shouting war like this one 
here’ - nodding at me - ‘and then skinning off to the synagogue with the 
profits.’65 
 
At this, the perplexed narrator makes successive, and increasingly desperate, attempts to 
prove to the Irishman that he is not a Jew at all: 
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   ‘Listen, I told you I’m not a Jew.’ 
   ‘I don’t give a damn what you are,’ he turned his half-dark eyes to me, 
wrenching his arm loose. ‘You talk like a Jew.’ 
   ‘What does that mean?’ Some part of me wanted to laugh. ‘How does a Jew 
talk?’ 
   ‘They talk like you, buddy.’ 
   ‘That’s a fine argument! But if I’m not a Jew, my talk only -’ 
   ‘You probably are a Jew. You look like a Jew.’66  
 
The narrator appeals to the crowd, but they remain impassive. When one man 
reluctantly agrees with the Irishman, the narrator feels ‘like a man betrayed by his 
brother’, and is left to look elsewhere for a satisfactory retort to the Irishman’s 
inexorable logic: ‘“You look like a Jew. You talk like a Jew. You are a Jew.’”67  
Despite the apparent impossibility of rational interaction with such a mindset, 
the narrator believes there is more at stake than his own, singular racial identity. The 
point he wishes to make is not simply eristic; and so while he says he would freely 
admit to being a Jew if he were one, and that he is not ashamed to be called a Jew, he 
continues to try to convince the Irishman of his error: 
 
I felt that everything for everyone there depended on my proving him wrong. If 
once this evil for which we have not even a name could be exposed to the rest 
of man as empty - if I could prove I was not a Jew - it would fall to the ground, 
neither would anyone else be a Jew to be accused. Then it would be trampled 
on. Fascist America was at stake.
68
 
 
Yet when the incensed Irishman finally asks him for the ultimate evidence of his non-
Jewishness - ‘“Are you cut?”’ - the narrator is thrown into a state of confusion and 
perceptual disorientation.
69
 Unable to reply, he withdraws from the crowd: ‘I was tired 
to the marrow […] Heavier and heavier appeared to me to press upon us in the fading 
night our general guilt.’70 
Berryman’s story concludes with a short postscript, separated from the main 
body of the text by a line break: 
 
In the days following, as my resentment died, I saw that I had not been a victim 
altogether unjustly. My persecutors were right: I was a Jew. The imaginary Jew 
I was was as real as the imaginary Jew hunted down, on other nights and days, 
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in a real Jew. Every murderer strikes the mirror, the lash of the torturer falls on 
the mirror and cuts the real image, and the real and the imaginary blood flow 
down together.
71
   
 
In this conclusion Berryman outlines what would, in later years, become a conventional 
model for explaining the psychology of the antisemite. His assertion that the murderer 
‘strikes the mirror’ - implying that the homicidal impulse arises when the murderer’s 
self-loathing is projected onto an arbitrary victim who is punished instead of the self - 
exactly anticipates psychoanalytic accounts of the cognitive dynamics of  SS men and 
women working in the concentration camps. This theory was advanced by Bruno 
Bettelheim, for example, himself a prisoner in Dachau and Buchenwald:  
 
The SS, by externalizing their own undesirable tendencies and projecting them 
into the stereotyped picture of, for example, the Jew, tried to shake off their 
own inner conflicts. The anti-Semite is not afraid of the comparatively 
insignificant Jewish individual, but of his stereotype of the Jew, which is 
invested with all that is evil in himself.
72
 
 
However, if ‘the Jew’ is an imaginary concept that is projected by the antisemite, then 
there is a disturbing paradox at the heart of Berryman’s postscript; for having been 
unable to prove that he is not a real Jew, the narrator happily adopts an imaginary 
Jewish identity (‘My persecutors were right: I was a Jew’) that is based on other 
people’s psychologically determined perceptions of him. This is to say that after 
struggling to define what a ‘Jew’ is, in order to prove that he is not one, he comes to 
believe that he is ‘as real’ as a real Jew by accepting the imaginary definition imposed 
on ‘the Jew’ by the antisemite. 
Furthermore, Berryman’s narrator is not claiming to be any old Jew; he is in 
fact constructing a quasi-Jewish identity through recourse to a particular figure: that of 
the ‘Holocaust Jew’. Berryman’s story begins with the narrator opining that the incident 
he is about to relay is of general relevance, and ‘could have happened in another year 
and in another place. No doubt it did, has done, will do’.73 The reference to Cain and 
Abel (‘I felt like a man betrayed by his brother’) and the epigrammatic postscript 
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combine to make the story sound like a creation myth of antisemitism, a Primal Scene 
for Hebraic victimhood. Yet the narrative makes several specific allusions to the Nazi 
persecution of the Jews: most obviously there is the date, which is the summer of 1941; 
at one point the narrator hopes to identify himself by his ‘papers’; and there is also a 
reference to news of the ‘German persecution’ enacted by ‘murderers and sadists’ which 
was filtering into America.
74
  
Hilene Flanzbaum has argued that in this story Berryman is suggesting ‘that 
there is finally no physical marker of ethnicity. Rather, it is a state of mind, or - to 
analogize it […] to the life of the poet in the middle generation - a club one voluntarily 
joins’.75 For Flanzbaum, in the post-Holocaust world ‘conventional notions of blood ties 
in ethnic determination must be suspended’, as should all traditional religious and 
genealogical construction of Jewishness; and it is Berryman’s discovery of a radically 
open conception of a Jewish ethnicity that ‘has no clear referent’ that allows him to 
explore, and ultimately to exploit, newly available forms of ‘metaphorical 
Jewishness’.76 She argues that in the story, Berryman demonstrates a ‘ready 
identification with Hitler’s victims’, with the result that the Jew becomes a ‘handy trope 
for imagining the suffering and marginalization he [Berryman] feels in America’.77 
Similarly, James E. Young reads ‘The Imaginary Jew’ as an early example of how the 
Jew - specifically the ‘Holocaust Jew’ - was to become a literary ‘archetype’. Yet 
Young sees the narrator’s identification as being more restrained: 
 
Unlike other confessional writers who also identified literarily as Jews, and who 
also killed themselves, Berryman sustains a completely self-conscious 
awareness of the figurative nature of his Jewishness. In fact, as becomes 
painfully clear to him, it is precisely the point at which a figurative Jew is 
reified that the danger begins.’78  
 
Psychoanalytic accounts such as Bettelheim’s argue that it is an inner, ‘imaginary Jew’ 
that the antisemite seeks to expunge when he or she goes about murdering real Jews; 
thus the imaginary dominates, takes precedence over, and finally constructs the real. 
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Berryman’s postscript suggests that he had much sympathy for such theorising; but, as 
Young points out, he also questions the applicability of this formula to a real genocide 
such as the Holocaust, and of drawing unqualified parallels between real and imaginary 
Jewish identities. Most strikingly, the narrator’s closing contention that ‘my persecutors 
were right’ marks a significant withdrawal from the reality of his actual encounter with 
an individual (albeit a single member of a larger crowd), and the onset of a more 
paranoid - indeed imaginary - sense of a larger confrontation with many persecutors. 
One could read this as an implicit critique, by the author, of his own unreliable - or 
unstable - narrator; perhaps Berryman is here suggesting that there are prescribed limits 
to ethnic identity, and it is madness - in both a figurative and a literal sense - to 
transgress them. 
While Flanzbaum contests, and Young upholds, the legitimacy of the Jewish 
identity that the narrator assumes in the story, they share the presumption that the 
narrator’s imaginary Jewish identity is also that of Berryman himself. While such 
readings are always susceptible to the charge that they are founded on a category error - 
a failure to theorise the distinction between author and narrator - and on a failure to 
acknowledge the ‘literariness’ of the work (Berryman himself worried that the important 
final paragraph of the story might even have been ‘a bit too literary’ (my emphasis)), the 
story was, as I noted, based on a real-life incident, and anticipates the ‘confessional’ 
style of writing to which Young alludes.
79
 We recall that M.L. Rosenthal defined the 
‘confessional’ poet as a writer who places himself or herself ‘in the centre of the poem 
in such a way as to make his [sic] psychological vulnerability and shame an 
embodiment of his civilization’; this idea seems pertinent to the language and 
representative logic of ‘The Imaginary Jew’, in which the narrator declares that the 
successful resolution of his own persecution might have nation-wide reverberations.
80
 
Berryman himself would also later come to see ‘The Imaginary Jew’ as a confessional 
work - though in a qualified sense - when, in his notes for Recovery, he traced the 
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history of his personal wish to convert to Judaism back to this text: ‘In  my old story 
[‘The Imaginary Jew’], a confrontation as Jew is resisted, fought, failed - at last is given 
into [sic] symbolically. I identified at least with the persecution. So the ‘desire’ (was it?) 
is at least 25 years old.’81 
Perhaps, however, this interpretation says less about ‘The Imaginary Jew’ than 
it does about Berryman’s preoccupations at the time of writing Recovery - a novel about 
an elderly man’s clinical treatment for alcoholism in which the narrator, Alan 
Severance, is often no more than a thinly veiled alter ego for Berryman himself. 
Severance is ostensibly a former ‘Professor of Immunology and Molecular Biology’; but 
he is also a celebrated writer and renowned literary figure.
82
 Many of the journal entries 
made by Severance throughout the novel are directly based on extracts from Berryman’s 
notebooks (Haffenden describes the novel as being ‘in large part a redaction of his 
[Berryman’s] own hospital diary’): the passage quoted above, for example, in which 
Berryman traces his ‘desire’ to be a Jew back to the writing of ‘The Imaginary Jew’, 
finds its way into the novel in an almost identical form.
83
 The original notebook entry 
dates to the autumn of 1970, when Berryman was being treated at St Mary’s Hospital in 
Minneapolis, and was entertaining the idea of converting to Judaism. This is it in full: 
 
     All has pointed HERE. 
I.  In my old story, a confrontation as Jew is resisted, fought, failed - at last is 
given into [sic] symbolically. I identified at least with the persecution. So the 
‘desire’ (was it?) is at least 25 years old. 
II.  PLUS after that, The Black Book - abandoned - obsessed - perhaps now take 
it up again? My position is certain. 
III. Horror of anti-Semitism.
84
 
 
The extract from ‘Severance’s Journal’ in Recovery reads as follows: 
 
   All has pointed HERE. 
   In my old story, a confrontation as Jew is resisted, fought, failed - at last 
given in to, symbolically. I [sic] 
   So the ‘desire’ (was it?) is at least 25 years old. 
   After that, the work on the Nazi doctors - abandoned - obsessed - perh now 
take it up again? my position certain. 
   Unique horror of anti-Semitism.
85
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In such passages there is only the thinnest pretence of ‘severance’ between Berryman 
and his literary persona; to use a phrase that Douglas Dunn applied to Henry in The 
Dream Songs, Berryman’s fictional alter ego here becomes ‘as like the real Berryman as 
makes no difference’.86 
 If, in ‘The Imaginary Jew’, the young Berryman demonstrated an intellectual 
grasp of the ambiguity of ethnicity - a sense that, as Young puts it, ‘it may always be a 
short step between figurative and literal Jews’ - by the time he came to write Recovery 
he was ill, and fighting for what he considered to be his personal spiritual salvation.
87
 
As a result, he was more directly and urgently concerned with what Young calls ‘the 
fine line between empathetic identification and actual conversion’.88 ‘The Imaginary 
Jew’ and Recovery share many similarities, the most obvious of which lies in the way 
that their respective narrators appropriate rather speculative Jewish identities (as 
Holocaust victim, as believer); but this is no more than a character sketch in Recovery. 
There is also little or no association of Jews with the Holocaust in the novel (other than 
where The Black Book turns, rather facilely, into Severance’s work on Nazi doctors). 
While Berryman writes in his diary that, when he was younger, a Jewish identity was 
‘given into symbolically. I identified at least with the persecution’, when this passage is 
translated into Severance’s journal, Berryman terminates the transcription in mid-
sentence, after the solitary word ‘I’. It seems that here Berryman wished to avoid 
comparing the fate of the Holocaust Jews with the predicament of his narrator (or 
indeed himself): a wealthy American alcoholic.
89
 However, the novel’s avoidance of the 
Holocaust means that those distinctions made in the short story between the ‘real’ and 
‘imaginary’ elements of an assumed Jewish identity are never satisfactorily interrogated.  
 There is, however, at least one distinctive and original feature of the 
representation of identification in Recovery that is missing from ‘The Imaginary Jew’, 
which is Berryman’s use of black humour. As he wrote to his ex-wife Eileen Mulligan 
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in 1971, perhaps with reference to a concluding section of the novel that was to have 
been called ‘The Jewish Kick and the Fifth Step’ (which has never been found, or else 
was never written): ‘I worked hard to become a Jew myself last Fall in hospital - the 
write-up in my novel will kill you laughing.’90 Above all, Berryman’s careful 
positioning of his personal notes in the novel allows for the ironic recontextualisation of 
the ‘conversion’ material.  
A noteworthy example comes when Severance alights on the actual idea of 
conversion. The journal entry in which Severance declares his new allegiance to the 
Jewish faith follows a chapter in which another alcoholic, Stack, who is in his eighth 
treatment, has been interrogated by Keg, the group leader. Stack has recently lost his 
job, and the chapter ends with Keg offering him a few home truths concerning the 
repressed resentments that might have been fuelling his drinking. Severance’s journal 
entry, however, which he writes immediately after the meeting, begins, rather 
incongruously: ‘To become a Jew - the wonder of my life - it’s possible! Rabbi Mandel 
is coming at 2:30.’91 The juxtaposition of the previous scene, told from a third person 
narrative viewpoint, with Severance’s self-absorbed first-person journal entry creates an 
excruciating comic contrast, and the apparently extempore religious conversion (along 
with the premature summoning of the Rabbi) tellingly undermines the outward control 
and bravado - and to some degree the sense of superiority - that Severance had been 
bringing to his treatments beforehand. As the journal entry continues, Severance’s 
justifications for his decision grow increasingly ludicrous. Earlier he had lamented his 
inability to learn Hebrew, after lessons from his friend Peretz Bargebuhr came to 
nothing: ‘I gave up. No staying power […] Same with Classical Chinese.’92 But this 
failure, in Severance’s desperate state, now becomes a positive advantage; to a list of 
the personal qualities and accomplishments that would make him a suitable candidate 
for the Judaic faith, Severance adds: ‘my Hebrew effort - studies with Peretz Bargebuhr 
(write - still alive?).’93 In such passages it is possible to detect traces of the tragi-comic 
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voice that had provided the foundation for much of Berryman’s most successful 
‘confessional’ poetry, not least The Dream Songs. Clearly here Berryman is at ease with 
his personal subject matter; having circumvented the Jewish association with the 
Holocaust - thus avoiding any kind of comparison, be it imaginary or real, between the 
alcoholic and the Jews as victims - he writes in a style that is wholly, distinctively (and 
sometimes almost too much) his own. 
 
 
 
‘from The Black Book (i)’ or ‘not him’ 
 
Both published selections from The Black Book, and all the drafts and notes that 
Berryman made for the collection, begin with the same poem - one which in Poetry 
went by the title of ‘not him’ (a quotation from the last line). When His Thoughts Made 
Pockets was published eight years later this title was removed, and the poem was called 
simply ‘from The Black Book (i)’. The text of both published versions is identical:94 
    
 Grandfather, sleepless in a room upstairs, 
 Seldom came down; so when they tript him down    
 We wept. The blind light sang about his ears, 
Later we heard. Brother had pull. In pairs 
He, some, slept upon stone. 
Later they stamped him down in mud. 
The windlass drew him silly & odd-eyed, blood 
Broke from his ears before they quit. 
Before they trucked him home they cleaned him up somewhat. 
 
Only the loose eyes’ glaze they could not clean 
And soon he died. He howled a night and shook 
Our teeth before the end; we breathed again 
When he stopt. Abraham, what we have seen 
Write, I beg, in your Book. 
No more the solemn and high bells 
Call to our pall; we crawl or gibber; Hell’s 
Irritable & treacherous 
Despairs here here (not him) reach now to shatter us. 
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This is a poem centrally concerned with ancestral lineage and inter-generational 
relationships: the first stanza (and thus the entire sequence of The Black Book) begins 
with the word ‘grandfather’, and the narrator evokes a specifically Jewish sense of 
descent through addressing the patriarch Abraham. The actual age of the narrator is 
unclear: while the final quasi-biblical lamentation implies a mature speaker, he or she 
has a child-like understanding of causation (‘so when they tript him down/ We wept’); 
the diction is at first chopped, uncomplicated and abbreviated (‘tript’); and the 
description of the anonymous ‘they’ who arrested the grandfather suggests that he or she 
has not grasped what happened exactly. As the first stanza develops, the short sentences 
and syntactic simplicity are retained, even as the subject matter becomes increasingly 
horrific. The grandfather is taken away to some kind of internment or concentration 
camp; but Berryman does not give us a realistic or plausible depiction of the man’s life 
as a Nazi prisoner. Rather, the grandfather is subjected to grotesque, almost cartoonish, 
acts of violence, again intimating a child’s-eye view of barbarity: ‘The windlass drew 
him silly and odd-eyed’. 
Narrative ambiguity is generated both by the narrator’s naivety, and by the 
grandfather’s evident inability to recount his own story before his death. He is described 
as ‘odd-eyed’, witness to a ‘blind light’, and the second stanza begins with a further 
reference to his sightlessness: ‘Only the loose eyes’ glaze they could not clean’. The 
poem’s representation of ‘sight’, in both a physical and narratorial sense, is that of an 
uncertain faculty that is becoming increasingly obfuscated, with the ‘loose eyes’ glaze’ 
hinting at the physical violence done to the grandfather, and also illustrating how the 
victim’s withdrawal from the outer world prevents both narrator and reader from 
‘seeing’ exactly what has happened to him, or understanding what inner destruction has 
occurred. In this way, the victim is figured in an essentially negative relation to his 
family and the reader; he is both ‘him’ and, as in the original title of the poem, ‘not 
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him’: someone whose terrible injuries and suffering are such that they place him beyond 
any of our familiar fields of human reference. 
In this context, it is significant that the grandfather also lacks a human 
language: on his return he ‘howled a night’, like a wolf. However, here and elsewhere - 
despite this lack of a sophisticated vocabulary, and despite the literal and figurative 
forms of blindness that we encounter in the poem - narrator and grandfather retain the 
capacity to hear and make noise: the light ‘sang about his ears,/ Later we heard’. Thus 
even as the poem fails to make clear sense visually, it does contain a certain sonic sense; 
and the sound of the poem, like the events it describes, is thuggish: ‘blood/ Broke from 
his ears before they quit.’ The metre is irregular throughout, but each line in the first 
stanza begins with either a monosyllable, or with a heavy, usually trochaic, beat 
(‘Grandfather’, ‘Seldom’, ‘Later’). The end rhymes are also irregular, yet they too 
create specific acoustic effects. The first full rhyme is spaced four lines apart, and is 
relatively tame in semantic terms - ‘upstairs’/ ‘pairs’; but then, suddenly, the rhymes 
close in towards the end of the stanza, forming a macabre couplet that rhymes ‘mud’ 
with ‘blood’. Equally, Berryman deliberately avoided certain rhymes, particularly those 
that would have produced an unwanted harmoniousness: drafts for the poem show that 
the final line of the first stanza, ending ‘they cleaned him up/ somewhat’, had originally 
read ‘they cleaned him up a bit’.95 The earlier version would have created a full end 
rhyme with the preceding line (which ends ‘before they quit’); in its place, ‘somewhat’ 
suggests both semantic and sonic uncertainty, while interjecting a mannered Anglo-
American voice which contributes to the pervasive feeling of narratorial awkwardness. 
The sounds made in the poem are so extreme that they have physical effects: for 
example, the grandfather’s howling ‘shook/ Our teeth before the end’. Once again there 
is something slightly cartoonish about this response to the grandfather’s suffering. 
There is also a dark irony in the reference to the family members’ full sets of teeth, for 
the man’s murder - which is only accomplished after his release from the unnamed 
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camp - must in fact prefigure the rapid accentuation of the Nazi persecution of the Jews, 
for whom the loss of teeth - through either malnutrition and disease, or as a result of the 
Nazi practice of extracting gold from the teeth of their victims - would become 
commonplace. The reference could also, much like the language that the narrator starts 
to use, be biblical: after the description of ‘the loose eyes’ glaze’, the mention of teeth 
in the next line seems to parody the Old Testament code of ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth 
for a tooth’. Perhaps it is even a rather grim allusion to Psalm 58, with its violent 
exhortation: ‘Break their teeth, O God, in their mouth: break out the great teeth of the 
young lions, O LORD’ (Psalm 58. 6).      
These biblical allusions are reinforced by the framing narrative that concludes 
the poem, most obviously because of the religious figure of Abraham, who is the 
addressee of this complex and highly personal dirge. Given that the narrative now 
locates the speaker in a sort of Hell on Earth, the reference to howling that ‘shook/ Our 
teeth’ could be an allusion to a passage in the gospel of Matthew, in which a centurion 
demonstrates an exceptional faith in Jesus, who, in turn, tells the centurion, ‘I have not 
found so great faith, no, not in Israel’ (Matthew 8. 10), continuing: ‘And I say unto you, 
That many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and 
Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven. But the children of the kingdom shall be 
cast out into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth’ (Matthew 8. 
11-12). The suffering of the ‘children of the kingdom’ - namely the chosen people of 
Israel, the Jews - in the place of ‘weeping and gnashing of teeth’ to which Christ 
condemns them, arguably becomes, in Berryman’s poem, an accomplished fact. The 
reader might almost infer that the Nazi genocide had scriptural origins, and that Nazi 
crimes were the literal fulfilment of Christ’s own prophesy. Such a reading is supported 
by the way that all Christian ceremonies, such as its rituals of mourning, are summarily 
banished from the poem: ‘No more the solemn and high bells/ Call to our pall’. 
Moreover, the narrator, a member of the tribe of the living dead who ‘crawl’ and 
 33 
‘gibber’ like children, but who is clearly no longer a child (or child-like) him- or herself, 
specifically invokes the Old Testament tradition as represented by Abraham who, 
according to the passage from Matthew, remains a representative of the Jews in the 
‘kingdom of heaven’. As the narrator calls on the Patriarch to write in his ‘Book’ of the 
historical crimes that ‘we’ (him- or herself, his or her family, his or her tribe, and also 
the reader) have ‘seen’, the parallels with how testimony was recorded in historical 
Black Books such as The Black Book of Poland suggest that here Berryman was trying 
to provide a poetic equivalent, recording not the factual details, but the metaphysics of 
loss.  
 Such a reading of the poem’s biblical allusions would suggest that the Jews are 
being represented as a people whose fate presents a challenge to the Christian God; and 
indeed the tribe of Israel actually does come to resemble the fallen angels of Paradise 
Lost in the final part of the poem, both in the possible allusion to the passage from 
Matthew (which describes how ‘the children of the kingdom shall be cast out into outer 
darkness’), and also directly through effects produced by the poem’s form. The final 
clause’s lineation is such that the first four words could be read as a self-description of 
the narrator and the rest of the Jews (whom he or she now represents, or who now speak 
collectively through him or her) as being, like Satan and the fallen angels, ‘Hell’s/ 
Irritable & treacherous’, with the adjectives of the penultimate line assuming the status 
of nouns. The layout ensures that this false sense, or misreading, is actually retained by 
the reader as a more obscure ‘full’ meaning is developed through the last line: 
 
[…] Hell’s 
Irritable & treacherous 
Despairs here here (not him) reach now to shatter us. 
 
A late switch to the present tense, a sense of rhythmic and syntactic urgency (the last 
clause is doubly enjambed, and covers three lines without being interrupted by any form 
of punctuation other than a short parenthesis), and the repetition of ‘here here’, combine 
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to represent the Jews’ condition as being horrifically present. However, it is also 
precarious: they ‘beg’ Abraham that their story be told, even as they portend their own 
disappearance (Hell’s despairs ‘reach now to shatter’ them); and the victim himself is 
enclosed in brackets, and is thus only visible in terms of grammatical and linguistic 
negativity: ‘(not him)’. Something immensely destructive is happening here; but it 
happens behind a veil that is at once historical, metaphysical and grammatical.  
This apostrophe to Abraham - a narratorial apostrophe that could even be 
understood as being targeted from within the poem at Berryman himself, as a generative 
poet-Patriarch - is beset by paradox and self-doubt. Even the way that the narrator(s) 
‘beg’ Abraham (or the poet) to write of ‘what we have seen’ in a ‘Book’ is undermined 
by the content of the poem, which constantly draws attention to the fact that we ‘see’ 
very little. In this way, the Holocaust poet highlights the representative difficulties he 
faces, now that he speaks of a truth whose authority does not lie in revelation - as J. M. 
Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello claims that it did for the Romantics - but in blindness.96 In 
the final lines, the rapidly ageing speaker seems to transcend the limits of his or her 
fictive corporeality, as though Berryman sends him or her out as an emissary into an 
obscure threshold space, an interstice where he or she meets with - even becomes - one 
of those who ‘crawl or gibber’, finding an opening into their Hell. But as the narrator 
reaches this point, his or her vision of imminent annihilation warns the poet-Patriarch 
that even if he is able to lay the single soul of the Grandfather to rest by writing of it in 
his Book (the parenthesised ‘(not him)’ suggests that the Grandfather is spared, perhaps 
because his death has been commemorated), there are still dead souls all around (maybe 
those whose lives remain unwritten) with invisible bodies and silent voices who are 
being destroyed by ‘Hell’s Despairs’. In this way, this final stanza - which refers to the 
Nazis’ genocidal persecution of the Jews, but which also shows how that mass murder is 
vanishing from within the very text which describes it - forms a template for the entire 
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sequence, introducing the reader to the metaphysical and representative parameters 
within which Berryman would craft the volume. 
‘Rising Hymn’ 
 
The poem that Berryman originally positioned second in his various lists and drafts for 
The Black Book, ‘Rising Hymn’, has never been published, and was never really 
finished, or at least not in a way that the poet found satisfactory. On what appears to be 
the last complete typescript there are large hand-written crosses against the fourth and 
sixth stanzas, smaller crosses against the last lines of the second, third and fifth stanzas, 
and on the top of the page Berryman has scrawled the blunt directive: ‘rewrite’.97 There 
are, however, at least three very similar unpublished versions of the poem, with only 
slight grammatical and linguistic variations, and these at least give a good indication of 
what type of poem the second in the sequence was to have been, and of how the various 
thematic and historical concerns set out in the first poem might have been developed:
98
 
  
 Yellow the stars & flashlights, blue 
 Below a blue-legg’d girl is curled 
 Beside the wire; the skin shows through 
 The camps that cover half the world. 
 
Easy the night if one lies still 
 Stopping one’s ears and fails to  mind 
 Busy with one as a lover Chill 
 Till memory and the day unwind. 
 
What song the sirens sing we know 
 And heave each others’ bodies up 
 Well before dawn; all will-less go 
 Who failed to sleep, not wail to sup. 
 
Who will complain when murmur must 
 Such guest that instant entertain, 
 Moving the spirit from its dust, 
 Booted, dividing cheek and brain? 
 
Hard hard however, hard the day 
 (The day is when one stands) and hard 
 Yesterday is, or later, say, 
 To see past the absorbing guard. 
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God grant us strength until the sun 
 First flashes on the frozen plain 
 Signalling their day begun; 
 If that time comes we’ll ask again. 
 
In all three unpublished versions the poem takes a traditional hymnal structure, using 
quatrains with alternate rhymes and tetrameters which are predominantly iambic. The 
theological associations of this particular verse structure obviously suggest a conflict 
between the form of the poem and its historical content - not least because the hymn is a 
Christian form, and the Holocaust a predominantly Jewish tragedy. Also, the hymn is 
traditionally used to offer thanks to a benevolent God; yet many would argue that the 
Holocaust offers a monumental disproof of the existence of such a deity. The sense of 
an internal antagonism between poetic content and what Hayden White terms ‘the 
content of the form’ is even implicit in the poem’s title: ‘Rising Hymn’.99 In one sense 
this title simply couples the form in which the poem is written with a central schema in 
Christian doctrine: ascent (a schema which underpins the hymn itself, where human 
voices rise up, or are lifted up, to God). Stretching the religious associations of the word 
‘rising’ a little, the title could even be taken as a reference to the Ascension: the ‘rising’ 
of Christ from Earth to Heaven. Yet the title also has a historical force of reference, 
above all bringing to mind the Warsaw Rising and the Warsaw Ghetto Rising (the next 
poem in the cycle is explicitly set in Warsaw during the Nazi occupation); also 
resonating with the memory of the ashes of dead Jews ‘rising’ into the air from the 
chimneys of the crematoria (this hymn is about an unnamed concentration camp), the 
title subtly undermines the redemptive aspect of the religious trope to which it alludes.  
In this title, and in his extensive use of Christian imagery, Berryman echoes a 
dominant concern of The Black Book of Poland which, while never denying or 
knowingly eliding the suffering of the Jews, specifically focuses on the Nazis’ 
destruction of a country of which ninety-three percent of its population was Catholic.
100
 
The book constantly draws attention to the Nazis’ debasement of Catholic 
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establishments and iconography, and to the persecution of the Catholic clergy. The Nazi 
threat to Catholic practice is never regarded as implicit or solely metaphysical: it is 
direct and literal - a fact to which many of the photographs in the book testify. I have 
noted that Berryman even wrote of his intention to give his own The Black Book the 
form of a Christian Mass for the dead. This can be thought of as a problematic 
conceptual device, or a formal element of a metaphysical drama; yet, more simply, his 
use of such a form could be understood as a belated attempt to give public expression to 
tragic historical events through a religious form which was itself threatened by the 
Nazis. The Black Book of Poland notes that even when Priests were permitted to 
perform the Sunday Mass, they were ‘compelled to offer a public prayer for Hitler’, 
lamenting how the church, ‘after a glorious revival of religious life during the last 
twenty years, has been forced to withdraw back to the catacombs’.101 At the Wawel 
Cathedral in Cracow, public Mass was banned altogether: 
 
The German authorities eventually permitted two nominated priests to celebrate 
Mass in the Cathedral twice per week - on Sundays and Wednesdays. The Mass 
is not attended by the public but a Gestapo agent is present. The Sacristan and 
one Ministrant are the only persons allowed inside the Cathedral, from which 
they are escorted after the Mass by an armed soldier. The keys of the Cathedral 
and its treasury are in the hands of the German authorities.
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Of course the targeting of Catholic practice was never as extensive as the persecution of 
the Jews; yet The Black Book of Poland offers much evidence to suggest that the Nazi 
regime might have had a lasting and destructive impact on Catholicism in the occupied 
territories, had Hitler not been defeated. There is thus an implicit sympathy between 
Berryman’s chosen form for a poem such as ‘Rising Hymn’, which is based on a mode 
of worship outlawed by the Nazis, and the wartime situation of both Polish Christians 
and Polish Jews - a sympathy that colours and complicates the more obvious 
antagonism between the historical content of the poem and the theological content of its 
form. 
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‘Rising Hymn’ begins by ironically describing the monochrome reality of 
imprisonment and death in a concentration camp in terms of a brightness that colours 
the universe. The reader is introduced to a world where meaning appears to be shaped 
by sensual impressions alone: ‘stars & flashlights’ are not distinguished from one 
another, but are instead coupled together because they are both yellow. According to 
Goethe’s mystical tract Theory of Colours (1840), which Berryman is known to have 
read, ‘yellow excites a warm and agreeable impression’.103 This colour, suggestive of 
light and illumination, also implies spiritual revelation, as do ‘stars’, which are 
traditionally associated with the romantic wonder of the poet and the journey of the 
Magi. However, the curt co-ordinating conjunction ‘&’ suggests that, at least to this 
narrator’s eyes, stars and concentration camp flashlights are of equal value, and that a 
star-gazing romantic or religious sensibility is brought down to earth by a historical 
reality where poetry and metaphysics were merely artificial lights: a reality where 
meaning was immediate and physical, not abstract and spiritual. It is appropriate, then, 
that the meaning of the rest of the stanza is shaped as much by the reader’s direct 
sensual impressions as by anything else, with the sound of the poem serving as a 
primary source of sense, as in the bruising, alliterative lines ‘blue/ Below a blue-legg’d 
girl is curled/ Beside the wire’. Goethe’s colour theory is again a possible source: ‘As 
yellow is always accompanied with light, so it may be said that blue […] brings a 
principle of darkness with it.’104 
 This stanza bears a striking resemblance to the first quatrain of Randall Jarrell’s 
contemporaneous poem ‘In the Camp There Was One Alive’, published in Losses 
(1948):  
 
Flakes pour to the black dead 
 At Lasen, by the wire. 
 The child, in his charred cave, 
 Watches the shaking fire
105
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Berryman’s and Jarrell’s poems share a similar stanzaic form, and each makes reference 
to a child (the ‘blue-legg’d girl’ and ‘the child, in his charred cave’) lying by the wire at 
the perimeter of a concentration camp. In Jarrell’s poem the child becomes the subject 
of a third person narrative. The consistent tone and narrative focalisation of ‘In the 
Camp There Was One Alive’ is, however, lacking in Berryman’s poem; the child of the 
first stanza appears to become the subject of the poem, but the actual subjectivity being 
voiced remains ambiguous, not least because the transition from third person narration 
in the first stanza to first person narration in the second stanza is achieved through the 
awkward use of the pronoun ‘one’. There is a further shift of pronoun in the third 
stanza; this time to the first person plural. Here Berryman uses simple language to 
describe, now more clearly from the girl’s point of view, the fatigue of the prisoners as 
they are awakened for the early morning roll call. The line ‘What song the sirens sing 
we know’ alludes to a famous quotation from Sir Thomas Browne’s essay Urn Burial 
(1658): ‘What song the Syrens sang, or what name Achilles assumed when he hid 
himself among women, though puzzling questions, are not beyond all conjecture.’106 
Given the context, however, the allusion strikes a false note, and the pun on the word 
‘sirens’ seems a little forced, especially as it is not developed in the rest of the poem, in 
which the predominant metaphysical schemas are not Greek or mythological, but 
biblical. 
As with ‘from The Black Book (i)’, theological texts are central to this poem; in 
the ambiguous last line and a half of the third stanza, the syntax and diction even create 
a pastiche of religious writing: ‘all will-less go/ Who failed to sleep, not wail to sup’. 
One usage of the word ‘sup’ given by the Oxford English Dictionary is ‘to sup with our 
Saviour, with Jesus Christ, to sup in heaven or hell (after Rev. iii 20): said of persons 
who have died or are about to die.’ The fact that in Berryman’s poem the dying are not 
able to ‘sup’ might thus imply that after their deaths they will not ascend to a Christian 
heaven. This interpretation is supported by an earlier, and slightly clearer, draft version 
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of the line: ‘Who might not sleep and may not sup’.107 This could, of course, be because 
the victims are Jews; it could also be because no-one could sup with the Saviour after 
Auschwitz, where the eruption of a living hell on earth rendered obsolete all hopes of 
heaven and divine justice. New Testament orthodoxies, particularly those relating to the 
afterlife, are also challenged in the fourth stanza, in which Christian burial rights and 
the idea of the ascent of the spirit come into an unholy association through a very 
earthly act of deliverance: the spirit is moved from the dead body, ‘its dust’, by being 
‘booted’. This provocative image is much weakened, however, by the fact that it comes 
at the end of a stanza-long rhetorical question that opens with the words ‘Who will 
complain’, leaving it unclear as to whether the whole stanza is ironically mocking 
Christian ideals of meekness and tolerance, or if it is obliquely advocating these virtues.  
Opaque imagery and jumbled syntax are the norm in the middle stanzas of the 
poem; yet there is a sense in which the conceptual and schematic framework of ‘Rising 
Hymn’ might allow for such obscurity, if we accept that this is a poem that is 
fundamentally about the ‘rising’ of its own language. Thus, from the horrific confusion 
of ‘stars & flashlights’ in the first stanza, through the ‘night’ and ‘Chill’ of the second 
(which can be seen as a kind of ‘dark night of the soul’), there comes a turn to God - 
along with the use of an appropriate language and syntax - in the third and forth stanzas. 
While doubt follows in the fifth stanza, which uses very simple, repetitive diction, the 
‘high’ language of religious worship is restored for the Divine invocation of the final 
stanza, which begins: ‘God grant us strength.’  
Strangely though, this concluding stanza does not seem to draw on the Christian 
doctrine that provides the poem with its form and written style; instead it seems to be 
suggestive of a specifically Jewish religious hope, with the sun that ‘flashes on the 
frozen plain’ representing the belief that this world (perhaps even Auschwitz itself, 
which was situated on the plains of Upper Silesia) will be redeemed by the onset of the 
Messianic era, when humankind will be brought into a new world order. In Basic 
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Judaism (1947) - a theological text that Berryman studied - Milton Steinberg describes 
the Jewish dream of God’s Kingdom ‘“shining forth” over all the world and in the eyes 
of all men’.108 The awaited sun ‘signalling their day begun’ perhaps symbolises this day 
in Berryman’s poem. The sudden theological transition, from a Christian to a Jewish 
perspective, brings to mind the critique of Christianity, and the subsequent affirmation 
of Jewishness, that is found in the first poem in The Black Book, and also in ‘The 
Imaginary Jew’ (in which an ex-Catholic assumes a figurative Jewish identity), which 
Berryman had completed just three years earlier.  
Through the impulsive conversions described in these works, Berryman perhaps 
risks intimating that the Holocaust invalidates key tenets of Catholic belief, but not 
those of Judaism. This might strike many as a rather problematic sort of conclusion, and 
also one that remains fundamentally incongruous with the fact that the main religious 
tropes and narratives that Berryman employs to represent the Holocaust remain almost 
exclusively Christian (albeit that many of these tropes work ironically, or through 
systematic inversions). Moreover, an autobiographical reading might hold that both this 
poem, and The Black Book as a whole, fail precisely because Berryman’s historical 
poetics are founded on a movement in his own personal faith away from Christianity 
and towards Judaism, to which he had long been attracted. As Young observes: 
‘Throughout his essays, poetry, and fiction, Berryman alternately idealizes what he 
perceives as Jewish traits - e.g., teetotaling, love of learning, and penchant for suffering 
- and then identifies with his idealizations.’109 Such a personal apostasy would be an 
insubstantial and inappropriate platform on which to ground a fictional account of the 
atrocities that took place in the Nazi concentration camps; and even if this conversion 
were made in response to, or in empathy with, the suffering of the victims of the 
Holocaust, it could only ever lead to theologically and artistically dubious poems: those 
of an ‘imaginary’, rather than a real, Jew. 
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However, such an autobiographical reading, of this poem at least, is countered 
by Berryman’s persistent use of the first person plural, which indicates that it does not 
simply describe a straightforward personal rejection of Christianity. Indeed, the 
narrative voice of both ‘from The Black Book (i)’ and of ‘Rising Hymn’ is never that of 
an individual ‘I’; rather, the narrators convoke a collectivity, or, to be more specific, 
they speak on behalf of a family or a people, and seemingly with full authority to do so. 
These narrators act as vessels through which shared familial and historical experiences 
are voiced, and in doing so they approximate very closely to the narrators of the Jewish 
tradition, even as their narratives are channelled through Christian forms.  
Classical Christian works that recount the epic journey to salvation through the 
archetypal narrative that we find in The Pilgrim’s Progress and The Divine Comedy, for 
example, describe an individual’s onerous upward journey towards God. These works 
are illustrative of a journey, or ‘rising’, that must be followed by every man on his own. 
The Jewish sense of epic poetry, on the other hand, originates in the Old Testament, 
specifically in the covenant formed between God and the chosen people of Israel, and 
concerns the trials and aspirations of a whole nation. As Stephen Spender writes: 
 
In the Old Testament, poetry is not an end in itself but the realization in 
language of a vision of life as old as the nation’s history. Thus the traditional 
Jewish poet/prophet does not write simply as an individual artist expressing his 
exceptional sensibility for the benefit of other individuals. Instead, he is the 
voice of the people, a people for whom nationhood is religion and the individual 
but a fraction of the nation’s millennial consciousness.110 
 
Berryman’s use of the first person plural, and his abandonment of the individualised 
narrator of the post-Whitman American tradition, suggests a representational poetics 
that is identifiably Jewish in character; so while he is highly dependent on theological, 
liturgical and literary forms that are associated with Christianity, he is also concerned to 
align his work to specifically Jewish narratives and ways of writing. This produces 
many internal conflicts within the poems, and may have paralysed a poem such as 
‘Rising Hymn’ (which, we recall, Berryman wanted to ‘rewrite’). What is important, 
 43 
however, is that there are clear signs that Berryman was attempting to explore the 
possibility of a reconciliation between Christianity and Judaism (even those Christian 
forms that he does make use of in The Black Book, such as the hymn and the Mass, 
relate to modes of worship which reflect the communal basis of the faith), which was 
possibly the only way he felt he could formulate a palatable religious response to the 
Holocaust: through imagining a radically inclusive future theology. Referencing the 
hymn in its title and stanzaic structure, and using a representative form of narration that 
recalls the Jewish tradition, ‘Rising Hymn’ suggests that Berryman was exploring the 
many rifts and the many connections that emerged between Christianity and Judaism in 
the aftermath of the Nazi genocide. 
 
 
 
‘from The Black Book (ii)’ or ‘2’ 
 
The poem that Berryman at first proposed to place third in The Black Book is the longest 
of all the completed poems, and also the most overtly innovative in its language and 
style. It has a complex, oneiric narrative, in which both distant and more recent elements 
of Polish history are mingled; it incorporates philosophical fragments and theological 
meditations; and it is markedly self-reflexive in its approach to historical representation. 
In this, the poem in many ways seems to consummate the specific aesthetic of Holocaust 
representation - that allusive and often arcane way of writing about atrocity and its 
outfall into the present, and into poetry - that Berryman adopted for The Black Book. 
Berryman himself seems to have rated the work quite highly: this poem and ‘not him’ 
were the only ones published in both Poetry magazine and His Thoughts Made Pockets 
and the Plane Buckt. In both publications the poem was placed second in the selections 
from The Black Book (this was presumably due to Berryman’s failure to complete a 
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satisfactory final version of ‘Rising Hymn’); and so, after originally being numbered 
‘(iii)’ in draft versions, it came to be titled simply ‘2’, or ‘from The Black Book (ii)’: 
 
Luftmenschen dream, the men who live on air, 
 Of other values, in the blackness watching 
 Peaceful for gangs or a quick raid, 
 The ghetto nods a mortal head 
 Soundless but for a scurry, a sigh, retching, 
 No moan of generation fear. 
 Hands hold each other limper 
 While the moon lengthens on the sliding river. 
 
 Prolong the woolen nightSolomon sang 
 And never the soul with its own revenge encumber 
 But like a cry of cranes dies out, 
 Ecstatic, faint, a moment float- 
 ing, flying soul, or flares like August timber 
 In wild woe vanishing. 
 Blue grows from grey, towards slaughter. 
 (An Ashkenazi genius stoned Ivan; a sculptor.) 
 
‘Boleslaus brought us here, surnamed the Good, 
Whose dust rolls nearly seven hundred years 
Towards Sirius: we thank that King  
 As for the ledge whereto we cling, 
 Night in the caves under the ruins; stars, 
 Armbands come off, for which we could 
 Be glad but the black troops gather.’ 
 So those who kneel in the paling sky & shiver. 
    
        *       *       *  
 
Dawn like a rose unfoldsflower of parks 
 Alleys of limetrees, villas, ponds, a palace 
 Down a deserted riverbed, 
The Lazienki Gardens’ pride, 
Monument to a king able and callous 
Who far Vienna from the Turks 
Bloodily did deliver. 
For foreigners, now, a sort of theatre. 
 
One officer in black demarches here 
 Cupshot, torn collar by a girl unwilling 
 Native & blonde through the debauch 
 That kept him all night from his couch, 
 Hurts his head and from the others’ howling 
 Drove him out for morning air. 
 Brooding over the water 
 He reddens suddenly. He went back & shot her.
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The poem begins by introducing the English-speaking reader to an unfamiliar 
foreign world through the use of an unfamiliar foreign word, one which Berryman 
italicises: ‘Luftmenschen’. Rather than leaving the word to stand as it is - which could 
suggest a direct refusal on the part of the poet to make sense, a refusal even to speak our 
language - the poet seems to offer a possible translation: ‘the men who live on air’. 
‘Luftmensch’ (the plural form is luftmenschen) is in fact a Yiddish word (a composite of 
luft, ‘air’, and mentsh, ‘human being’); the Oxford English Dictionary gives the single 
sense of ‘an impractical visionary’, but it also has a rather more pejorative usage, 
describing a person who has no definite occupation or income: someone who ‘lives off 
air’. Berryman’s translation evokes this sense of a class of people who do not earn a 
living in a conventional fashion; but it also modifies or adds to the sense of the word, as 
the men who live ‘on’ air could also be physically situated on top of air. The single 
word ‘on’ means that the men are attributed with both heavenly and very earthly 
characteristics, imbuing them with a phenomenological uncertainty that compounds and 
exaggerates the sense of otherworldliness which already inheres in the OED definition 
of the luftmensch as an ‘impractical visionary’. 
The luftmenschen in Berryman’s poem are the ghetto’s night-watchmen. 
However, the description of their ‘watching/ Peaceful for gangs or a quick raid’ while 
the ‘ghetto nods a mortal head’ gives a sense of their being an unearthly presence; 
clearly unsuitable for an actual security service, the luftmenschen perhaps offer the 
inhabitants a form of spiritual protection - of metaphysical continuation - by dreaming 
of those ‘other values’ that allay ‘generation fear’. If this poem is set in a Jewish ghetto 
in the Second World War, then it is even possible that the luftmenschen are dead men 
who have returned to look over their former habitation. The sense in which these 
luftmenschen are ‘men who live on air’ might thus have an altered meaning and 
significance when we consider their association with the Holocaust; perhaps they are 
revenants, the ghosts of murdered Jews who, having been deported from the ghettos, 
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were gassed and released into the air through the chimneys of the death camp 
crematoria.
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 The imagery of the rest of the stanza obliquely intimates the killing 
process: ‘a sigh, retching’, ‘Hands hold each other limper’. In this way, Berryman 
suggests a terrible new historical meaning for the word luftmenschen, implying that the 
Yiddish language has been infected with something of the duplicity of the Third Reich’s 
particular brand of Newspeak, with all its talk of ‘special treatment’ and ‘heaven blocks’ 
- Berryman’s observation perhaps being that in the death camps all Jews were turned 
into luftmenschen, and that the Jews literally became a people of the air. The meaning of 
the word luftmenschen is thus dramatically refashioned in the Holocaust context, with 
the original definition of ‘men who live on air’ giving way to a new sense of the men 
who died in it. 
A recurrent observation made in Holocaust writing is that language cannot fully 
convey the horrific nature of the victims’ reality. As Primo Levi put it: ‘Just as our 
hunger is not the feeling of missing a meal, so our way of being cold has need of a new 
word.’113 In Berryman’s poem, the shortcomings of language extend even beyond the 
damaged definitions of single words: language in its entirety seems to have been thrown 
into a state of disorder. No word or image has a stable or singular meaning, and formal 
elements, such as syntax and lineation, work against each other, often leaving the reader 
unable to make even the most basic differentiation between the grammatical subject and 
object of a sentence. For example, it could be either the luftmenschen or the ghetto itself 
that is ‘in the blackness watching/ Peaceful for gangs or a quick raid’, and we do not 
know who the owners of the disembodied ‘hands’ that ‘hold each other limper’ are. This 
is very much a dream world - or rather a nightmarish world - and the oddly detached 
narratorial voice, and the use of ghostly half-rhyme, create a suitably narcotic 
atmosphere: one which ensures that the reader’s sense of historic identity, action and 
space remains fundamentally impressionistic.  
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The nocturnal feel, and the imagery suggestive of spiritual bodies floating in the 
sky, spill over into the second stanza; but there is, at the same time, a rather bewildering 
switch to an entirely new narrative tone, voice and subject matter. Through this sharp 
break with his earlier style, Berryman draws attention to the poem’s stanzaic form - the 
‘device’ is laid bare, to borrow a concept from Russian formalism - which he uses as a 
principle of both continuity and discontinuity. Indeed the joins and rifts between stanzas 
come to embody the fractured philosophy of history that the poem as a whole espouses. 
The first line, ‘Prolong the woolen nightSolomon sang’, seems to quote King 
Solomon; yet it does not actually derive from ‘The Song of Songs’, as might be 
expected, nor indeed from any of the other biblical writings accredited to Solomon. A 
further discrepancy between the tone of the passage, which is heavy and prophetic, and 
the diction, which is rather light - ‘woolen’, ‘faint’, ‘float’ - means that the stanza lacks 
unity, making it read like some kind of scrambled metaphysical treatise, with the 
eccentric syntax blurring the argumentative logic of the single sentence running from 
the beginning of the first line to the end of the sixth. Such counteractions and internal 
restraints on meaning constitute the working principle of the stanza; sense still has to be 
construed rather tentatively, and requires a significant input from the reader, who must, 
above all, attend to the dynamic interaction of imagery and acoustics. So, for example, 
while the dominant imagery is metaphysical, and suggestive of the eventuality of 
transcendence, the sounding of the passage is tight, even claustrophobic, especially in 
the alliterative middle lines; this creates a feeling of restraint, forging a sonic hold on 
the staccato traces we get of the ‘flying soul’ that seems to be part heavenly body, part 
firework, an animus that ‘flares like August timber/ In wild woe vanishing’.  
The language of spirituality is abandoned altogether in the last two lines of the 
stanza, and gentle lyricism gives way to the language of atavistic violence: ‘Blue grows 
from grey, towards slaughter./ (An Ashkenazi genius stoned Ivan; a sculptor.)’ The anti-
world of the ghetto, in which the dead take on characteristics of the living and the living 
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resemble the dead, now becomes the scene of complete moral and historical inversion; 
indeed, the most incontrovertible feature of the Jewish persecution - that of Jewish 
victimhood - is overturned, as Berryman describes in parentheses how an ‘Ashkenazi 
genius’, which is to say a Jew of East European origin, ‘stoned Ivan; a sculptor’. 
Significantly, the victim is connected with artistic and cultural production: he is a 
‘sculptor’, and thus crafts aesthetic objects out of the very material, stone, that his 
persecutor uses to inflict pain on him. But this victim is a Russian (‘Ivan’ was wartime 
slang for a citizen of the Soviet Union), which is to say a citizen of the totalitarian state 
that was ultimately to finish the political and social demolition job on Warsaw begun by 
the Nazis. This line offers a multi-pronged attack on the Polish Jews, figuring them as 
the ancient aggressors; even the reference to stoning is commonly associated with 
Christ’s intervention in the punishment of an adulteress, where he condemned the 
barbarism of Judaic law by proclaiming: ‘He that is without sin among you, let him first 
cast a stone at her’ (John 8.7). 
If the second stanza of the poem marks a distinct stylistic shift from the tone 
and voice of the first, then the third stanza effects a complete break with all that has 
come before. It is as if a fragment of an Elizabethan drama has inexplicably got tacked 
onto the poem: 
 
‘Boleslaus brought us here, surnamed the Good, 
Whose dust rolls nearly seven hundred years 
Towards Sirius […]’ 
 
This new speaker is like something out of Tamburlaine, full of the linguistic 
extravagance and bombast of the arch-conquistador. Given the historical context of the 
first two stanzas, this crusading speechification is perhaps rather grimly parodic of the 
Nazi drive towards Empire and lebensraum, but little else seems to connect these lines 
with the historical time and place of the preceding stanzas. There is a connection with 
Poland, however; the first crowned Polish King was called Bolesaw I Chobry, or 
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Boleslaus the Brave (a picture of a monument to Boleslaus the Brave that was destroyed 
by the Germans appears in The Black Book of Poland), and his ancestors were named 
Bolesaw II Szczodry (Boleslaus the Bold) and Bolesaw III Krzywousty (Boleslaus 
the Wry-mouthed).
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 These Kings ruled Poland during the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries, during the Piast era of Polish sovereignty, when the state undertook expansive 
territorial drives to the East - an era which, as Norman Davies has pointed out, is often 
evoked by extreme Polish nationalists as a time when the country was ‘undiluted by 
German colonists, Jewish refugees, or Ruthenian conquests’.115 However, there was 
never a King Boleslaus of Poland who took on the name of ‘the Good’. It is possible 
that Berryman was here thinking of another famous historical ‘Boleslaus’: the fratricidal 
Czech Prince Boleslaus, whose murdered brother Wenceslas was to become the patron 
Saint of their country. However, as the Christmas carol recounts, it was the martyr 
Wenceslas, and not Boleslaus, who became known as ‘the Good’. The most likely 
explanation for this onomastic confusion is that Berryman confounded epithets such as 
Boleslaus the Brave, the story of the murder of Good King Wenceslas, and the historical 
figure of King Bolesaw Pobozny (Boleslaus the Pious), who in 1264 inaugurated 
special legislation for the protection of Jews in Poland - the ‘Royal Privilege’ or the 
‘Statute of Kalisz’ - which ‘guaranteed to the Jews full religious and communal 
autonomy, including even the protection of Jews against the rule of other groups of the 
Polish population’.116 Above all, this would explain the line ‘Whose dust rolls nearly 
seven hundred years’, as it approximates to the period of time separating the original 
enactment of the ‘Royal Privilege’ from its wholesale violation during the Holocaust.  
The ‘Boleslaus’ of the poem, then, does not appear to be an exact reference to a 
real historical or mythological personage; while Berryman clearly draws on the names 
and stories associated with the historical foundations of the Polish state, he does so in a 
rather tangential way. This loose, dreamy concern with historical reality is again 
suggestive of the erratic movements of night thoughts; one feels that the poem could 
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still be situated in some deep, nostalgic stratum of the dream-world of the luftmenschen. 
There is, however, the sense of an awakening midway through the stanza, when these 
fragments of dynasties and legends, and the flamboyant, archaic rhetoric, suddenly give 
way to the much starker language and symbolism of the ghetto: ‘Armbands come off, 
for which we could/ Be glad but the black troops gather.’ The anachronistic quotation 
from the anonymous guest speaker closes with references which bring to mind the 
armbands that Jews living in ghettos (and elsewhere) were forced to wear, and the black 
uniforms of the SS - images that reconnect the reader with the original setting and 
historic present time frame of the poem.  
The stanza ends with a single line which also seems to revert to the narrative 
voice and temporality of the first stanza, and which seems to affirm that the preceding 
passages were the thoughts or speech or dreams of the luftmenschen: ‘So those who 
kneel in the paling sky & shiver.’ Here Berryman develops the unsettling imagistic 
possibilities begun by the wordplay in the first line of the poem. The luftmenschen are 
now very clearly sky-bound, but they are still described in paradoxical terms: they 
‘kneel’, a religious posture, but the sky - which one might connect with heaven - is 
‘paling’. Similarly, the figures are airborne, and thus they are presumably non-human, 
but they ‘shiver’, and so are still capable of human forms of suffering. 
 These first three stanzas are separated from the final two by three small stars: 
suitable symbols with which to indicate a break between what can be thought of as the 
‘night’ section of the poem and the second part, which opens with a Homeric 
description of the beginning of a new day: ‘Dawn like a rose unfolds’. The stanza is set 
in the Lazienki Gardens (Park azienkowski) in Warsaw, and this is why I take the 
reference to a ‘ghetto’ in the first stanza to be a reference to the Warsaw Ghetto, as it 
would at least offer a continuity of place between the two parts of the poem.
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 There is, 
however, much to suggest that this second part is almost entirely discontinuous with all 
that has come before. For example, the water-bound Lazienki Palace (which is literally 
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‘Down a deserted riverbed’) and gardens were not built by any of the Kings called 
Boleslaus, as the reader might assume; they were built in the late 1760s by King 
Stanisaw August Poniatowski, who became King of Poland in 1764. Stanisaw 
August was a monarch noted for his ambition to transform Warsaw into a major cultural 
centre, and he hoped that the newly built palace and gardens would further this design; 
yet he is traditionally a rather maligned King, principally known for the rather 
inglorious fact that he was Poland’s last monarch. His hold on power was always weak - 
he was crowned only as a result of the intervention of Catherine the Great of Russia, 
whose lover he had been - and he was eventually toppled as a result of the growing 
political might of the Prussians, who instigated the Partition of Poland in 1772.
118
 This 
political fragility is not, however, reflected in Berryman’s poem, whose terse 
description of a ‘king able and callous’ hardly seems to fit with the general view of 
Stanisaw August. Moreover, during his reign Stanisaw August’s foreign exploits 
were negligible, and he had nothing to do with the deliverance of ‘far Vienna from the 
Turks’. Berryman’s reference here is to a battle which took place about eighty years 
before the rule of Stanisaw August, when King Jan Sobieski finally halted the advance 
of the Ottoman Turks into central Europe with the successful defence of Vienna in 1683 
- a battle which led to Sobieski becoming a highly celebrated King, even though the 
victory came at considerable cost to the health of the Polish military and state.
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Sobieski, then, is a King who became widely regarded as being ‘able and callous’; yet 
the palatial ‘monument’ to Sobieski is not at Lazienki, as Berryman’s poem implies, but 
rather at Wilanw, on the outskirts of Warsaw, where he spent nearly twenty years 
building a grand palace and gardens. 
Despite the slightly botched allusions to distant historical battles (it is hard to 
tell whether this was by accident or design), this remains an astonishingly tranquil 
stanza, one seemingly quite uninvolved with the historical context of the rest of the 
poem. There is very little in this eight-line quasi-pastoral pastiche to suggest that the 
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‘now’ of its narration is the volatile ‘now’ of wartime, other than the allusion to the 
historical defence of Vienna and the final phrase ‘a sort of theatre’, which puns on the 
word ‘theatre’ as a place of both entertainment and war. It is only in the final stanza, 
still set in the Lazienki Gardens, that Berryman makes any attempt to give a more direct 
fictional representation of the ever-present yet never stated subject of the poem: the 
Nazi occupation of Warsaw. And as he does so, he gradually abandons the whole 
aesthetic of grammatical and linguistic confusion and historical revisionism in favour of 
a much simpler writing style, and a more direct narrativisation of events. The story of a 
(presumably Nazi) officer’s carouse, his subsequent humiliation, and his cold-blooded 
reaction, is relayed in a more straightforward language: a stylistic simplification which 
is made all the more effective and morally emphatic by the chaos that precedes it. 
Anthony Hecht used a very similar, indeed almost identical, technique in his 
celebrated Holocaust poem ‘“More Light! More Light!”’, which was written about two 
decades after ‘from The Black Book (ii)’. Hecht’s work also ends by describing the 
murder of an innocent Pole by a Nazi; as this death scene unfolds, his language is, again 
much like Berryman’s, purged of archaisms and embellishments; thus a brief discussion 
of the poetics of ‘“More Light! More Light!”’, and a critique of Hecht’s use of historical 
sources (by way of recent theoretical approaches to Holocaust poetry formulated by 
Susan Gubar), might help to illuminate Berryman’s less well-known piece.  
Hecht begins by describing the death of a Christian martyr in a style that 
parodies the theological writings of the Renaissance - ‘Nor was he forsaken of courage’, 
‘And such as were by made prayers in the name of Christ,/ That shall judge all men’ - 
reflecting the historical epoch in which the first section of the poem is set.
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 There is 
then, in the fourth stanza, a sudden leap in time and place to the Third Reich, and the 
language of the poem travels with it, becoming instantaneously modernised: 
 
We move now to outside a German wood. 
Three men are there commanded to dig a hole 
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In which the two Jews are ordered to lie down 
And be buried alive by the third, who is a Pole. 
 
Here the straightforward style and syntax suggest a kind of representative clarity; 
divested of rhetoric and metaphor, and using only full rhymes, the implication is that the 
poem now approximates to historical reality in a closer, more objective fashion. And 
indeed this stanza, and the horrific narrative that completes the remainder of the poem, 
is adapted from a survivor’s account, taken from Eugen Kogon’s The Theory and 
Practice of Hell (1950). 
Kogon, a trained sociologist, wrote his book when the Supreme Headquarters of 
the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) commissioned a study to assess the function 
and organisation of the Nazi concentration camps.
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 Kogon had himself been one of the 
first people to be arrested as an opponent of the Nazi regime, and had spent much of the 
war in Buchenwald, ‘the first big concentration camp to fall into the hands of the 
western allies intact’, which, as such, ‘was to serve as the key to an understanding of the 
system behind the Nazi concentration camps as a whole’.122 The passage on which 
‘“More Light! More Light!”’ is based describes an incident which took place in the 
spring of 1944 at Buchenwald, when an SS Work Detail Leader caught sight of two 
Jews ‘whose strength was ebbing’. Kogon, drawing on an account by an unnamed 
eyewitness, writes: 
 
He ordered a Pole by the name of Strzaska to bury the two men, who were 
scarcely able to keep to their feet. The Pole froze in his tracks - and refused! 
The sergeant took a pick handle, belaboured the Pole and forced him to lie 
down in one of the ditches in place of the two Jews. Next he forced the Jews to 
cover the Pole with soil. They complied, in terror of their lives, and in the hope 
of escaping the ghastly fate themselves. 
When only the head of the Pole was still uncovered, the SS man called 
a halt and had the man dug out again. The two Jews now had to lie down in the 
ditch, while Strzaska was ordered to cover them up. Slowly the ditch was filled 
with soil. When the work was done, the Detail Leader personally trampled 
down the soil over his two victims.
123
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The episode ends when Kogon describes how, five minutes later, two more Jews from 
the same work detail were ordered to dig up the buried Jews; one was found dead and 
the other showed only ‘feeble signs of life’; both were sent by the SS man to the 
crematorium.
124
 
 In Poetry after Auschwitz: Remembering What One Never Knew (2003), Gubar 
cites Hecht’s poem as a key example of a genre she terms ‘documentary verse’. While 
never reproducing the exact words of survivors, and remaining distinct from the ‘poetry 
of witness’, poets writing in this genre draw on testimonial accounts in order to serve 
‘as witnesses of the witnesses’:125 
 
This reliance on earlier testimony, which I will term ‘proxy-witnessing,’ brings 
to mind legal venues [sic] of finding a way to testify for those […] who cannot 
testify for themselves. […] As in legislative or political representative bodies, in 
aesthetic representation the proxy functions as a licensed authority for an absent 
party. The proxy does not replace, but instead acts or speaks in the place of, 
another.
126
  
 
By deploying archival material in order to arrest ‘memories not yet assimilated into 
banal or clichéd reconstructions in public memorials and popular forms’, poets such as 
Hecht, Gubar argues, take historical material and ‘paradoxically, use their imagination 
to make it more palpably real’.127 In doing so, they perform an essential mediatory 
function: ‘poets of proxy-witnessing attempt to return what they have borrowed 
“sharper” than they received it. In this regard, the refreshing of testimony relies on 
verse.’128 
Gubar makes much of Hecht’s dependence on The Theory and Practice of Hell, 
observing that ‘by repeating an eyewitness account (rather than inventing a narrative of 
his own devising), Hecht acknowledges that personal testimonial provides validation for 
those imaginative approaches to the Shoah that rest on its truth claims’.129 But while 
Hecht’s poem records the same shocking sequence of events outlined by Kogon - from 
the initial refusal by the Pole to follow the Nazi’s orders, to the moment when the two 
Jews are buried alive - he concludes the narrative differently. Having described how ‘a 
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riding boot packed down the earth’ on the Jews’ graves, Hecht adds that the Pole ‘was 
shot in the belly and in three hours bled to death’. Kogon, however, does not actually 
tell us what happened to Strzaska; so here Hecht embellishes on a factual historical 
narrative - even as he strips down Kogon’s language, removing the italics and 
exclamation marks, as if to suggest a reverential fidelity to factuality. 
Gubar contends that this revision serves a valid poetic purpose:  
 
The crisis of Hecht’s isolated trio contains no possibility of rescuing efforts or 
firsthand recounting. As if to dramatize Dori Laub’s reflection on the Holocaust 
as a unique historical occurrence that ‘produced no witnesses’, the poem’s Pole 
is shot on top of the grave of the Jews. Burial alive is Hecht’s trope for the fate 
of the Jews not only because so many Jewish people were literally buried alive 
during the Holocaust but also, as Shoshana Felman has explained, because the 
‘essence of the Nazi scheme’ was to make the Jews ‘essentially invisible’ by 
confining them to hidden death camps, by diminishing their materiality through 
starvation, and by reducing their dead bodies to smoke and ashes. That the 
buried are alive, while the dying lie bleeding unburied: this misrule governs not 
the original prose but the concluding stanza of ‘“More Light! More Light!,”’ a 
title that repeatedly echoes throughout the account of the episode and is used to 
encapsulate it as well.
130
  
 
This justification for Hecht’s alteration does not, however, sufficiently account for the 
fact that it is the poet himself who creates the historical absence - the lack of witnesses - 
which, according to Gubar, legitimates an art of proxy-witnessing. Gubar suggests that 
by figuring the Holocaust through the ‘emplotment’, to use Hayden White’s term for the 
kind of story that is being told, of what she calls an ‘illogical fable’, the poet attributes a 
more general significance to the Pole’s actions.131 Yet by not referring to the Pole by 
name, by inventing a violent death for him for which there is no documentary evidence, 
and by using a form of emplotment which is presumably designed to produce the sort of 
‘blurring of the line between fiction and fact’ that Gubar suggests characterises works of 
proxy-witnessing, the poet effectively replicates standard Nazi practice.
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 Hecht’s 
decision not to name Strzaska also allows him to circumvent the most basic moral 
implications of his decision to invent an imaginary death for a real Holocaust victim. 
The ‘generality’ and fable-like qualities that Gubar discerns in the poem thus seem to 
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bear out Cynthia Ozick’s suggestion that ‘it is moral ease to slide from the particular to 
the abstract’ (a cautionary sentiment which Gubar quotes with full approval when 
introducing her reading of Hecht).
133
 
The legalistic terminology which Gubar uses to describe the work of a ‘proxy-
witness’ who is ‘appointed or authorised to act instead of another’ cannot hold in the 
case of a self-appointed individual who only becomes the ‘licensed authority for an 
absent party’ by creating a fictional death for the witness in whose place he testifies. 
Her claims that the genre of ‘documentary verse’ exercises ‘scrupulous vigilance about 
the specificity of particular and often eccentric experiences’ is also contradicted by the 
representative strategies of ‘“More Light! More Light!”’.134 Gubar holds that the ‘poets 
of proxy-witness often acknowledge their belated dependence on after-the-fact accounts 
of extremities never in their purview,’ and that ‘by stressing their dependence on 
recalcitrantly alien eyewitness accounts, poets send readers back to such documents’: 
Hecht, however, makes no mention of Kogon’s book (he dedicates the poem to Hannah 
Arendt and her husband Heinrich Blcher).135 Furthermore, in arguing that the use of 
testimonial material can transform a literary work into a documentary surrogate, Gubar 
does not sufficiently differentiate the project of the proxy-witness from that of the 
actual witness; for survivors have often spoken of their sense of surrogacy, of how they 
speak ‘as witnesses of the witnesses’. Levi, for example, understood his own testimony 
as 
 
a discourse on ‘behalf of third parties’, the story of things seen from close by, 
not experienced personally. When the destruction was terminated, the work 
accomplished was not told by anyone, just as no one ever returned to recount 
his own death. Even if they had paper and pen, the submerged would not have 
testified because their death had begun before that of their body. Weeks and 
months before being snuffed out, they had already lost the ability to observe, to 
remember, compare and express themselves. We speak in their stead, by 
proxy.
136
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By describing a poet whose use of historical sources is appreciably inexact as a writer of 
‘documentary verse’, Gubar risks obscuring the moral meticulousness of categorisations 
such as Levi’s, and his contention that ‘we, the survivors, are not the true witnesses’.137  
 In arguing for the cultural need for a poetry of proxy-witness, Gubar revisits 
Dori Laub’s contention that the Holocaust was ‘a unique historical occurrence that 
“produced no witnesses”’ (or at least no ‘true witnesses’, as Levi puts it); as such, many 
of the worst crimes become dependent on those who were not there bearing witness to 
things they have neither seen nor experienced if they are to find a place in public 
memory. This imperative determines how, for Gubar, poets of proxy-witness must enact 
a ‘poetics of anamnesis’, with anamnesis being defined as ‘a calling to mind; a 
remembering of a life before this life’.138 The representational logic behind such a 
poetics does not really hold for those cases where actual proxy-witness accounts, such 
as Kogon’s, already exist, and testimonial material is neither ‘sharpened’ nor ‘refreshed’ 
when crucial elements of its narrative are changed. However, a concept of anamnesis is 
readily applicable to many of the poems in Berryman’s The Black Book, which take as 
their subject those unrecorded historical events where the witnesses themselves could 
not have survived. In the final stanza of ‘from The Black Book (ii)’, for example, a girl 
is raped by a drunken Nazi, who then shoots her: an event which is not documented 
historically in any of the Black Books, and which would not have figured in the history 
books even if it had happened exactly as Berryman describes. The only person with 
access to all the information given in the last stanza of the poem would have been the 
Nazi (or his drunken comrades, who would have been unlikely to testify to his act with 
candour); this suggests that Laub’s definition ought, perhaps, to be slightly amended: 
rather than the Holocaust being an event that ‘produced no witnesses’, it was an event 
for which the only surviving witnesses were, very often, the perpetrators.  
By describing an isolated death which forecloses the possibility of the victim’s 
perspective ever being passed on, Berryman concurs with Terrence Des Pres’s assertion 
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that ‘we cannot not imagine’ these fates.139 Indeed these are the sorts of events that 
demand to be imagined, being, as they are, almost totally irrecoverable other than 
through fiction. Through his efforts to imagine unimaginable events, Berryman fulfils 
the conceptual criteria that Gubar sets out for the poetry of ‘proxy-witness’; and 
Berryman, unlike Hecht, actually does refer the reader back to the historical source in 
which his poem is grounded, through the title of his collection. 
While this poem does not reproduce a specific incident for the reasons stated 
above, it does seem to be indebted to a specific chapter of The Black Book of Poland, 
entitled ‘The Treatment of Women’, which gives details of the generalised patterns of 
Nazi abusiveness, describing the forcible abductions of Polish wives and mothers, and 
the ‘women hunts’ that were organised in occupied cities such as Warsaw: 
 
During the war operations and the early months of the occupation, there were 
numerous cases of women being raped by German soldiers - cases which will 
remain forever unpunished. The German soldiers themselves have told 
witnesses, known to us, of incidents in which women were imprisoned, 
violated, and finally assassinated with a sadism that horrified even those who 
told of these crimes.
140
    
 
After this introductory passage, there follow a number of reports of specific Nazi 
assaults on women, some based on German admissions, some based on the testimony of 
Poles. All of this testimony is partial and curtailed, and the catalogue of horrors listed in 
the chapter has little in common with Berryman’s geographically precise and subtly 
psychologised description of the rape and murder of a blonde Polish girl. This particular 
narrative is Berryman’s own invention, even if the event he describes was an historical 
norm. Through an imaginative appropriation of these incomplete or elliptic historical 
accounts, Berryman adopts the retributive approach to history which informs a genuine 
poetics of anamnesis, and which also underpinned The Black Book of Poland, which, we 
recall, was to serve as a ‘monument of accusation’. In Berryman’s case, this approach 
holds that even if such historical crimes go unpunished, they, or at least their like, will 
not go unrecorded. The poetry of proxy-witness is thus, as Gubar observes, a 
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paradoxical form of memory, on the one hand stressing ‘the disjunction between 
documentary sources and their own utterances so that the lacuna between “then” and 
“now” broadens’, yet also asking us ‘not to forget what we can neither recollect nor 
fully comprehend as we ponder what others have recalled’.141 On a hand-written draft 
version of the poem, Berryman added a succinct note which encapsulates the inner 
contradictions of anamnesis: ‘The Music of the Dead < Life cannot even remember. No. 
Yes.’142 
In the last line of ‘from The Black Book (ii)’, in order to render the complex 
duality of the form of memory found in the poetry of proxy-witness, Berryman switches 
from the historic present to the past tense: ‘Brooding over the water/ He reddens 
suddenly. He went back & shot her’ (a reversal of the technique used in the last line of 
‘from The Black Book (i)’, where the past tense gives way to present tense narration). In 
this way, the very language of the poem ensures that ‘the lacuna between “then” and 
“now” broadens’; even as the unimaginable, unwitnessed murder is given literary 
representation, a kind of blockade is imposed on the reader’s comprehension of the 
central event of the poem. Before this last line, a community of temporality between past 
and present has been established through the use of the historic present, which means 
that, throughout the final stanza, the reader has effectively been placed alongside the 
Nazi, in his time and space. This remains the case right up to the point where the Nazi 
reddens by the water; but between that moment of shame or feared discovery and the 
subsequent act of murder there is a gulf that those of us who were not there cannot hope 
to transcend, a hiatus between cause and effect that we cannot decipher. The use of the 
past tense to represent the moment when the Nazi shoots the girl nudges his action into 
a place where we, the readers, and perhaps even the poet himself, can no longer quite 
reach it - the murder is placed beyond a common temporality of ongoingness and into a 
zone of finitude and incomprehension.  
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It is noticeable that in a poem such as ‘from The Black Book (ii)’, and also in 
Hecht’s ‘“More Light! More Light!”’, the focus is on a single murder, an isolated act of 
an individual’s sickening cruelty, rather than on mass murder and the trans-European 
horrors of the Holocaust as a whole. In one sense this could be seen as a classic 
rhetorical strategy, with the poet encouraging the reader to infer universal conclusions 
from the isolated example; on the other hand, it could reflect the limits of Holocaust 
writing, with these narratives marking the maximum capability of an aesthetic form 
which can just about compass particular examples of the Nazi persecution, but not the 
totality of the genocide of six million victims. It is also possible that this focus on the 
individual is to some degree indicative of the broad epistemological biases of the 
postwar era, and that it again reveals the influence of the historical interpretations 
offered by the testimonial texts on which these poems were based. 
Both Berryman and Hecht focus on the psychological perversions of what was, 
at the time, regarded as the stereotypical Nazi sadist - the brutal thug whose 
consciousness remained untouched by reason and light. The Black Book of Poland 
makes numerous references to the atavistic nature of Nazi crimes. For example: 
 
The ‘New Order’ which is being inflicted on Poland, and indeed on the whole 
of the European Continent, will be new mainly to those who have an inadequate 
knowledge of the Dark Ages. As far as the Jews are concerned, it is the ancient 
persecution writ large.
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Kogon also makes much of the regressiveness of the Nazi character in The Theory and 
Practice of Hell, describing the psychology of the SS in the following terms: 
 
It differs little from that of the Praetorian Guard in ancient Rome, the followers 
of Mohammed’s immediate successors, the Mongol shock troops of Ghengis 
Khan, the Janissaries, the dervishes of the Mahdi, and similar bodies of men 
known from history. Only in the matter of social origins did the SS bring a 
modern note into the picture. 
Whether they were consciously attracted to SS ideals or not, the men 
who volunteered for Hitler’s Elite Guards were without exception of a type in 
whom a primitive psychological mechanism was at work. Their minds were 
enclosed by a hard shell consisting of a few sharply fixed, dogmatic, effortless, 
simplified concepts underneath which lurked a flood of inchoate emotionalism. 
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They suffered from no internal conflicts between instinct and reason. They 
acknowledged no universally valid standards of conduct.
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As well as being characterised by a primitive and predatory psychology, Berryman’s 
murderer shoots a ‘Native & blonde’ girl after some unspecified sexual humiliation. 
Speculation about the pseudo-sexual motivations of the Nazis, and the idea that the 
violence of the regime could be traced to the sexual appetites of the individual, were 
also common in the immediate postwar era. While the editors of The Black Book of 
Poland judiciously attribute the raping and abduction of Polish women to a deliberate 
policy by the Nazis to weaken resistance to the occupation, accounts such as Kogon’s 
more commonly tend to suggest that Nazi licentiousness resulted from the degeneracy 
of the German mind.
145
 
Berryman was thus writing the poems for The Black Book in accordance with 
broad hermeneutic frameworks that were emerging in the postwar era. These 
interpretations of the Nazi period predate the more contemporary focus on Hitler’s 
regime as a social, bureaucratic and modernistic phenomenon which, following the 
Eichmann trial in 1961, was developed in such works as Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), 
Hannah Arendt’s controversial account of the trial, and Zygmunt Bauman’s Modernity 
and the Holocaust (1989). So, while on one level the narratives that Berryman and 
Hecht deploy seem to intimate a certain representative restraint - an inability or 
unwillingness to move beyond the tragedy of the individual to that of a people - these 
narratives actually derive from a cultural tradition which believed that the key to 
interpreting the Holocaust was the genocidal mentality of the individual. As such, the 
micro-narrative of psychological deviancy became a significant historiographical 
master-narrative of its time.  
What is impressive about Berryman, though, especially given the short amount 
of time which had lapsed between the Holocaust and his poetic response to it, is that he 
reflects critically on this master-narrative even as he employs it in his final stanza. A 
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pertinent change made to the register of his diction suggests that, above all, he 
understood the risk of luridness. In the earliest published version of the poem, that 
which appeared in Poetry, the second line of the last stanza had read ‘Cupshot, torn 
collar by a bitch unwilling’; when it was published in His Thoughts Made Pockets and 
the Plane Buckt, however, Berryman restored an earlier version of the line that dated 
back to his drafts, and changed the word ‘bitch’ to ‘girl’. The insult can clearly be 
attributed to the Nazi; but by making the change nonetheless, Berryman tempered the 
sort of cheap frisson that is an habitual offshoot of psycho-sexual interpretations of Nazi 
criminality, and avoided any association of male violence with female sexuality (an 
association which Sylvia Plath would provocatively explore in poems such as ‘Daddy’).  
It is also possible that a critical reflection on the very concept of a governing, 
explicatory master-narrative is in evidence in the last line of the poem, where the past 
tense time frame ensures that the poetic narrative is not passed off as a full historical 
explanation. Indeed, the line obdurately refuses any form of explanation whatsoever. In 
this way, Berryman ultimately seems to eschew a purely psychological understanding of 
historical atrocity, perhaps recognising that such explanations are themselves historical 
phenomena - above all, ones belonging to a contemporary world of comparative 
normality, making them unreliable tools with which to attempt to master the 
extraordinary historical crimes committed in even the outer circles of l’univers 
concentrationnaire. 
The interplay between literary narrative and history is a central concern of 
‘from The Black Book (ii)’. In the overblown and rhetorical second and third stanzas, 
even basic names, such as Boleslaus ‘surnamed the Good’, suggest an implicit critique 
of the relation between narrative and history, as the epithet (irrespective of its historical 
accuracy or inaccuracy) already implies the overlaying of a grand mythology onto the 
past - one which will eventually come to replace the past as it really was, in all its 
complexity and dynamism. The passage which refers to that which ‘Solomon sang’, in 
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the second stanza, subverts the standardised, canonical narratives to which it refers in 
name but not in content, replacing them with something more apocryphal. In doing so, 
the stanza suggests that the past is not reducible to a single stable narrative; instead we 
catch fragments of metaphysical wisdom as they pass, like shards of lost meaning. The 
second ‘day’ section comes as a stark stylistic contrast to the rest of the poem; the 
language is simpler, and Berryman uses a more comprehensible syntax; but by 
continuing to muddle his kings and palaces, Berryman extends something of the 
deranged logic of the earlier dream section into the latter part of the poem. The 
confused historical references suggest that nothing can be retrieved from the past in its 
full ‘presentness’; rather, the ‘nightmare of history’ - Joyce’s phrase perfectly 
encapsulates Berryman’s interest in the intermingling of psychology and history - is that 
the past is always buried beneath the narratives that we use to contain it, and, as such, it 
is always elsewhere, submerged in time and in consciousness. As a result, its return is 
always murky, disordered, and incomplete. 
If this is Berryman’s conception of historical return, then we might actually feel 
that by describing the Nazi’s murder of the Polish girl in the past tense, he intimates that 
the murder he portrays is inexplicable and radically unknowable - no more ‘real’ than 
‘Boleslaus the Good’, or the monument to Jan Sobieski at the Lazienki Gardens. In one 
sense, this is of course profoundly true, as this is, after all, a work of the imagination. 
However, this temporal shift, and the subsequent exaggeration of the gap between past 
and present, does not necessarily mean that Berryman questions the usefulness of this, 
or indeed any other, narrativisation of the Holocaust; for a stark counterpoint to this 
sense of obfuscation is made through the simple, anti-poetic style of the final stanza. 
Through a marked shift in representational technique, he challenges his own aesthetic of 
disorientation and confusion and nightmare - or at least questions the central implication 
of this aesthetic, which is that when the past is narrated it is always other than itself; 
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because here Berryman’s language and style suggest that he has hit upon some kind of 
truth.  
This stylistic production of an hermeneutic effect is brought about when 
Berryman’s writing, like Hecht’s in ‘“More Light! More Light!”’, becomes, to use Berel 
Lang’s terms, ‘historical’, rather than ‘imaginative’, in character. Lang has argued that 
historical discourse, by definition, ‘stands in a direct relation to its object’, claiming that 
its representative coherence is safeguarded by the Holocaust: ‘the fact of the Nazi 
genocide is a crux that separates historical discourse from the process of imaginative 
representation and its figurative space’.146 Yet Berryman’s poem suggests the opposite; 
for historical discourse is what enables the poet to prise open a ‘figurative space’. For 
Berryman, this is not a glib appropriation of documentary authority: he is not simply 
equating his own writing with historical accounts, or claiming a similar authenticity. 
The last stanza of the poem is, for the most part, still obviously poeticised: it uses a 
slightly odd syntax, eye-rhyme (‘debauch’ and ‘couch’), and its diction includes 
neologism (‘Cupshot’). Even the last line of the poem, which most closely resembles 
historical discourse, reflects the fact that it is a self-conscious dramatisation (or parody) 
of an historical style of writing through the use of the ampersand - a signature mark of 
Berryman’s mature style.147 This approximation to historical discourse is, however, a 
necessary subterfuge for a poem which uses fictional techniques to document an 
historical truth: that the individual murders in a genocide tend to take place ‘outside 
history’, unwitnessed and unwritten. By salvaging ‘historical’ forms of discourse from 
the ruins of speech through what remains a ‘process of imaginative representation’, the 
poet of proxy-witness retrieves invented memories from the ruins of the past, ensuring 
that consciousness of the outside of history is interred inside literature. 
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‘the will’ and ‘waiting’ 
 
The selection of poems from The Black Book that Berryman included in His Thoughts 
Made Pockets & The Plane Buckt in 1958 does not feature two poems that were written 
for The Black Book and published in Poetry magazine eight years earlier. These poems, 
‘the will’ and ‘waiting’ (none of the titles of the poems from The Black Book that 
appeared in Poetry were capitalised), have consequently been omitted from editions of 
Berryman’s Collected Poems. The discarding of these works would seem to suggest that 
Berryman had either decided to remove them from The Black Book altogether, or, more 
likely (given the publication dates), that he felt that they were no longer the strongest 
representatives of a volume he had anyhow decided to abandon. Yet the rejection of this 
pair of poems in many ways makes them highly representative of a project whose 
significance is arguably to be found as much in its overall conceptual failure as in its 
limited individual successes. These poems are certainly more typical of Berryman’s 
labour on the collection as a whole than those completed poems that were published in 
His Thoughts Made Pockets & The Plane Buckt, which, after several years of 
researching and writing about the Holocaust, numbered just three. 
 Both ‘the will’ and ‘waiting’ are short narrative poems told in the first person, 
and both offer brief character studies of individuals who have to face up to, and then in 
some way overcome, their fates as Holocaust victims. In ‘the will’ the narrator describes 
how a concentration camp prisoner, a ‘frail vague man’, takes his own life by 
electrocuting himself on the perimeter fence.
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 This act is not, however, portrayed as 
despairing, or even wholly bleak, as the man is able to reclaim control over his own life 
through his suicide: by killing himself, the prisoner asserts his right to live and die in the 
manner of his own choosing. So while the poem begins by recounting that the inmate 
had begun to ‘whisper with himself/ At line-up, from the rear’, it ends by describing 
how ‘well beyond fear,/ He suddenly sang, sang, hanging on the wire’. In the second 
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poem, ‘waiting’, another prisoner prepares himself for some form of interrogation that 
he fears will involve torture, possibly through electrocution. As he contemplates the 
pain that he is about to experience, he struggles to establish a sense of his own reality, 
reflecting: ‘Than tissue & ash/ I am more indistinct’.149 Eventually, however, he seems 
able to theorise an approach to his fate that will allow him to transcend the pain that is 
to be inflicted on his body. The monologue ends with tentative resolve: ‘I am almost 
ready’.  
As the titles imply, in these poems the Holocaust becomes the setting for an 
interrogation of abstract philosophical concepts, such as identity and the self, providing 
an extreme historical context for densely imagined meditations on the ways in which the 
individual might resist political oppression and overcome suffering. In particular, the 
Holocaust experience seems to be used as a test-case for the major tenets of 
existentialist philosophy, especially as outlined by Albert Camus in such works as 
L’Etranger (The Outsider, 1942) and Le Mythe de Sisyphe (The Myth of Sisyphus, 
1942), in which the absurdity of the human condition, the imperative to revolt against 
this, and the need for the individual to create his or her own meanings in an 
overwhelmingly meaningless universe, are central themes. These two poems imply that 
the eternal nothingness of the existentialist outlook found its most extreme expression in 
the Nazi concentration camps; a contention that would appear to reflect the opinion of 
Camus himself, who is said to have told Elie Wiesel: ‘I envy you for Auschwitz.’ 
Wiesel has commented: ‘Camus could not forgive himself for not knowing that majestic 
event, that mystery of mysteries.’150 
In the version of ‘the will’ printed in Poetry, a sestet is followed by a second 
stanza of twelve lines; yet in all drafts the poem is printed as three sestets, suggesting a 
possible misprint in Poetry. The poem was most likely structured as follows: 
 
A frail vague man, in whom our senses ached 
With nothing, began to whisper with himself 
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At line-up, from the rear,  
We trembled for him,  shook the scald that caked 
His skull, totting up phantoms that none could solve, 
Fag-end of a career. 
 
(Shadowless in a cairn, four lights. Farewell, 
 The legacy trots off, 
 A swimming moment of the stiff’s desire 
 Such decades since. Or nothing trots to tell 
 Intestate once with love 
 Pain brain stood up a bit out of time’s mire.) 
 
He scrambled one night out 
 And dodged between their lights far to the wire, 
 Where he lodged. I suppose he crisped, dying in fire; 
 A shot or so, a shout; 
 But certainly, lifting our scalps, well beyond fear, 
 He suddenly sang, sang, hanging on the wire. 
 
The narrative begins with a description of a man who appears to be turning rapidly into 
one of the nameless, faceless Muselmnner described by Levi in If This Is a Man 
(1958). In his autobiographical account of his imprisonment in Auschwitz, Levi recalls 
how those he termed ‘the drowned’ formed ‘an anonymous mass, continually renewed 
and always identical, of non-men who march and labour in silence, the divine spark 
dead within them, already too empty to really suffer’.151 Similarly, the concerned 
narrator of ‘the will’ describes how a man on the bottom is becoming lost to him, to his 
fellow prisoners, and also to himself. Unlike Levi’s Muselmnner, however, the 
drowned man of Berryman’s poem stands apart from the collective body of prisoners: it 
is the isolated individual, rather than the broad mass of men, who seems doomed. The 
use of the first person plural emphasises the fact that the majority of prisoners are in a 
significantly better state than this man who they ‘tremble for’, whilst also perhaps 
lending a particularly Jewish sense of inclusiveness to the narration (as was also the 
case in ‘from The Black Book (i)’ and ‘Rising Hymn’). The victim’s Jewishness is also 
suggested by the scald that he has on his head, where a skullcap might otherwise be: a 
symbol of religious observance is here hideously transformed into a mark of physical 
pain. 
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 It is very difficult to understand quite why, following this opening, Berryman 
bisects the poem’s main narrative, which charts the victim’s reclamation of his identity, 
and his rediscovery of himself as a volitional human being, with a hugely ambiguous 
stanza that he places in parentheses. Not only does it appear to be completely unrelated 
to the action of the poem; it is virtually impossible to say with any assurance quite what 
it relates to full stop. The reference to the ‘four lights’ that are ‘Shadowless in a cairn’ 
could perhaps be taken as an allusion to Plato’s ‘Allegory of the Cave’.152 If this is the 
case, then the stanza could perhaps be read as a criticism of Plato’s transcendentalism, 
as the explanatory logic of his parable - where knowledge is gained by tracing the 
appearance of shadows to their true cause, the sun - is negated: the ‘lights’ have become 
‘shadowless’. It is possible that this subversion of philosophical tradition is being 
conceived of as an after-effect of the Holocaust itself, and this might, in turn, link to the 
way that ‘the legacy trots off’: the metaphysical dualism advanced by Plato, who 
described how idealised ‘forms’ exist beyond the outward appearance of objects, has 
become untenable in the face of meaningless atrocity. The Polish writer Tadeusz 
Borowski made this exact point in a letter to his fiancée when they were both 
imprisoned in Auschwitz: ‘You know how much I used to like Plato. Today I realise he 
lied. For the things of this world are not a reflection of the ideal, but a product of human 
sweat, blood and hard labour.’153 Randall Jarrell makes a parallel critique of Platonic 
dualism in his poem ‘In the Camp There Was One Alive’, whose contemporaneity to, 
and similarities with, poems from The Black Book were noted in my reading of ‘Rising 
Hymn’. In Jarrell’s poem, however, the reference and implications are rather more 
obvious; he describes how ‘The child, in his charred cave,/ Watches the shaking fire’, 
but goes on to show how the Platonic celebration of philosophical wisdom is absolutely 
discontinuous with the situation of a dying child who ‘understands/ Nothing’. The 
reader of Berryman’s poem, on the other hand, is left to flounder in a stream of far more 
abstract negativity. This parenthetical stanza forms a kind of hermeneutic black hole in 
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which we find an obscure representation of leave-taking, before we scramble out, along 
with the ‘frail vague man’ himself, into the concluding section of the poem, leaving 
‘time’s mire’ and moving into the more comprehensible continuum of narrative. 
The first four lines of the final stanza are marked by a degree of perceptual 
uncertainty - ‘I suppose he crisped’, ‘A shot or so’ - but this resolves in the final 
couplet, with the narrator’s observation that ‘certainly’ the man ‘sang, sang, hanging on 
the wire’. The hideous death song finds a sonic analogue in the stark internal rhymes 
and assonantal end rhymes (‘out’ and ‘shout’, ‘wire’ and ‘fire’) of the poet’s own 
singing, and this link to the authorship of the poem perhaps reflects Berryman’s overall 
celebration of self-determination, whereby the suicide asserts his right to be the ‘author’ 
of his own destiny. The only way that he is able to transcend his condition, and move 
‘well beyond fear’, is by discovering (or rediscovering) his own will; the ultimate 
expression of that discovery is his decision to take his own life, rather than allowing it 
to be taken from him. It is, as Martin Amis puts it in his Afterword to Time’s Arrow 
(1991), with reference to the death of Primo Levi, ‘an act that asserts something like: 
My life is mine and mine alone to take’.154 
In this poem, Berryman uses the prisoner’s suicide as a means through which to 
discuss ontological questions and existential anxieties that were not solely limited to, or 
brought about by, life in the camps (but which conditions in the camps perhaps drew 
into much sharper focus). The suicide enables him to discuss a struggle for life that 
takes place internally in individuals who have never been anywhere near a concentration 
camp; the very title of the poem suggests that its main focus is on ‘the will’ as a 
universal aspect of human identity, and not on the particular restraints placed on it by 
Nazism. The poem ‘waiting’ is also a poem of generalisation and identification, 
exploring unchanging existential dilemmas by way of the heightened forms of terror 
inflicted on humanity during the Nazi era. If anything, ‘waiting’ moves even further 
away from a conception of the Holocaust as a unique event whose significance is 
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strictly limited to those individuals who were directly involved in it; indeed there is very 
little in the poem’s narrative that directly connects it with the Nazi genocide, other than 
its association with The Black Book sequence. Berryman’s concern is with the situation 
of all individuals who suffered persecution under the totalitarian regimes of the 
twentieth century; the poem’s fictional brethren are thus George Orwell’s 1984 (1949) 
and Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon (1940) and Arrival and Departure (1943), 
rather than a more historically specific and factually-orientated body of Holocaust 
literature. Yet in this, ‘waiting’ is, along with the work of Orwell and Koestler, very 
much of its time, as it is fairly representative of social and political responses to Nazism 
during the 1940s. As cultural commentators such as Peter Novick have outlined, early 
‘lessons’ that were drawn from the Holocaust tended to stress the need to oppose all 
forms of totalitarianism through a kind of precautionary generalisation. It was only later, 
after the Cold War, that a greater cultural sensitivity to ethnicity meant that the 
Jewishness of the victims came to be considered its most salient feature, and the lessons 
of the Holocaust were reformulated in terms of the dangers of genocidal antisemitism.
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Berryman had written a very similar poem to ‘waiting’ a few years earlier, ‘The 
Song of the Tortured Girl’, which forms part of the cycle of ‘Nervous Songs’ published 
in The Dispossessed (1948). The poem is narrated by a girl who is imprisoned and 
tortured by faceless persecutors who lack any form of personal or group identity. She 
doesn’t know why she is there, what they want from her, or even what has happened to 
her:  
 
The ceiling of that place was high 
And there were sudden noises, which I made. 
I must have stayed there a long time today: 
My cup of soup was gone when they brought me back.
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A division between the narrator’s written self and the experiential self that is subjected 
to torture is also found in ‘waiting’, in which another nervous narrator loses their sense 
of their own reality, this time as they await interrogation: 
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Nearer, my heart, to me … My cigarette 
Endures an apotheosis; I feel 
More for the grey twirl than I mull or whet 
God’s promise … probably the butt is real. 
  
Now I seem less so. Than tissue & ash 
I am more indistinct, than fire and weed 
Yielding to fire, as fire to the weed’s trash: 
Do pins & feathers kill? Can a root bleed? 
 
Master my heart will nothing to my side? 
Otherwhere, neither broods nor aches for me 
Regitive by the iron door unterrified 
Foully it leans. That hole, my mystery, 
 
Which once its bolt, the muscle of their State, 
Opened to drop me in, cannot keep shut! 
Lancet intensities I anticipate! 
Feathery movement twires about my thought! 
 
The frontier posts, disfigured sphincters, spill 
Invaders home; heart through the ribs returns; 
How corn & wine return, transfigured, fill 
Sleepy lands, our land. Ice on my brow burns, 
 
Ebbing, blackfellow-dull, when the bolt shoots 
Over the tigerish flood may I soar steady 
Whither the latched starless & heartless roots 
O need blindly night. I am almost ready  
 
 As the narrative develops, the disintegration of the self, and of distinct categories such 
as inner and outer worlds, past and present, becomes so extreme that the speaker does 
not appear to have a concept of memory, or even of his or her own guilt or innocence. 
The fragmented style of the narrative reflects this temporal and ontological dissolution; 
in its style, the poem has much more in common with the abstract imagery and 
undefined menace of the middle stanza of ‘the will’ than with that poem’s more 
transparent first and third stanzas. 
In the first stanza, the world of physical sensation becomes enmeshed with 
theological texts and values: the first line parodies Sarah F. Adams’s hymn ‘Nearer, my 
God, to Thee’, and the narrator’s cigarette is attributed with such metaphysical 
importance (or unimportance) that the act of smoking it becomes a profane parody of 
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the Last Supper. Christianity is in fact roundly debased as a belief system: the cigarette 
itself ‘endures an apotheosis’, and is thus raised to the status of a divine object, leading 
the prisoner to ‘feel more’ for the smoke of his or her cigarette than he or she does for 
‘God’s promise’. The cigarette is also a phenomenological benchmark, the narrator 
contemplating how its butt seems to possess a greater weight of reality than he or she 
does. Indeed, he or she is much more like the tobacco: ‘indistinct’ and eminently 
combustible. The ensuing sequence, in the first three lines of the second stanza, which 
suggests an exponentially increasing inflammability, emphasises the prisoner’s physical 
vulnerability; the references to ‘tissue & ash’ and ‘fire’ evoke the burning of bodies in 
the crematoria of the Nazi death camps. It is through this extreme suggestibility of very 
banal language that the narrative becomes, at least to a degree, historicised, as though 
language itself has been burdened by the Nazi epoch, having acquired layers of 
unwanted meaning - even an entire system of dire resonances. And so what would 
otherwise be relatively benign nature imagery, that of ‘roots’ and ‘weeds’, is here used 
to suggest the crimes of the Third Reich - specifically the Nazi’s horticultural approach 
to ethnicity and social engineering.  
Zygmunt Bauman has described how gardening and medicine were the two 
central paradigms for the Nazi conception of statehood: 
 
Human existence and cohabitation became objects of planning and 
administration; like garden vegetation or a living organism they could not be 
left to their own devices, lest they should be infested by weeds or overwhelmed 
by cancerous tissues. Gardening and medicine are functionally distinct forms of 
the same activity of separating and setting apart useful elements destined to live 
and thrive, from harmful and morbid ones, which ought to be exterminated.
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The prisoner in Berryman’s poem seems to see him- or herself in precisely these terms, 
as vegetal matter that will be destroyed by fire or cut from the earth, asking ‘Can a root 
bleed?’, though he or she struggles to envisage the real consequences of his or her own 
metaphorisation. The ‘pins’ and ‘feathers’ are the stuff of fiction (one might almost say 
of fantasy), and evoke the surreal, nightmarish paintings of the German artist Max 
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Beckmann who, in Bird’s Hell (1938), portrayed a brightly coloured bird-person cutting 
the back of a naked man who lies strapped to a wooden table, while in the background a 
crowd of freakish bird figures makes the Nazi salute. 
In the third and fourth stanzas, Berryman’s eccentric, stylised narration 
describes the prisoner’s predicament in terms of a Kafkaesque situation of entrapment; 
he or she seems to be locked in a prison building as a result of some indecipherable state 
process, awaiting a mechanised form of bodily punishment. In this expectation of his or 
her own elaborate vivisection, the narrator resembles a cross between the bewildered 
Joseph K in The Trial (1925) and the condemned man in In the Penal Colony (1919). A 
solitary individual, he or she becomes the target of an unwieldy authoritarian state 
apparatus. As the judgement of that muscular ‘State’ becomes imminent, the narrator 
begins to lose his or her mind, and their sense of the reality of an already precarious 
situation diminishes. Again the poem has parallels with ‘The Song of the Tortured Girl’, 
whose narrator finds herself in a situation of total disorientation, with her bafflement 
also testifying to the extreme illogicality of torture: ‘I no longer remember what they 
want.’ 
In ‘waiting’, because the narrative is so underdeveloped and the scene so 
minimalist, the narrator’s condition of agonised expectation is made to seem 
representative of all people who, condemned to die, but never knowing exactly where or 
when, must serve their life sentences in a cold and hostile universe (and this is, of 
course, how many read Kafka: as a chronicler of humankind’s unchanging condition). In 
this respect, the poem resembles ‘the will’, as Berryman again finds in the Holocaust 
experience a telling reflection of man’s general affliction; yet while the narrator’s 
situation is metaphorical and representative, the poem’s diction is, as I mentioned, 
particularly resonant with the discourse of the Third Reich. The penultimate stanza 
might almost be said to constitute an anatomisation of the central figures and tropes 
used by the Nazi state to describe itself - particularly of the way that its governing 
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ideology of ‘blood and soil’ was founded on an Elizabethan notion of the nation as a 
human body. As Bauman points out, medicine and gardening were aspects of a singular 
metaphor that the Nazis used to rationalise their quest to sanitise Europe, aspiring to 
populate the land with a healthy and salubrious Herrenvolk that had rid itself of the 
disease-carrying Jewish bacillus. The description of invaders ‘spilling home’ might 
therefore constitute an ironic allusion to the great German retreats from the East that 
took place after the defeat at Stalingrad in January 1943, with military withdrawal being 
portrayed as a gigantic bodily retraction: the extreme outposts of the foreign campaigns 
are now ‘disfigured sphincters’ (to put it crudely, after expelling its shit the body of the 
Reich is left a crippled mess), while the ‘heart through the ribs returns’.  
Oddly enough, in this penultimate stanza the prisoner seems to describe the 
Nazi ideology represented by these biological schemas with something like nostalgia; 
there is a tone of lament as he or she tells of how the ‘heart’ and the ‘corn & wine’ that 
the Germans had intended to spread throughout the globe all return (although these 
human and arable ideals are now ‘transfigured’). The homeland is described almost 
tenderly; the country which the narrator still calls ‘our land’ is ‘sleepy’, like a hefty 
organism that has recently exhausted itself in the drive for lebensraum; although, by 
contrast, the prisoner him- or herself remains, to the end, in a state of intense nervous 
excitement. He or she is almost feverish, exclaiming ‘Ice on my brow burns’, and in the 
final stanza, religious, political and sexual language all fuse to create a climax in which 
the prisoner shoots and soars skyward in some form of internal flight ‘over the tigerish 
flood’. In a manner that recalls the syntactic drama of the poetry of Emily Dickinson, 
the final punctuation mark, a dash, suspends the narrative at this moment of agitated 
anticipation for prisoner and reader alike; action and meaning are delayed, placed 
beyond the terminus of the poem, ensuring that there is no end to the prisoner’s or the 
reader’s ‘waiting’. 
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‘from The Black Book (iii)’ 
 
The opaque imagery and narratives that we find in many of the poems written for The 
Black Book suggest that Berryman deliberately made use of a self-conscious aesthetic of 
anti-representation for the sequence: the poems - or sometimes just specific stanzas - are 
meant to describe something of the perceived meaninglessness of the Holocaust through 
their style. Through an occluded approach to their historical subject, they reflect the 
impossibility of drawing positive values and moral messages from the Nazi genocide, 
and the difficulty, or undesirability, of producing transparent poetic representations of 
the offence. However, the final poem from The Black Book included in His Thoughts 
Made Pockets & the Plane Buckt marks a clear departure from this anti-representational 
approach to the Holocaust. 
The poem, numbered ‘from The Black Book (iii)’, was largely written over a 
decade after Berryman first began work on The Black Book (a hand-written draft of the 
poem in the Minnesota archive includes the note ‘16 July ’58, largely remade’), which 
is to say several years after he seems to have given up hope of ever finishing the project, 
or at least in the grand form he had originally conceived.
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 Yet this is the only poem 
written for the collection in which Berryman makes unveiled reference to the most 
notorious features of the exterminatory process, particularly to the practice of mass 
killing in gas chambers. As the sequence finally reached what would seem to be the 
nadir of any journey into l’univers concentrationnaire, arriving at this point of absolute 
moral murk, Berryman’s language and style become as clear as anything in The Black 
Book: 
 
 Lover & child, a little sing. 
 From long-lockt cattle-cars who grope 
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 Who near a place of showers come 
 Foul no more, whose murmuring 
 Grows in a hiss of gas will clear them home: 
 Away from & toward me: a little soap, 
 Disrobing, Achtung! in a dirty hope, 
 They shuffle with their haircuts in to die. 
 Lift them an elegy, poor you & I, 
 Fair and strengthless as seafoam 
 Under a deserted sky.
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The poem takes us through the phases of an execution process that was experienced by 
millions of victims, and which became common knowledge as accounts of the genocide 
circulated in the postwar years. Most of the well-known features of the journey are here: 
the initial dehumanising voyage in cattle-cars to a death camp, disorientation on arrival, 
the shaving of the prisoners’ heads, undressing, and gas chambers disguised as shower 
rooms. This all too familiar narrative is, however, identifiably indebted to a specific 
primary source. The document in question is a report compiled from eyewitness 
accounts - given by both victims and persecutors - by Vassili Grossman, which outlines 
conditions in the death camp of Treblinka, and which was published in another Black 
Book - this one brought out just after the war - entitled The Black Book: The Nazi Crime 
Against the Jewish People (1946).
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Grossman’s narrative, like Berryman’s poem, charts the path to destruction 
trodden by the deportees, beginning with the moment when they arrived at the infamous 
fake station in Treblinka, and ending with their extermination in gas chambers. 
Grossman describes how, during the thirteen months that it was operational, Treblinka 
became a finely-oiled killing factory, a ‘conveyor belt execution block’, with each new 
train’s arrival designed to coincide with the so-called ‘liquidation’ of the previous batch 
of victims.
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 As soon as the prisoners got out of the cattle-cars they were led to a square 
near the station, where they were immediately forced to surrender their possessions. 
They were then escorted into the camp through a barbed-wire fence. The men were told 
to remain where they were, and the women were ordered to go and undress in a nearby 
barracks. Grossman continues: 
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And again the square resounded with the word: - Achtung! - Achtung! It is at 
such a moment that the peoples’ [sic] minds must be confused again; they must 
again be filled with hope, with rules of death given out as if they were rules of 
life. And the same voice shot out each word distinctly: 
   ‘Women and children are to take their shoes off at the entrance to the 
barracks. The stockings are to be put into the shoes. The children’s socks are to 
be placed in the sandals, in the little shoes and slippers. Be neat.’ 
   And then again: 
   ‘When going to the baths, take along your valuables, documents, money, a 
towel and soap … We repeat …’ 
   Inside of the women’s barracks there was a barber shop. The naked women 
were given hair cuts, and the wigs were taken from the old women. This death 
hair cut - according to the testimony of the barbers - convinced the women that 
they were being taken to the baths.
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The parallels between this passage in Grossman’s account and the sixth, seventh and 
eighth lines, in particular, of ‘from The Black Book (iii)’ are striking: Berryman’s 
description of prisoners disrobing as guards shout Achtung! at them, and then having 
their hair cut, before being led to the gas chambers while carrying bars of soap, all 
derives directly from Grossman’s report. Even the evocation of the prisoners’ desperate 
hope that they would not be killed can be traced to the testimonial document.  
We recall that Susan Gubar has theorised how verse is the ideal literary form for 
the practice of ‘proxy-witnessing’, whereby poets bear witness not to events themselves, 
but to the depositions of the victims. In ‘from The Black Book (ii)’ Berryman used 
fiction as a kind of recompense for the unavoidable lack of testimonial responses to 
singular events that could not be witnessed. This particular poem, however, with its 
evident dependence on Grossman’s text, engages with larger-scale events which have 
become known to us all. Gubar argues that poetry of this kind attempts to re-energise 
testimony through the ‘deliberate placement of words in lines that do not necessarily 
accord with syntactic breaks; the use of rhythm or rhyme; the compression of a plethora 
of details into fewer and therefore more charged terms and images; the reaching for 
analogies, albeit inadequate ones; the suppression of logical, narrative links’.163 I remain 
dubious of Gubar’s contention that, as a result of such stylistic adjustments, poetry is 
able to make documentary accounts ‘more palpably real’, as this seems to foreclose the 
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critical disjunction between historical reality and aesthetic representation that has 
formed the definitive agon of post-Holocaust poetics. However, it is certainly the case 
that our understanding of source material can be radically altered when a poet makes 
innovative use of the sorts of stylistic and formal techniques that Gubar draws attention 
to. For example, the dramatic and acoustic elements of poetry can give documentary 
material a greater sense of immediacy than it has in prose; the sound of poetry can also 
be used to create an emotional terrain for the action described in a lyric: in Berryman’s 
poem, the prisoners ‘shuffle’ to their deaths to the accompaniment of an elegiac iambic 
pentameter. Verse form also allows a writer to generate a more dynamic interplay of 
emphases; so when Berryman rhymes ‘soap’ with ‘hope’, he highlights the precise 
connection that the Nazis wanted the Jews to make. 
 Other than in the final couplet, almost all the figures and metaphors in the poem 
belong to the discourse and racial ideology of the Nazis themselves. As the victims 
leave the cattle-cars they are described as being ‘Foul no more’, Berryman here drawing 
attention to the Jews’ place in the Nazi mentality as tainted and socially undesirable 
Untermenschen, while also showing how this conception of the Jew became concretised 
through practices such as the use of cattle-trucks, where Jews were treated like animals 
(like fowl). The reference to the soap that prisoners were given to hold as they were led 
to their deaths, and the description of how the gas would ‘clear them home’, also 
emphasise the way that the Nazis would stage their antisemitic construction of the 
verminous, disease-carrying Jew with astonishing literalism. For the Nazis, killing was 
above all a matter of hygiene (Zyklon B was originally used as rat poison). In a subtle 
interiorisation of this Nazi metaphor, it is not the Jews themselves, however, but rather 
their desperate hope that they would not be killed, that Berryman emotively terms 
‘dirty’. 
It is not only what the formal elements of poetry add to documentary texts, by 
way of an altered focus gained through rhyme or rhythm or a fragmentation of narrative, 
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that can change a reader’s perception of that material: what poets leave out in their 
revisions of historical documents can be just as significant, and ‘from The Black Book 
(iii)’ is a very good example of a poet acting as an astute editor of primary material. 
Through his critical selectivity, Berryman draws out particular elements from the 
documentary source, and these take on an added resonance when placed in a shortened 
poetic form; it is this process of purposeful narrative abbreviation that allows Berryman 
to show how the metaphors and paradigms that the Nazis employed in their antisemitic 
diatribes were practically implemented during the genocide itself. Another key 
difference between Grossman’s prose report and Berryman’s poem is that any form of 
extended commentary on events is noticeably absent from the latter. In his report, 
Grossman expands on the barbers’ interpretation of why they thought they had to give 
victims the ‘death hair cut’ - they believed it was simply a way of convincing the 
victims that they were being taken to the baths - adding that the hair itself had economic 
value, and was sent back to Germany where it was used as raw material by the army and 
navy for such things as stuffing mattresses.
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 There is no explanatory or discursive 
equivalent in ‘from The Black Book (iii)’, and indeed a rumination on the economic and 
material uses that the Nazis made of the by-products gleaned from the destruction of 
human bodies would be improbable, almost impossible, given the limited space afforded 
by Berryman’s chosen eleven-line elegiac form. Rather than extended explanation of, or 
commentary on, events themselves, what we do get in Berryman’s poem, however, is a 
contemplation of the non-victim’s mode of relation to these events: a self-reflective 
consideration of encounter that is explored primarily through the writer’s control of 
poetic address.  
The poem begins with a characteristic piece of baby-talk: ‘Lover & child, a 
little sing.’ The phrase ‘a little sing’ seems to introduce a song, and is therefore 
presumably a reference to the poem itself; the suggestion is that the unidentified ‘Lover 
& child’ are its addressees. Given the content of the rest of the poem, this ‘Lover & 
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child’ could be victims of the Nazi genocide (the line evokes the Nazi practice of 
separating women and children from the men on entry to the camps, as described in 
Grossman’s report); and even if their identity is never made particularly clear, the 
possibility that the narrator might here be addressing the dead, along with the tenderly 
encoded private language used in the line, implies a certain narratorial intimacy. In the 
fifth and sixth lines the narrator then describes how the deaths of the Holocaust victims 
in the gas chambers ‘will clear them home:/ Away from & toward me’. The narrator’s 
relation to the victims is here conceived of in terms of a double movement, as though 
their passing away from the living somehow brings them closer to those they have left 
behind. The ambiguity of this relationship is reflected in the reference to a ‘home’, 
which has both domestic and theological connotations, leaving it unclear as to whether 
this double movement is a way of describing a relation to things past (their old lives 
together, perhaps), or if the dead are being conceived of as spirits whom the narrator 
hopes to join in the afterlife.  
This representation of simultaneous loss and contact, of immediate absence and 
premonitions of presence, could also be understood as a meditation on the role of the 
Holocaust poet: even a reflection on how Berryman conceived of his own personal 
relation to the murdered Jews whose deaths formed the subject of The Black Book. The 
ambiguous addressivity might figure the poet’s uncertain relation to historical women 
and children whom he feels compelled to write about, and yet with whom he fails to 
make complete poetic contact. In this context, it is significant that the relation between 
the narrator and his ‘lover’ has connotations of illegitimacy, even indecency, with the 
word ‘lover’ displacing the more normative ‘mother’. The suggestion is that the male 
poet is illicitly infatuated with his own grievous subject matter. 
If the poem follows an abiding trajectory of descent, plunging into the depths of 
history, into mass murder and the death camps, then the final three lines describe a 
reciprocal movement of ascent, hauling the subject-matter heavenward in a manner that 
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seems integrally bound to the production of the elegy itself. As the poem develops, its 
imagery lightens: scanning down the lines, the reader finds the diction becoming 
gradually more airy, with the weighty ‘long-lockt cattle-cars’, wrenched together with 
firm, brace-like hyphens, giving way to ethereal ‘seafoam’ and ‘sky’ in the final two 
lines. The poet wishes to ‘lift’ an elegy to the dead, and in a manner reminiscent of the 
call to flight in the opening couplet of ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’ - ‘Let us 
go then, you and I,/ When the evening is spread out against the sky’ - he seems to enjoin 
the reader to take part in this task.
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 It is almost as though poet and reader, ‘poor you & 
I’, have become involved in a Dantean partnership of guide and pupil; and as we come 
out on the other side of this Inferno we join together to tell our tale (and thus perform 
the requisite task of all those who journey into the underworld).  
The poem thus implicates the reader in the struggle to produce meaning - or, 
like a modern-day Atlas, to hold up meaning - after Treblinka. Yet our elegy, and our 
obligation to rise up as proxy-witnesses, is at the same time an impossibility, or at least 
a contradiction, not least because we find that there is nothing of any substance for us to 
hold on to. The unexpected lightness and vacuity of the imagery at the end of the poem 
confounds the traditional sense of the elegy as monolith; rather than lifting up 
monumental meaning, we find meaning itself floating away. Perhaps this relates to a 
trope established in poems such as ‘Rising Hymn’ and ‘from The Black Book (ii)’, 
which suggests that any narrative of ascent, when used in the Holocaust context, 
becomes inextricably linked to the ashes of the dead that rose into the sky through the 
chimneys of the crematoria. If so, then this final poem is characteristic of the way that 
Berryman links the taintedness of schemas of ascent to theology, here describing how 
the sky is ‘deserted’, void of elegiac commemoration and consolation and also God after 
the tremendum of the genocide.
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 Allusions to Eliot and also to Emily Bront (whose 
early poem ‘Stars’ has a first stanza ending: ‘Have you departed, every one,/ And left a 
desert sky?’) further suggest the difficulty of writing a Holocaust poem as weighty and 
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unprecedented as the crime it seeks to portray, leaving the poetic tradition to 
acknowledge its own abject insufficiency, its inability to reconfigure itself absolutely, in 
light of the disaster.
167
  
The lightness of the past becomes the heaviest of burdens in a poem in which 
reader and writer are categorically unable (or unqualified) to lift even an increasingly 
flimsy-seeming elegy; we are ‘fair & strengthless’, with our fine Aryan heads of hair 
(the fact that the implied reader is ‘fair’ means that in all likelihood he or she never 
could have been a victim, but could have quite possibly been a perpetrator) making our 
attempt to raise an elegy to victims whose heads were shaved seem like an incongruous, 
almost obscene sort of enterprise. The gap between the two key duos of the poem - the 
historical ‘Lover & child’ on the one hand, and ‘you & I’ in the present, on the other - 
widens, and the only simile of the poem, the comparison of the ‘Fair and strengthless’ 
dyad of reader and writer to ‘seafoam’, confirms our ineptitude, our elegiac labour 
merely washing around the outermost fringes of a vast, oceanic crime. The allusion to 
the birth of Aphrodite, who rose from the foam of the sea, again figures the poet’s 
obsession with history as a dubious kind of love affair, or worse: the way the word 
‘foam’ harks back to the ‘soap’ that the prisoners were made to carry to the gas now 
makes this attraction seem almost necrophilic.  
The image of ‘seafoam’ also brings to mind, once more, the writings of Primo 
Levi, and in particular his description, in The Drowned and the Saved (1986), of how, 
even after the war, the victims were overcome by the ‘memory of the offence’: ‘The 
ocean of pain, past and present, surrounded us, and its level rose from year to year until 
it almost submerged us.’168 In contrast, Berryman imagines a union between writer and 
reader which clearly presupposes that neither partner was there. We remember nothing 
and, as a result, we can only ever skim the surface of an ‘ocean of pain’ whose awesome 
depths remain hidden from us. The very fact that we have never descended in the way 
that Levi describes means that neither can we take it upon ourselves to represent any 
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kind of ascent from the depths of history, thus forestalling the elegy’s implicit promise 
of imaginative resurrection. For Berryman, ‘you & I’ remain the uninitiated: those who 
must act as the witnesses to the witnesses, yet who must continually falter in our 
attempts to lift them a befitting elegy of permanence. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The handful of published poems from The Black Book represents a fraction of the forty-
two sections that Berryman had originally planned to write; yet the voluminous notes 
and drafts that he made for the sequence, along with miscellaneous fragments from 
incomplete or rejected poems, offer tantalising clues about what other material might 
have been included.
169
 In one hand-written draft, a motorcade heads towards a 
concentration camp: 
    
South thro’ unwintering boroughs the big cars glide 
Foreign & swift; officials snug inside; 
A tinkle from a foreign orchestra 
Startles the Polish fields. Until these arrive, 
The ceremonial fires delay, 
Eight thousand bodies are & are alive. 
 
Another hand-written lyric portrays ‘the crematorium at Maidanek’: 
 
 So many bodies in a breathless space 
 To dust & air! Your bloody body burns 
 Three to an hour, save the bigger bones, 
 Haircuts have saved the hair. 
 
The published poems and drafts also seem to map out a provisional structure for The 
Black Book, suggesting that it might have mirrored the actual chronology of the ‘Final 
Solution’: the first poem describes the death of a ‘grandfather’ in the period before the 
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Nazi purges had reached their worst; the next involves a central precursor to the 
destruction, the establishment of Jewish Ghettos, and the murder of a single woman in 
Nazi-occupied Warsaw; ‘Rising Hymn’ and ‘the will’ are then set in labour camps; 
finally, the death camps and industrialised mass murder form the subject of ‘from The 
Black Book (iii)’. A sort of master-narrative does emerge, then, with Berryman moving 
deeper into the heart of the extermination process, tracing a gradual descent as he passes 
through the worsening circles of an historical Inferno. However, his problem wasn’t so 
much thinking up a master-narrative as confronting the kind of meanings that a master-
narrative might yield. 
George Steiner has famously claimed: ‘The world of Auschwitz lies outside 
speech as it lies outside reason. To speak of the unspeakable is to risk the survivance 
[sic] of language as creator of humane, rational truth.’170 Berryman’s Holocaust 
sequence suggests that after Auschwitz the survival of a rational language is not a risk 
but a necessity, and that language itself, and also certain narrative structures (such as 
religious schemas of ascent and descent) have become even more redolent with meaning 
(albeit with catastrophically inverted meaning) than ever before. Berryman’s drafts 
reveal that, at least on occasions, he aimed to write ‘v. elaborate + rich + “obscure” 
stanzas’ (though the inverted commas around the word ‘obscure’ suggests a distrust of 
the word, or a conviction that these so-called obscure stanzas of his are really not all 
that obscure); but he also attempts to overcome obscurity, ‘to speak of the 
unspeakable’.171 A central feature of both The Black Book sequence as a whole, and of 
individual poems - most notably ‘from The Black Book (ii) - is that as their subject 
matter becomes increasingly horrific, their style grows more perspicuous. However, the 
poems also, of necessity, confront the limits of Holocaust representation, and face up to 
the difficulty, even the undesirability, of depicting certain events, and of adopting 
overarching explicatory models. While they do not wholly concur with Steiner’s 
assessment that Auschwitz lies ‘outside speech’, in drawing attention to their own inner 
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silences, they do anticipate what Adorno would diagnose in his 1965 essay 
‘Commitment’ as art’s situation of permanent, disabling paradox after Auschwitz. 
‘Commitment’ was one of the first critical works to draw out the conflict 
between aesthetics and ethics that exists in any work of Holocaust representation, and it 
continues to inform theoretical approaches to the subject to this day. In this essay, 
Adorno observes that any aesthetic reproduction of ‘the unthinkable fate’ of the victims 
risks turning that alien experience into something potentially gratifying, with the result 
that ‘it is transfigured, something of its horror is removed’.172 Yet equally, he argues, art 
cannot not confront this past: the same suffering that calls into question art’s right to 
exist also ‘tolerates no forgetting’, and therefore ‘demands the continued existence of 
art while it prohibits it’.173 Revisiting the often misquoted and critically misappropriated 
‘saying’ from his earlier essay ‘Cultural Criticism and Society’ (1951) that ‘to write 
lyric poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric’, Adorno upholds the poet Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger’s retort - that literature must ‘resist this verdict’.174 In identifying this 
aporia at the heart of literature’s confrontation with real suffering, ‘Commitment’ seems 
to call for a self-scrutinising and morally scrupulous form of representation (identifiably 
post-modernist, if not fully postmodern) which would work negatively, aspiring to 
document its own impossible position. Berryman’s The Black Book can be regarded as 
an early indicator of the possibilities and the limitations inherent in such a vision of 
poetry after Auschwitz, being both driven and stalled by the antagonistic ethical 
imperatives which arise once historical atrocity comes into contact with aesthetic 
design. 
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2 
Critical Distance: 
Sylvia Plath and the Holocaust 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The poems that are collected in Sylvia Plath’s Ariel (1965), and the so-called ‘late’ 
poems that she wrote between the winter of 1962 and her death in February 1963, are 
almost obsessively preoccupied with things past. In an interview with Peter Orr in 
October 1962, Plath remarked: 
 
I am not a historian, but I find myself being more and more fascinated by 
history and now I find myself reading more and more about history. I am very 
interested in Napoleon, at the present: I’m very interested in battles, in wars, in 
Gallipoli, the First World War and so on, and I think that as I age I am 
becoming more and more historical.
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However, Plath’s self-confessed ‘fascination’ with history was not, in the main, taken 
seriously by literary critics in the years following the publication of her most important 
work, a central assumption being that her exploration of her personal past somehow 
rendered her unable to offer any real insight into ‘History’ proper. The legitimacy of her 
representation of historical events was routinely called into question by those who 
argued that in her work Plath only used them - and in particular historical atrocities, 
such as the Holocaust - as figures for her own internal pain. In her essay ‘The Death 
Throes of Romanticism’, Joyce Carol Oates made what would become an archetypal 
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criticism of Plath’s historical imagination, when, with reference to ‘Daddy’, she wrote: 
‘Plath exhibits only the most remote (and rhetorical) sympathy with other people. If she 
tells us she may be a bit of a “Jew,” it is only to define herself, her sorrows, and not to 
involve our sympathies for the Jews of recent European history.’176 Plath’s subject 
matter, according to Oates, is her inner life, and not the historical events which she 
references. Similarly, James E. Young has argued that Plath ‘is not a Holocaust poet, 
simply because she does not write about the Holocaust. She writes about herself figured 
as a Holocaust Jew, among other contemporary images of suffering.’177 Even fellow 
poets, such as Seamus Heaney, have accused her of sensationalism and artistic 
indecorum: again it is ‘Daddy’, perhaps Plath’s most notorious poem, that proves 
unpalatable, Heaney observing that it is ‘so entangled in biographical circumstances and 
rampages so permissively in the history of other people’s sorrows that it simply 
overdraws its rights to our sympathy’.178 
In this chapter, through a series of close readings, I will attempt to identify the 
specific ways in which Plath’s Holocaust poetry engages with ‘other people’s sorrows’; 
but by way of introduction, I wish to take a brief look at the Ariel poem ‘Letter in 
November’, which offers an instructive starting point for any consideration of Plath’s 
representation of the past; for while it does not evoke any one specific historical event, 
it makes highly eccentric use of the central term in this debate: ‘history’. In a 
monologue which is identifiably set at Plath and Ted Hughes’s cottage home at North 
Tawton in Devon, but which is not reducible to straightforward biographical readings, 
the narrator walks through her garden feeling ‘stupidly happy’: 
 
This is my property. 
Two times a day 
I pace it, sniffing 
The barbarous holly with its viridian 
Scallops, pure iron, 
 
And the wall of old corpses. 
I love them. 
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I love them like history. 
The apples are golden, 
Imagine it 
   
My seventy trees 
 Holding their gold-ruddy balls 
In a thick gray death-soup.
179
 
 
It seems significant that the speaker loves the ‘wall of old corpses’ ‘like history’ (my 
emphasis), as one would assume that her love of the wall is already itself a love of 
history. Some sort of distinction is being made here: by using the word ‘history’ as a 
point of comparison, rather than as a synonym (Plath might have written: ‘I love them./ I 
love history’), or even as the object of a subordinate clause (‘I love them because I love 
history’, for example), the narrator effectively intimates that the dead and history are not 
one and the same thing. 
If we are to understand, then, quite what the speaker means by ‘history’, we 
must first try to grasp the exact nature of her love for the ‘wall of old corpses’ to which 
she compares it. Most strikingly, her insistence on her proprietary rights - it is her 
property and her trees - constitutes an attempt to confer legitimacy on her attachment to 
the wall. Such an emphasis on ownership might imply that the dead - or at least the 
narrator’s particular emotional connection to them - are being conceived of as a form of 
private property. This claim, however, is denaturalised within the poem itself, through 
the image of the (or rather her) golden apples. This image alludes to the Hesperides of 
Greek mythology, who guarded the orchard of golden apple-trees that was given to Hera 
by Mother Earth, and is also used to portray the speaker’s garden as a kind of Eden. Yet 
the description of the apples as ‘golden’ suggests that this is an artificial paradise: an 
artifice that links to the language of commercialism on which the speaker’s idea of the 
past as property is founded. The colour gold was a particular favourite of Plath’s, and it 
is used here, as in other poems from the Ariel and late periods (see, for example, my 
readings of ‘Lady Lazarus’ and ‘Mary’s Song’), to represent a love-object - specifically 
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a form of forbidden knowledge - that elicits both temptation and repulsion. This sense 
of taut psychological contradiction also inheres in the way that the garden is related to 
the human body: it is a thing to be ingested, but only as a form of sustenance that is 
potentially lethal (as golden apple or ‘death-soup’); and it is also highly sexualised, but 
only through the speaker’s strange ‘love’ of a wall of corpses that she appears to be 
‘sniffing’, and the slightly grotesque description of the inhuman trees ‘holding their 
gold-ruddy balls’. 
So if we are to understand how Plath’s speaker is conceptualising the past when 
she says that she loves the wall of corpses ‘like history’ - and we are directly exhorted 
to ‘imagine it’ (although the syntax and lack of clear elaboration leave it unclear as 
to exactly what we are supposed to imagine, perhaps suggesting that this a form of 
reality, or psychology, that exceeds the possibilities of clear literary representation) - 
then it follows that history in some way resembles her love of the corpses. And as this 
love - as private property, as sustenance, and as eroticism - is conflicted and ambiguous 
in almost every aspect, so too must her sense of history - which we might understand, in 
the light of Plath’s comments to Orr, as a scholarly interest in such things as Napoleon 
or the First World War - be conflicted. However, the dynamics of the simile - which 
introduces a corollary of likeness, as opposed to the metaphor’s more absolute mode of 
comparison - equally ensure that while the speaker’s love for the corpses is like history, 
they are not identical: a schism thus opens between her attitude to history, on the one 
hand, and her emotional bond with the wall on the other. Ultimately, history is not the 
same as her relation to the dead, who, in this poem, are not buried within the pages of 
literary chronicles: rather they are upright and vivified (it is easy to overlook the fact 
that her garden houses a wall not of statues or sarcophagi, but of corpses!), and their 
uncertain forms strangely encroach into the present, even as the speaker fails to find 
concrete terms to describe the way that she loves them. 
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In this complex simile, Plath examines how we, in the present, connect to a past 
which both attracts and repels us; she considers the ambiguous relation between the 
living and the dead, and the contemporaneity of past lives; and in her address to the 
reader (‘Imagine it’) she indicates the role that the imagination plays in creating 
links to the past through art. In this way, ‘Letter in November’ counteracts the stock 
allegation that Plath had no real interest in history other than as a direct metaphor for 
her personal suffering. Insisting on the interconnectedness of subject and object, past 
and present, while simultaneously dissociating the subjective and objective categories of 
knowledge which contribute to historical understanding, the poem suggests an approach 
to the more specific references to the Holocaust that I will be examining in this chapter - 
references which do not betray the inadequacy of Plath’s conception of history, but 
rather the inadequacy of the critical model (the poet’s use of private emotion as subject, 
and historical atrocity as rhetorical figure) on which criticisms such as Young’s and 
Oates’s are founded.  
 
 
‘The Dead Are in Possession of a Secret…’ 
 
Critical discourses which celebrated the psychological honesty of the ‘extremist’ poet, 
and which hypothesised a mirroring relation between self and world within the 
‘confessional’ lyric (see Introduction), were in part responsible for the way in which, for 
approximately a generation, from the mid 1960s to the 1980s, both positive and negative 
appraisals of Plath’s Holocaust poems were grounded in the assumption that she was 
making some form of direct correlation between her personal suffering and that of the 
victims of the genocide. George Steiner, for example, argued in his essay ‘Dying is an 
Art’ that in her Holocaust poems ‘Sylvia Plath became a woman being transported to 
Auschwitz on the death trains’. He continued: 
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In ‘Daddy’ she wrote one of the very few poems I know of in any language to 
come near the last horror. It achieves the classic act of generalisation, 
translating a private, obviously intolerable hurt into a code of plain statement, of 
instantaneously public images which concern us all. It is the ‘Guernica’ of 
modern poetry. 
180
  
 
Steiner’s positive assessment of Plath’s work reflected his belief that only a non-victim, 
such as Plath, could focus on the death camps ‘rationally and imaginatively’.181 For 
most, however, any suggestion of equivalence between Plath’s suffering and that of the 
women who actually were transported to Auschwitz on death trains was obscene. Irving 
Howe’s views - and tone - are fairly representative: 
 
Is it possible that the condition of the Jews in the camps can be duplicated? 
Yes…. But it is decidedly unlikely that it was duplicated in a middle-class 
family living in Wellesley, Massachusetts, even if it had a very bad daddy 
indeed. 
   To condone such a confusion is to delude ourselves as to the nature of our 
personal miseries and their relationship to - or relative magnitude when placed 
against - the most dreadful event in the history of mankind.
182
 
 
For critics such as Howe, there was a clear absence of any reasonable ‘objective 
correlative’ between the ‘personal miseries’ of a girl from Massachusetts and ‘the most 
dreadful event in the history of mankind’. As a result, Plath was widely accused of 
indulging in a form of Nazi fetishism which revealed little about the camps, but much 
about her own pathology. Writing about ‘Daddy’, Howe commented: ‘There is 
something monstrous, utterly disproportionate, when tangled emotions about one’s 
father are deliberately compared with the historical fate of the European Jews; 
something sad, if the comparison is made spontaneously.’183 Alvin Rosenfeld also 
doubted that Plath could ‘expose the atrocity of the age through exposing self-inflicted 
wounds’.184 
As well as reflecting the broad impact of theories of ‘confessionalism’, such 
criticisms owe much to a concurrent debate about the status of the Holocaust as a 
singular historical event (for Howe it was ‘the most dreadful event in the history of 
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mankind’, for Rosenfeld ‘the atrocity of the age’), and the proper place of that tragedy 
in art. When, in 1962, Plath wrote poems such as ‘Lady Lazarus’ and ‘Daddy’, survivor 
memoirs and testimonies (such as Anne Frank’s diary) were, after more than a decade of 
relative silence, beginning to appear in increasing quantities; the Eichmann trial had 
meant that eyewitness accounts of Nazi crimes were broadcast to an international 
audience for the first time; and a consensus began to develop among the American 
Jewish intelligentsia that the Holocaust belonged to - and was thus, in a sense, the 
intellectual property of - its victims. These cultural critics argued that the Holocaust 
defied imaginative or overtly ‘literary’ responses: only the victims themselves could 
ever describe with any authority what the event was ‘really like’. Consequently, in many 
critiques of Plath’s Holocaust verse, her identity as a non-victim caused more 
consternation than the actual content of the poems themselves: note how Howe 
sardonically draws attention to the fact that she was from a ‘middle-class family living 
in Wellesley, Massachusetts’. Steiner, apparently revising his earlier, positive 
assessment of Plath’s work, also asked: ‘does any writer, does any human being other 
than an actual survivor have the right to put on this death-rig?’185  
Elie Wiesel, a survivor of Auschwitz and Buchenwald, was (and remains) a 
hugely influential spokesperson for this anti-representational ethos, famously arguing in 
a 1986 interview that ‘any survivor has more to say than all the historians combined 
about what happened’.186 For Wiesel, the Holocaust constitutes a sacrarium that cannot 
be penetrated by those who were not there: 
 
Auschwitz cannot be explained nor can it be visualized […] The dead are in 
possession of a secret that we, the living, are neither worthy of nor capable of 
recovering […] The Holocaust [is] the ultimate event, the ultimate mystery, 
never to be comprehended or transmitted. Only those who were there know 
what it was; the others will never know.
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Arguing that the Holocaust was a singular historical cataclysm that is, by its very nature, 
irretrievable as a form of historical knowledge or discourse, Wiesel exemplifies what 
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Michael Rothberg has termed an ‘antirealist’ approach to the Holocaust.188 While one 
might assume that a ‘secret’ that cannot be transmitted might be forgotten, the sense of 
inscrutability that Wiesel evokes is in fact consistent with the innumerable attempts to 
‘explain’ and ‘visualise’ the Holocaust which have been made in recent decades by 
those who were not there: in art, as in life, mystification and fascination tend to go hand 
in hand (though this is not to say that these attempts at representation do not themselves 
constitute a kind of forgetting of the ‘secret’). Nonetheless, the perceived forcefulness 
of the antirealist position was broadly assented to by non-victims up to around the mid 
1960s. Before this point, very little serious fiction was written on the subject, and even 
Plath herself - writing seventeen years after the death camps were abandoned by the 
Nazis, and despite having apparently transgressed this very prohibition against non-
victim representation - remained hugely under the sway of the logic that her critics used 
against her. In her interview with Orr, given shortly after she had completed ‘Daddy’ 
and ‘Lady Lazarus’, Plath defended her right to represent events in Nazi Germany by 
simply stretching the definition of involvement: ‘my background is, may I say, German 
and Austrian. On one side I am a first generation American, on one side I’m second 
generation, and so my concern with concentration camps and so on is uniquely 
intense.’189 Plath legitimates her writing through a concept of lineage that figures the 
Nazi genocide as an inherited form of property: one accessible only to those raised 
within the confines of the (un)privileged group. The antirealist ethos advanced by 
writers such as Wiesel was not simply ignored or overthrown by Plath when she came to 
write her most contentious Holocaust poems: it remained an essential aspect of her 
historical poetics, even as - continuing a theme from ‘Letter in November’ - she 
questioned how much those with a proprietary stake in the past, be it small or large, 
could really hold on to. 
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Approaching the Subject 
 
The American version of Plath’s Journals was published in 1982, co-edited by Frances 
McCullough and Ted Hughes (Plath died intestate, and so Hughes became the executor 
of her literary estate). In her Editor’s Note, McCullough outlined the rationale behind 
the numerous cuts that had been made to the original material, explaining that omitted 
passages included ‘prospective poems and stories’, ‘ordinary commentary’, ‘devastating 
comments’, ‘intimacies’, and, rather comically, ‘nasty bits’.190 In this note, McCullough 
goes on to propose a specific framework through which to interpret the relation between 
fact and fiction in Plath’s writing:  
 
So here is not only her life […] but also the germs of most of her work. The 
interrelation is especially important in a writer whose work was so completely 
centered on her biographical details, though it’s important to understand that the 
autobiography doesn’t work in Plath as it does in the ‘confessional’ writers, but 
rather in a mythological sense - as can be seen most clearly in Judith Kroll’s 
critical study Chapters in a Mythology.
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The traditional understanding of the biographical origin of Plath’s verse is not contested 
- here we have ‘the germs of her work’ - but the uses to which she puts this material is. 
McCullough’s reference to Kroll’s ‘mythological’ reading of Plath’s work authorises an 
alternative approach to ‘confessionalism’, and two pages later, in his Foreword, 
McCullough’s co-editor, Ted Hughes, gives his interpretation of Plath’s private 
mythology, marking a key intervention in a growing debate that was, and remains, at the 
heart of Plath studies: that of how to read the poems.  
In this extraordinary piece of writing, Hughes claims that few people apart from 
himself were privileged enough to encounter Plath’s innermost self: ‘though I spent 
every day with her for six years […] I never saw her show her real self to anybody - 
except, perhaps, in the last three months of her life’.192 However, he then offers a quasi-
mystical account of Plath’s development as a poet that suggests that she did, ultimately, 
reveal that self to the world in the Ariel poems. He uses the metaphor of alchemy to 
 95 
describe how her early writings were ‘like impurities thrown off from the various stages 
of the inner transformation, by-products of the internal work’ until, eventually, her 
development was complete, and she wrote the verse that would make her name: ‘When 
a real self finds language, and manages to speak, it is surely a dazzling event - as Ariel 
was.’193  
By describing her poetry as a revelation of her ‘real self’, Hughes risked 
legitimating the sort of response to Plath’s verse that might more normally be reserved 
for an encounter with a real person - which is to say the kind of reading that had already 
led some Plath devotees to accuse Hughes, who had had an affair shortly before Plath’s 
death, of effectively murdering his wife. He thus qualifies his description of the absolute 
coming together of poet and poem by noting that in Ariel we see little of the ‘incidental 
detail’ or of the ‘crucial inner drama’ that produced the poems. Plath’s final poems are, 
for Hughes, the voice of her real self, but the psychology and circumstances that 
allowed for the gestation of that self remain concealed: ‘Maybe it is this very bareness 
of circumstantial detail that has excited the wilder fantasies projected by others in 
Sylvia Plath’s name.’194   
Here Hughes’s categories perhaps need unpacking, in particular his use of the 
term the ‘real self’, as his metaphysic goes beyond a simple opposition of true inner self 
and false social self. For Hughes, the concept of Plath’s real self is organically 
connected to the process of writing poetry; it is something more along the lines of what 
we might term an ‘authentic poetic voice’, only with the understanding that, for Hughes, 
the search for such a voice is an eminently spiritual affair. He notes that in his late wife 
there was ‘a craving to strip away everything from some ultimate intensity’ which he 
compares to ‘what one reads of Islamic fanatic lovers of God’.195 Throughout his 
account, Hughes figures Plath’s voyage of discovery towards her real self through a 
traditional religious paradigm: that of self-sacrifice. He describes how in Plath he 
perceived ‘something very primitive, perhaps very female, a readiness, even a need, to 
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sacrifice everything to the new birth’.196 While the positive outcome of this drive was 
the final poems of the Ariel period, Hughes adds (echoing Al Alvarez) that ‘the negative 
phase of it, logically, is suicide’.197 
More recent critical responses to Plath’s work have tended to question Hughes’s 
teleological narrative of a self-destructive female creativity. In The Haunting of Sylvia 
Plath (1991), Jacqueline Rose offers a reading of Plath grounded in post-structuralism 
and psychoanalytic theory, and challenges the idea of the ‘emergent female selfhood’ 
that one finds in the mythological schemas proposed by Hughes and Kroll.
198
 Rose’s 
objection to this concept is both hermeneutic - it imposes a false and damaging sense of 
consistency on Plath’s work - and linguistic, dependent as it is ‘on a specific, unitary 
conception of language as tending, like the subjectivity it embodies, towards the 
ultimate fulfilment of itself’.199 Rose notes that in another article, ‘Sylvia Plath and her 
Journals’, Hughes refers to the ‘objectivity of her [Plath’s] subjective mode’, describing 
how ‘the succession of images in “The Stones” […]  has to be given the status of 
fact’.200 She argues that by deploying such language, Hughes overlooks the multiplicity, 
uncertainty, and acceptance of conflict which, for her, are the predominant features of 
Plath’s writing, while also presenting an untenable form of interpretative 
authoritarianism: one that becomes particularly insidious when it ‘naturalises itself into 
the process of editing’.201 
In contrast to Alvarez’s and Hughes’s suggestion that the imagery in Plath’s late 
poems can be understood as psychological fact, Rose offers an approach to Plath and 
her writing, and also to its autobiographical origins, that stresses the importance of a 
concept of ‘fantasy’: 
 
It has been objected that writing on Plath is a fantasia with no purchase on, or 
even interest in, the truth. This book starts from the assumption that Plath is a 
fantasy. But, rather than seeing this as a problem, it asks what her writing, and 
responses to it, might reveal about fantasy as such. Far from being an obstacle, 
fantasy will appear in what follows as one of the key terms through which 
Plath’s writing, and responses to her writing, can be thought.202 
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Rose uses the term ‘fantasy’ both in its proper psychoanalytic sense - in relation to 
sexuality and desire - and also as a corrective to the rhetoric of literary and 
psychological factuality deployed by a largely male tradition of Plath criticism 
(although it could be argued that when Rose looks to Plath’s writing to ‘reveal’ its own 
constitutive fantasies, she presupposes that ‘fantasy’ has a knowable, factual origin 
beyond its literary representation: an argument which is paradoxical, depending as it 
does on a concept of ‘presence’ in the sign and in language, which is to say a formula 
that Rose constantly berates). 
Beyond her revision of the tradition of straightforward biographical criticism in 
Plath studies, Rose also takes issue with Plath’s supposed abuse of historical events 
such as the Holocaust, suggesting that those critical of her representation of historical 
suffering employ concepts of subjectivity and history without sufficiently accounting 
for the workings of fantasy in either term. She contends that the very separation of 
subjective and historical processes into oppositional phenomena (‘I’ being a subject 
which acts on an historical object) is erroneous, as our understanding of each concept 
must always be defined by, and limited to, the conditions of possibility provided by the 
other: 
 
There is no history outside its subjective realisation, its being-for-the-subject, 
just as there is no subjectivity uncoloured by the history to which it belongs. 
The division between history and subjectivity, between external and internal 
reality, between the trials of the world and the trials of the mind, is a false one. 
The distribution of opposites which has so relentlessly attached itself to Plath is 
the consequence of a false premiss, a false antagonism, from the start.
203
 
 
In arguing that subjectivity and history are interdependent, Rose upholds the very 
relativism that critics of Plath’s use of Holocaust metaphors, such as Howe and 
Rosenfeld, had distrusted. It was precisely these critics’ point that there was a very real 
difference between the ‘trials of the world and the trials of the mind’, between historical 
victimhood and that of the contemporary subject, and that the meaning of historical 
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experience was not limited to the subjective apprehension of it. Rose, on the other hand, 
disregards the existence of an historical ‘scene’ beyond or in excess of the subjective, or 
fantasised, relation to it.  
Rose’s pre-emptive retort to criticisms of her relativist conception of history is 
to argue that Plath’s writing constitutes a necessary revision of our understanding of the 
event, rather than an undermining of our belief in its objective occurrence. That it is a 
revision that we have been culturally unwilling to accept merely intimates that it is a 
‘deeper’, more challenging truth than any we had known before (here Rose’s conception 
of historical understanding self-consciously echoes Freud’s model of repression).204 In a 
chapter on ‘Daddy’, Rose suggests that the Holocaust can only be approached by way of 
the fantasies which underpin fascism. She contends (somewhat arguably) that ‘fascism 
is in fact one of the few historical moments which historians have generally recognised 
as needing psychoanalytic concepts of desire and identification in order for it to be fully 
understood’, and that ‘Daddy’ presents the contemporary reader with a whole series of 
‘fantasies which, at a precise historical moment and with devastating consequences, 
found themselves at the heart of our political life’.205 These fantasies, Rose suggests, 
were responsible for the development of complex interrelations between Jews and their 
Nazi persecutors.  
Plath would not have been the first writer to make such a claim. As I noted in 
the previous chapter, the idea of Jewish complicity (on a psychological level) with Nazi 
brutality had been put forward by Bruno Bettelheim, for example, in his study The 
Informed Heart (1961). Bettelheim describes how victim and executioner were 
inseparably linked in the dynamics of persecution, arguing that not only did the Nazis 
project their own undesirable tendencies onto a stereotyped picture of the Jew, but also 
that the victims, unable to externalise their resentment for fear of punishment, came to 
rationalise their situation by ‘accepting SS attitudes on the racial question’, with many 
prisoners developing ‘passive-masochistic’ personality traits as a result.206 The 
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traditional, acceptable understanding of the one way flow of intent within the dynamic 
of persecution, from the oppressor to the oppressed, is contentiously reformulated by 
Bettelheim, and Rose argues that Plath’s poem occupies similarly subversive 
psychological territory. For Rose, the traditional objection to Plath’s Holocaust 
representation - that she deals with material which she has no right, or indeed ability, to 
use - can be overturned if we start to see her writing as an act of moral daring, risking 
censure and misunderstanding in an attempt to give an unacceptably comprehensive 
picture of ‘the desire that should not speak its name’.207 
Rose acknowledges that her reading of ‘Daddy’ involves a conflation of 
‘psychic positions which, it is often argued, if they cannot be clearly distinguished, lead 
to the collapse of morality itself’.208 The exemplary expression of this counter-argument 
is found in Primo Levi’s The Drowned and the Saved (1986), in his chapter ‘The Grey 
Zone’ (this passage is a response to Liliana Cavani’s 1973 film The Night Porter): 
 
I am not an expert of the unconscious and the mind’s depths, but I do know that 
few people are experts in this sphere, and that these few are the most cautious; I 
do not know, and it does not much interest me to know, whether in my depths 
there lurks a murderer, but I do know that I was a guiltless victim and I was not 
a murderer. I know that the murderers existed, not only in Germany, and still 
exist, retired or on active duty, and that to confuse them with their victims is a 
moral disease or an aesthetic affectation or a sinister sign of complicity; above 
all, it is precious service rendered (intentionally or not) to the negators of 
truth.
209
 
 
Levi makes justice the ordering principle for any historical judgement (the language 
used in this passage is that of the courthouse: ‘murderer’, ‘guiltless victim’, ‘truth’), 
with the actual lived relation between victims and murderers ensuring that speculation 
on the inner life or ‘fantasies’ of the victims is either irrelevant (‘it does not much 
interest me to know’) or irreverent (‘a moral disease’). Rose’s reversal of this logic - by 
which inner reality supersedes historical occurrence, meaning that history does not exist 
beyond the subjective realisation of it - is therefore, by Levi’s definition, inherently 
unjust. Her reference to those who claim that a failure to distinguish between ‘psychic 
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positions’ can lead to the ‘collapse of morality itself’ consciously evokes Levi’s 
censorious paragraph (she cites The Drowned and the Saved in her bibliography); but 
her paraphrasing of the passage contains a significant terminological oversight, as 
Levi’s argument rests on the fact that moral collapse is brought about through the failure 
to distinguish between actual positions, not psychic ones.  
Rose’s work has transformed Plath criticism: her provocative chapter on 
‘Daddy’, in particular, paved the way for a necessary freeing of interpretation from rigid 
biographical schemas and mythological readings. However, the moral precepts evoked 
by Levi - in particular his differentiation between the historically ‘real’ and the 
‘psychological’ - are of central importance to Plath’s work, and ought not to be lost in 
what Janet Malcolm has memorably termed ‘Rose’s bazaar of postmodernist 
consciousness’.210 For while a poem such as ‘Daddy’ attempts to make certain 
psychological or historical insights, and indeed might, at times, even conflate the two 
categories (intimating, as Rose claims, something like the working of psychology in 
history), it constantly probes the validity - the justice even - of its own utterance, and, 
importantly, it retains a concept of historical truth. 
Rose also argues that the issue in Plath’s work is ‘not whether Plath has the 
right to represent the Holocaust, but what the presence of the Holocaust in her poetry 
unleashes, or obliges us to focus, about representation as such’.211 Yet while Plath’s 
verse is clearly very much concerned with the psychodynamics of representation, it is 
inconceivable that a Holocaust poem written in 1962 could ever divorce itself from the 
ongoing cultural debate about who had the right to write the Holocaust. Critical 
sensitivity to the genocide’s impact on the literary culture of the 1960s meant that the 
question of who was writing a text became inseparable from the question of what such 
texts could say about their historical subject. A poem written at this time was culturally 
obliged to validate itself, to vindicate itself, as art after Auschwitz. It had, of necessity, 
to argue its own existence into being. Consequently, a discourse about the legitimacy of 
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Holocaust representation by non-victims is deeply woven into the fabric of Plath’s 
verse. 
In contrast, then, to Rose’s understanding of Plath’s ‘moral daring’, I will 
consider how poems such as ‘Daddy’ incorporate a far more traditional set of moral 
imperatives into their representative logic, repeatedly upholding the antirealist position 
concerning the Holocaust’s supposed inviolability, and its tendency to induce linguistic 
and existential paralysis. For Plath, the meaning and significance of atrocities such as 
the Nazi genocide is never limited to their ‘subjective realisation’: the inadequacy of 
subjectivist approaches to historical experience is, I will argue, one of the recurring 
themes of her work (as is shown in ‘Letter in November’, in which the objective term 
‘history’ is internally divided, separated from the dead, and also from the living subject 
who attempts to grasp its significance). In poems such as ‘Daddy’, the Holocaust is 
represented as being both dependent on and irreconcilable with contemporary 
experience: it is made available as an object of knowledge through its being-for-the-
subject (which of course, as Rose suggests, would normally make it an inescapably 
relative concept); but at the same time, as a writer such as Levi was always at pains to 
point out, historical truth is shown never to be wholly reliant on, or contingent with, the 
subjective apprehension of it. 
 
 
 
‘Daddy’ 
 
A rough synopsis of the narrative of ‘Daddy’ might read as follows: a female narrator, 
who has lived in a black shoe for thirty years, kills her father, even though he is already 
dead. She says that she has previously searched for him in Germany and Poland, and 
though she did not find him, the German language transported her to the Nazi 
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concentration camps, and she began to foster a sense of kinship with the murdered Jews. 
She then looks at a photograph that she has of her father standing by a blackboard, in 
which he is a satanic figure. She recalls that she was ten when he died, and that when 
she was twenty she tried, but failed, to commit suicide. Some time after that she made a 
model of her father, married it, and killed a vampire, who both was and was not him. 
Finally, some unnamed villagers dance and stamp on the dead patriarch. 
This is, of course, a massively over-simplified outline of the poem’s narrative; 
but it reveals enough of its psychological, temporal and structural artfulness (and 
oddness) to cast doubt on any suggestion that in it Plath simply equates her own mental 
torment with the suffering of the Jews. As Christina Britzolakis notes: ‘The elements of 
caricature, parody, and hyperbole in “Daddy” are so blatant that only a very determined 
misreading could identify the speaker with the biographical Sylvia Plath.’212 The poem 
lacks even the most basic forms of autobiographical reference (Plath’s father, Otto, was 
a German-born teacher who died when Plath was young, and she did try to commit 
suicide during her adolescence, but that is about all), and to equate the author with the 
narrator presupposes a unified and personalised symbolic schema (of the Otto Plath = 
Nazi; Ted Hughes = vampire variety ) that the poem itself does much to destabilise. 
 ‘Daddy’ begins with a surreal stanza that stands on a par with some of Samuel 
Beckett’s more abstract moments: 
 
You do not do, you do not do 
Any more, black shoe 
In which I have lived like a foot 
For thirty years, pure and white, 
Barely daring to breathe or Achoo.
213
 
 
The first two lines present the reader with an immediate problem of addressivity: the 
poem is a dramatic monologue, which we at first presume is being spoken to the 
‘Daddy’ named in the poem’s title; however, in the second line we learn that the ‘you’ 
addressed by the ‘I’ narrating the poem is actually a ‘black shoe’. It is possible that the 
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shoe is simply a symbol for the girl’s father; but such neat symbolic readings become 
complicated if, as Rose observes, we read the first line of the poem with an ear out for 
the Germanic pronouns employed in subsequent stanzas (‘Ach, du’, ‘Ich, ich, ich, ich’). 
The homophone subsequently produced between ‘do’ and the German word ‘du’, 
meaning ‘you’, creates an alternative first line that reads ‘You you not you, you you not 
you’, suggesting that the addressee, the ‘black shoe’, both is and is not the ‘you’ to 
whom the narrator’s monologue is being spoken.214  
This internal subversion of the poem’s symbolic logic is complemented by the 
construction of a highly complex and disorientating time-scheme. The narrator has lived 
in the shoe for thirty years, indicating that she is middle-aged, and also implying that the 
time of narration coincides with a moment of long awaited liberation; yet the defiant 
voice of the mature versifier is undercut by the nursery rhyme aesthetic, with its 
repeated ‘oo’ sound, which creates a contrasting tone of appeasement, and a sense of 
inescapability and repetition. The nursery rhyme to which the poem most readily alludes 
is, significantly, ‘There was an Old Woman who Lived in a Shoe’ (a song about a 
woman who, as Kroll observes, ‘didn’t know what to do’), meaning that in the very first 
stanza, the narratorial ‘I’ is constructed through allusions to each of childhood, middle-
age, and old-age, suggesting that either several different orders of time can coexist in 
the same ‘I’, or that the narrator will in fact never be free from the shoe - whatever it is 
or means - in which she is condemned to live.
215
 
The final line and subsequent stanzas consolidate the bitchy early-teenage voice 
for which the poem is famous; there is something slightly preppy about someone who 
talks of their ‘Daddy’, and of how she dared not ‘Achoo’, even something slightly 
damaged. This could indicate that some traumatic childhood experience has extended 
into the speaker’s adulthood. More extremely, one might read the entire first stanza as a 
recollection of a childhood spent hiding from the Nazis, making the narrator a sort of 
fictionalised survivor-sister of Anne Frank: the black shoe that has forced the narrator 
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into silence could be that of an approaching Nazi coming up the stairs, with the tapping 
of footsteps finding an analogue in the poem’s opening iambic tetrameter. This rhythm 
comes to an abrupt and terrifying halt with the spondee which coincides with the 
naming of the very object that creates the sound, the ‘black shoe’: a spondee which is 
thus, as Antony Rowland observes, a black ‘foot’ of both the poem’s rhythmic scheme 
and its imagined (or remembered) historical landscape.
216
  
The association of the warping of linear constructions of temporality, and of 
meaning itself, with the figure of Anne Frank - a girl forced by experience into a 
preternatural maturity - had already been made by Plath in her journals some years 
previously.
217
 After reading an article in Life magazine, she wrote: 
 
cremation fires burning in the dead eyes of Anne Franck [sic]: horror on horror, 
injustice on cruelty - all accessible, various - how can the soul keep from flying 
to fragments - disintegrating, in one wild dispersal?
218
 
 
In the first stanza of ‘Daddy’, one moment of time - perhaps an imagined moment when 
footsteps came marching towards the secret annexe - explodes across a lifetime in ‘one 
wild dispersal’, paradoxically enclosing the narrator within its total and inescapable 
external order: an order represented by the black shoe in which the narrator has lived for 
thirty years. While the suggestion that she has lived ‘like a foot’ in this moment of time 
might suggest a journey - a chronologically structured passage through time - the black 
shoe unites and confuses many different temporalities, and represents a journey whose 
point of departure is so horrific that a liberating point of arrival can never really be 
envisaged. Indeed, the black shoe is essentially an image of stasis, representing futility 
and imprisonment within time, even total mental collapse: a pervasive sense of madness 
underlies the monomania and obscure symbolism of the stanza as a whole.  
A further, conflicting version of time is represented at the beginning of the 
second stanza: ‘Daddy, I have had to kill you./ You died before I had time’. Here 
Plath develops the theme and time frame of the Freudian family drama, and with it the 
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possibility of the narrator’s Electra complex, which has already been alluded to in the 
poem’s title and in the first stanza (Oedipus translates as ‘swell foot’).219 In particular, 
she evokes Freud’s concept of the ‘Nachtrglichkeit’, or after-effect, in which 
patricide is accomplished imaginatively, after the fact of the father’s death, with the 
child’s inner recovery of the father forming the precondition for his second, symbolic 
death.
220
 The narrator says that her father died before she ‘had time’, suggesting both 
that the father cheated her of the chance to be the agent of his death by dying too soon, 
and also that his return (and symbolic death) is dependent on her now ‘having time’ in a 
second, almost existential, sense - as in possessing time. Such autonomy over inner, 
psychological forms of time would imply that she has in fact successfully escaped from 
the black shoe - and the external temporality it symbolised - in which she was trapped in 
the previous stanza. Predictably, however, we are not permitted to alight on such a 
stable interpretation for long, as the subsequent description of the father portrays him as 
a dead-weight of inhuman proportions:  
 
You died before I had time 
Marble-heavy, a bag full of God, 
Ghastly statue with one gray toe 
Big as a Frisco seal 
 
And a head in the freakish Atlantic 
Where it pours bean green over blue 
In the waters off beautiful Nauset.  
 
The monolithic, ocean-straddling father stands in the way of any straightforward inner 
recovery of time past, and the heavy dash which precedes the anatomised description of 
him emphasises the chasm separating the narrator’s desire for liberation from the 
possibility of its fulfilment. 
So while the poem seems to propose certain temporal, narrative and 
psychological developments, they are rendered through images which imply hindrance, 
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and the theme of the obstructed journey is continued when the speaker recalls how her 
search for her father led her to the wasteland of postwar Europe: 
 
I used to pray to recover you. 
Ach, du. 
 
In the German tongue, in the Polish town 
Scraped flat by the roller  
Of wars, wars, wars. 
But the name of the town is common. 
My Polack friend 
  
Says there are a dozen or two. 
So I never could tell where you 
Put your foot, your root, 
I never could talk to you. 
The tongue stuck in my jaw. 
 
Now a circular time-frame is suggested through the use of repetition and the description 
of war as a ‘roller’: this is something like a poetic rendering of the geometry and 
temporality of damnation, with the lost narrator circling the terraces of Dante’s Inferno 
(much as in Berryman’s The Black Book). The oppressive density of rhyme and 
assonance (almost every word has a phonetic equivalent in either the same line, or in a 
line immediately before or after it) intensifies the depiction of Poland as a place of 
everlasting torment. The trope of infernal decent also links to the name of the town 
being ‘common’ (there were ‘a dozen or two’), and the ubiquity of the father whom she 
can’t find (‘I thought every German was you’). In these instances her journey resembles 
a form of Hellenistic damnation: recalling how she searched Europe for a place and a 
person who were everywhere and nowhere, her visit is figured as an abject exercise in 
futility, like the labours of the dead in Hades.  
 The psychological and metaphysical ‘fall’ that accompanied the narrator’s 
arrival in Europe is attributed to the foreignness of the ‘German tongue’ (it is German, 
as opposed to Polish, that the girl constantly berates) which ‘stuck in her jaw’, cutting 
off her prayers to her father-God and literally preventing her from communicating with 
the outside world: 
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It stuck in a barb wire snare. 
Ich, ich, ich, ich, 
I could hardly speak.  
 
However, as language ensnares the narrator in a symbolic order that is profoundly alien 
to her, as an American brought up on the other side of the ‘freakish Atlantic’, she has 
her first real confrontation with collective European history, specifically that of the 
Jews. The metaphor of a ‘barb wire snare’ suggests linguistic entrapment by evoking an 
animal trap that ‘shuts the trap’ of the narrator, but it also obliquely intimates the 
capturing of the Jews (who were treated like animals) by the Nazis, and perhaps also the 
electric-wire fences which enclosed the concentration camps. In this way, the image 
reflects the poem’s preoccupation with the act and imagery of suicide (also indicated by 
the self-despising repetition of ‘ich’), foreshadowing the narrator’s failed suicide bid in 
stanza twelve, and even her quasi-suicidal triumphalism at the end of the poem, as 
prisoners in camps were either shot or electrocuted if they approached the fences. 
The German language - and, by implication, the buried meanings and historical 
associations it generates and imposes upon a speaker powerless to resist them - is 
described as ‘obscene’. Yet it is this very language which becomes, in the seventh 
stanza, the elusive propelling force that the narrator’s various journeys have thus far 
lacked: 
 
 An engine, an engine 
Chuffing me off like a Jew. 
A Jew to Dachau, Auschwitz, Belsen. 
I began to talk like a Jew. 
I think I may well be a Jew. 
 
The snows of the Tyrol, the clear beer of Vienna 
Are not very pure or true. 
With my gipsy ancestress and my weird luck 
And my Taroc pack and my Taroc pack 
I may be a bit of a Jew. 
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The German language is represented as an external agency that empties the narrator of 
her selfhood and replaces it with a series of speculative foreign identities, such as her 
being ‘a bit of a Jew’. Having been abducted by discourse, she is obscurely motioned 
towards ‘Dachau, Auschwitz, Belsen’ by the monotonous ‘chuffing’ rhythm of a poem 
which briefly becomes ‘an engine, an engine’. The industrialised language and 
metaphors form a stark contrast to the ‘feet’ and ‘toes’ of the first five stanzas, and seem 
to stand for a very different kind of journey. The narrator’s confinement in a static foot, 
and the disappearance of her father’s foot (‘I never could tell where you/ Put your foot, 
your root’), represent failed attempts to revisit the past through recognisably human 
metaphors. When a connection to the past eventually does take place, however, through 
the German language, it is figured as inhuman (recalling Steiner’s judgement on what 
became of the language of Goethe and Heine after Auschwitz: ‘Something immensely 
destructive has happened to it. It makes noise. It even communicates, but it creates no 
sense of communion’).221 One might infer that the narrator could not find her father’s 
‘foot’ because she attributed to him human traits, whereas the Nazi crimes to which she 
links him are essentially foreign to human (or humanist) forms of understanding. (There 
is perhaps also a sense in which, seeing as he is later figured as ‘a devil’, she would 
have done better to look for a cloven hoof.)
222
 These earlier lines could again also refer 
to poetry itself, and to the metrical ‘foot’ of verse, suggesting the impossibility of a 
human form, such as poetry, finding an adequate ‘root’ (or route) through which to tap 
Germany’s horrific past. Here an important distinction emerges between the two 
languages used in the poem; for the English in which it is written does not seem to have 
been brutalised or magnetised to horror in quite the way that, according to the narrator, 
German has. Susan Gubar has pointed out that ‘English was one of the few Western 
languages not generally spoken by guards or prisoners inside the ghettoes [sic], boxcars, 
camps, deportation stations, gas chambers, mass graves, and law courts that constitute 
the settings of these [Holocaust] poems.’223 It is perhaps this very foreignness of the 
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English language to the events of the Holocaust that allows the narrator to make the 
perception that the German language has become an inhuman ‘engine’ in a poem which 
cannot ever really get near the camps, or to the events which took place beyond the 
barbed wire. 
The tracks of the German language lead directly to the name Auschwitz, and 
also, by implication, to the narrator’s positioning as victim; yet this linguistic 
mechanicalism is starkly contrasted to the speaker’s own offbeat rationalisations of her 
conjectured Jewish identity. She cites a ‘gipsy ancestress’, ‘weird luck’ and the ‘Taroc 
pack’ - symbols of mysticism, the irrational, and the occult - as the reasons for her part-
Jewishness. While the ‘gypsy ancestress’ perhaps evokes the Nazi persecution of the 
Romanies, this imagined link between the narrator and the Jewish victims of Nazism - 
and this is, we recall, the source of the poem’s infamy - is so tenuous as to be 
nonsensical. The first-person voice becomes, at this point, weirdly distracted and 
dreamy, and the speaker’s concept of her metaphorical Jewishness appears to be 
extempore, being continually discarded and replaced by what seems like the next 
random thought, only to be returned to again, but never grasped entirely: ‘I think I may 
well be a Jew.// The snows of the Tyrol, the clear beer of Vienna/ Are not very pure or 
true’; ‘I may be a bit of a Jew.// I have always been scared of you.’ The dropping of the 
connection at the end of a stanza, and the change of subject matter in each new stanza, 
suggests that the narrator cannot sustain, or even examine, the comparisons she makes 
between herself and the Jews. 
While the narrator is ‘like’, or ‘may be’, a Jew, the lapse into direct metaphor, 
and with it direct identification, is noticeably avoided (though this is not because of a 
deliberate caution exercised by a perspicacious speaker). ‘Daddy’ thus circumvents the 
direct symbolic identification with Holocaust victims that we find in a poem such as 
Yevgeny Yevtushenko’s ‘Babii Yar’, for example (first published in English in 1962, 
the same year that ‘Daddy’ was written), in which the poet-narrator visits the ravine on 
 110 
the outskirts of Kiev where in September 1941, according to Einsatzkommando records, 
33,771 Russian Jews were massacred in two days.
224
 The narrator proclaims: 
  
I am 
        each old man 
   here shot dead. 
 I am 
        every child 
             here shot dead.
225
 
 
The poem famously opens with the line: ‘No monument stands over Babii Yar’. By 
giving belated witness to crimes that would otherwise fade into oblivion, the poem itself 
becomes that missing monument. Conversely, in ‘Daddy’ no such historical 
responsibility is assumed: the very possibility of a non-victim identifying with the dead 
is undermined by the narrator’s evident lack of knowledge of the historical experiences, 
traditions and religion of the Jews to whom she compares herself. Indeed the links 
between narrator and Jew in ‘Daddy’ are so obscure that one has to wonder if she has 
any idea quite what a Jew is. However, a commentary on the narrator’s relation to the 
Jews, and on the meaning of the term ‘Jew’, is elaborated through Plath’s precise use of 
poetic tools, such as repetition and rhyme, demonstrating how the critical intelligence of 
the poem is generated through arguments of structure and form. The word ‘Jew’ is used 
four times in two stanzas in which it forms end-rhymes only with itself (a technique for 
which John Lennard usefully coins the term ‘autorhyme’), and with the word ‘true’.226 
This use of autorhyme would imply that the word cannot be rhymed or compared with 
anything other than itself, and that there are no other ‘true’ equivalents for the Jewish 
Holocaust victims. In this way, the poem provides a structural counterpoint to the more 
ambiguous representation of the Jew in its lyric. Such an affirmation of the self-
determination and stability of the term is enforced by the way that the word Jew is never 
used as a direct metaphor. As a result, it never becomes harnessed to, or dependent on, 
any external meaning: it is contrasted to other concepts, such as the narrator’s ‘I’, but is 
never engulfed by them, and retains its autonomy as a discrete term. Even the rhyming 
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of Jew with ‘true’ comes in a line in which the latter word is used in a negative sense: 
‘not very pure or true’. Alluding to the Nazi myth of Jewish racial inferiority, this line 
suggests that the girl’s connection with the Jews is itself not very pure or true. 
The narrator sees her father as possessing otherworldly powers that have 
determined the course of her life; but as she cuts short her manic reflection on her 
relation to history’s victims and turns her attention back to her father-God, she loses her 
illusions about his holiness: ‘No God but a swastika /So black no sky could squeak 
through.’ The swastika that fills the sky parodies Nazi Messianism and the Millennial 
Reich, alluding to the Synoptic accounts of Jesus’s crucifixion, which describe how a 
darkness fell over Israel between midday and three in the afternoon, with the imagined 
absence of God recalling Christ’s plea on the cross: ‘Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani?’ (‘My 
God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?’).227 Now the coy tone of the earlier stanzas 
is replaced by a terseness amplified by the use of a harsh alliterative ‘k’ (‘swastika’, 
‘sky’, ‘squeak’). The original ‘oo’ sound returns: 
 
Every woman adores a Fascist, 
The boot in the face, the brute 
Brute heart of a brute like you. 
 
But the throbbing vowels have lost all of their former playfulness: the word ‘brute’ 
occurs three times in two short lines, like successive punches, or rather kicks. Rose has 
suggested that in this infamous passage Plath demonstrates that ‘victimisation by this 
feared and desired father is one of the fantasies at the heart of fascism, one of the 
universal attractions for women of fascism itself’.228 This dubious conception of the 
‘universal’ desire of women for paternal victimisation is far more troubling than the 
actual lines themselves: it is questionable both as an opinion, and also as a piece of 
literary criticism, for it seems rather eccentric to regard the damaged narrator of 
‘Daddy’ as a mouthpiece for the experience of all women. Moreover, the line seems 
more of a sarcastic rejection, rather than a straightforward repetition, of a crude and 
 112 
misogynous fantasy: this is not a poem in thrall of male violence, but rather an 
indictment of it. In the following stanza, the daddy is figured as a devil with ‘a cleft in 
your chin instead of your foot’: the idea that his foot should ever be in his own chin 
emphasises the fact that the ‘boot in the face’ is not necessarily the secret desire of the 
narrator, nor of every woman, to be kicked. If any fantasy is being expressed here it is 
that of retributive justice, and the narrator’s wish for the father’s violence to be turned 
against himself (again one suspects the influence of Dante; specifically his law of 
‘counter-penalty’, which is the organisational principle of the Inferno).229  
As the poem speeds to an increasingly bizarre-seeming climax, the relationship 
between the narrator and her father - and with it the relationships between her self and 
her external world, her past and her present - is figured through the trope of a telephone 
conversation: 
 
So daddy, I’m finally through. 
The black telephone’s off at the root, 
The voices just can’t worm through.  
 
Simultaneously suggesting connection (she is ‘through’) and disconnection (being 
‘through’ can also suggest that one is finished with something), these lines reflect the 
fundamental ambiguity that characterises the narrator’s psychological state, and her 
relation to her daddy. The fact that she describes more than one voice might imply that 
she has been hearing, and sharing with the reader, voices in her head (a continuation of 
the theme of madness introduced in the first stanza), in which case the absence of voices 
would signify a triumphant overcoming of her illness. Yet these voices could relate 
more directly to the polymorphous father figure, who might be expected to have as 
many voices as he has forms, opening up the possibility that their absence is being 
registered both as a liberation and a painful loss: the voices from the past ‘just can’t 
worm through’ (my emphasis), though in some ways she wishes that they could. 
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The description of the telephone being ‘off at the root’ refers the reader back to 
the fifth stanza: 
 
I never could tell where you 
Put your foot, your root, 
I never could talk to you. 
 
Here the elusiveness of the daddy’s ‘root’ suggested a self-reflexive critique on the 
representational logic of the poem as a whole, describing the unavailability of ‘routes’ 
to the past through the metrical ‘foot’ of verse. The black telephone which is now ‘off at 
the root’ might be regarded as a continuation of this conceit, representing the 
impossibility of full communion with the underground voices of the dead (which can’t 
‘worm through’) through poetry. The phone’s failure to harmonise past and present, the 
hearer and the heard, is given added emphasis by the way that the word ‘root’ forms a 
tantalisingly incomplete half-rhyme with ‘through’. It is as though the bad connection is 
not only overheard, but also produced, by the workings of a poetic phone which is black 
in colour and also, ‘Daddy’ suggests, in its usage. 
 The image of a black telephone opens up poetic ‘connections’ with earlier 
images in ‘Daddy’ itself, and with other of Plath’s late poems. Most strikingly, it can be 
found in allotropic forms, and in similar contexts, in ‘Little Fugue’ and ‘The Munich 
Mannequins’ (the former written shortly before, and the latter shortly after, ‘Daddy’), 
which seem to mark the inception and an extension of the self-reflexive representational 
poetics I have been discussing.
230
 Taken together, these three poems - which share 
striking similarities of location, subject matter, and even coloration (each poem makes 
extensive use of black and white colour symbolism) - might be said to loosely comprise 
a kind of ‘German Trilogy’.  
‘Little Fugue’ foreshadows ‘Daddy’ through both its imagery and its Freudian 
psychodrama:
231
  
 
Deafness is something else. 
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Such a dark funnel, my father! 
I see your voice, 
Black and leafy, as in my childhood, 
 
A yew hedge of orders, 
Gothic and barbarous, pure German. 
Dead men cry from it. 
I am guilty of nothing.
232
 
 
The speaker’s father is again a Nazi, and she conceives of a muffled connection to his, 
and Germany’s, past through a paradoxical ‘deafness’ that is, in a distortion or parody 
of an instrumental understanding of memory, a ‘dark funnel’. The image of the ‘yew 
hedge of orders’ evokes the destructive potential of language - specifically, the 
ironically termed ‘pure’ German language. It is this that causes the ‘dead men’ to cry; 
therefore the ‘yew hedge of orders’ could be an historical phenomenon, evoking the 
literal orders that were given for people to be killed. The poet-narrator can ‘see’ this 
‘voice’, which she recognises from her childhood through its destructive effects, even if 
she cannot hear the dead men’s cries; the fact that she is writing in English allows her to 
proclaim that, unlike her father, she is ‘guilty of nothing’. 
There is also a mythological dimension to the image of the yew hedge. In The 
White Goddess (1946), Robert Graves records that in Brittany there was a traditional 
belief that yews in churchyards spread a root to the mouth of each corpse buried beneath 
them.
233
 Thus, in mythology, the yew tree symbolises an organic connection between the 
worlds of the living and the dead - a connection that T.S. Eliot draws on in ‘The Dry 
Salvages’ section of Four Quartets (1935-42): 
 
We, content at the last 
If our temporal reversion nourish 
(Not too far from the yew-tree) 
the life of significant soil.
234
  
 
A draft for ‘Little Fugue’ included a stanza that came immediately before the two 
quoted above, which read: 
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The yew is many-footed. 
Each foot stops a mouth. 
So the yew is a go-between: talks for the dead.
235
 
 
In the final version of the poem this stanza was omitted, but Plath’s representation of the 
yew as a ‘go-between’ that both ‘talks for the dead’ and ‘stops a mouth’ retains its 
ambiguity, and challenges Eliot’s more optimistic reading of the myth as an illustration 
of the fecundity of the real and symbolic soil in which the dead are buried. In Plath’s 
poem the yew is an obscure religious feature of a ‘Gothic and barbarous’ landscape - 
‘The yew my Christ, then./ Is it not as tortured?’ - but the passageway it offers to the 
dead is severed from any redemptive Christian meaning: ‘Death opened, like a black 
tree, blackly.’ In this way, ‘Little Fugue’, through its reinterpretation of Breton myth, is 
the progenitor of ‘Daddy’, a work in which various roots or feet (human, metrical) 
promise to connect the living narrator to the dead ‘you’ (yew) she addresses. In both 
poems, however, revisiting the past sets down roots, or travels down routes, that muffle, 
or else cut-off completely, the voices of the dead. In particular, the language which 
narrator and poem alike must make use of is either a ‘black telephone’ or a ‘dark funnel’ 
that does not enable distant voices to ‘worm through’ what Eliot terms the ‘significant 
soil’ of history. 
A yew tree also features in ‘The Munich Mannequins’, this time as part of a 
freakishly morbid reference (especially given the Breton legend recounted by Graves) to 
childless German women and their sterile wombs, in which ‘the yew trees blow like 
hydras’.236 The poem derides the high society of postwar Germany, and its location is 
particularly significant: Munich was the birthplace of the Nazi party, and it was in 
Munich that Adolf Hitler began his political career, making antisemitic speeches in 
taverns and beer-cellars in the 1920s. It was also in this city, in October 1938, that the 
British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, along with other European leaders, signed 
the Munich Agreement, handing over the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia to Hitler, 
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who had by this time become the German Chancellor. The poem describes postwar 
Munich as the ‘morgue between Paris and Rome’. 
The poem’s subject is not, however, simply the crimes of Nazism, but rather the 
postwar (non)memory of them in an officially ‘denazified’ Germany. Plath describes the 
childless, mannequin-like nulliparas of the city who are ‘naked and bald in their furs’, 
recalling those victims who were literally ‘naked and bald’, but placing them, 
grotesquely, in fashionable ‘furs’. The poem never makes explicit reference to the dead 
Jews: in avoiding direct representation of the memory that the German glitterati 
depicted in the poem itself fails to confront, Plath becomes dependent on a strategic 
manipulation of the poem’s internal aesthetic - above all of its black and white colour 
symbolism - to make it clear that the city is implicated in some moral catastrophe far 
more serious than a low birth-rate. The poem thus intimates its own, and Germany’s, 
absent history through images such as the snow dropping its ‘pieces of darkness’, which 
recalls the ash created by the burning of human bodies in extermination camps, and 
alludes to Paul Celan’s ‘Schwarze Flocken’ (‘Black Flakes’) and ‘Todesfuge’ (‘Death 
Fugue’), the latter with its images of ‘black milk’, smoke, and graves in the sky.237 
However, rather than reproducing the musical ironies of Celan’s poem - an aesthetic 
that Celan himself would later reject, replacing it with a more contained ‘hermetic’ form 
of writing - ‘The Munich Mannequins’ operates through a logic of suggestion and 
indirect intimation.
238
 Through this allusive technique, even the poem’s more cool, 
observational moments become doubly sinister: 
 
Nobody’s about. In the hotels 
Hands will be opening doors and setting 
 
Down shoes for a polish of carbon 
Into which broad toes will go tomorrow. 
 
The poem’s vocabulary is made to work hard, but readers who are familiar with the 
events of the Holocaust, and conversant with poems such as ‘Daddy’, will be startled 
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into a disturbing series of inferences by phrases such as ‘Nobody’s about’ (no bodies 
about), and a line that contains the words ‘shoes’, ‘polish’ (Polish), and ‘carbon’. As 
Stan Smith has observed: ‘Plath’s language is always radically overdetermined, so that 
the same image can be charged with quite contradictory associations, conflicting 
emotional resonances.’239 
The poem concludes with the repetition of, and a certain elaboration on, another 
favourite image: 
 
The thick Germans slumbering in their bottomless Stolz. 
And the black phones on hooks  
 
Glittering 
Glittering and digesting 
 
Voicelessness. The snow has no voice. 
 
The ‘black phones’ again represent a mode of communication with the past that can 
only transmit incommunicability; as an image within the poem, and as a meta-
commentary on the poem, the ‘black phone’ thus elaborates a paradox of representation. 
The tension this image creates between connection and disconnection, even between 
good (white) and evil (black), is heightened by the single-line break that occurs between 
the penultimate stanza and the last line, which makes the phrase ‘glittering and 
digesting’ syntactically ambiguous. The mise-en-page means that ‘glittering and 
digesting’ can be read independently of the word ‘Voicelessness’, describing the way 
that the black phones eat and digest some unnamed and unknown object; yet the 
enjambment means that the verb ‘digesting’ could take ‘Voicelessness’ as its object. 
This would suggest an extreme annihilation, through the doubly-negative consumption 
of something which was not even there; though at the same time, like all double-
negatives, the logical outcome of this action is positive, as the black phones digest - and 
in doing so, they contain - voicelessness, making them (and thus poetry) the enabling 
principle for the transmission of absent historical voices. The significance of this act is 
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amplified in the final sentence of the poem: ‘The snow has no voice’. The snow was 
earlier dropping ‘pieces of darkness’ that recalled the ashes of Holocaust victims burnt 
in the crematoria of death camps. The fact that the snow now has ‘no voice’ might 
suggest that the poem, the ‘black phone’, intrudes upon historical voicelessness, 
depriving the dead of their right to silence; yet the stark lineation, which renders 
‘Voicelessness’ eminently visible, implies that this is perhaps a necessary incursion. 
 The oxymoronic black telephone is consistently used by Plath to complicate the 
normative understanding of memory as a process of recovery, drawing attention to the 
inevitable refashioning that occurs when we revisit historical persons and events 
shrouded in silence, whilst simultaneously interrogating the relation between poetry and 
history. The self-reflexivity of Plath’s dominant metaphor registers the deficiencies of 
poeticising traumatic encounters with the past, and the impossibility of poetic figuration 
putting us in touch with history in its ‘pure’ form; but by suggesting that poetic 
language taps into the past darkly, offering a ‘line’ of sorts, Plath does not relinquish the 
possibility of encounter altogether. In ‘Daddy’, for example, the phone is ‘off at the 
root’, and the voices of the dead ‘just can’t worm through’; nonetheless, this 
disconnection is rendered through a poem which itself puts the narrator - and the reader 
- in touch with different forms of historical silence.
240
  
In the final stanzas of ‘Daddy’ a gathering internal momentum - constructed 
through rhythm, recurrent autorhyme, and the quickening of a narrative which is relayed 
with a growing brusqueness - reaches its climax:  
 
If I’ve killed one man, I’ve killed two 
The vampire who said he was you 
And drank my blood for a year, 
Seven years, if you want to know. 
Daddy, you can lie back now.  
 
There’s a stake in your fat black heart 
And the villagers never liked you. 
They are dancing and stamping on you. 
They always knew it was you. 
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Daddy, daddy, you bastard, I’m through.  
 
Traditional mythological readings of the poem have tended to regard the exorcism of the 
father as prefiguring the speaker’s symbolic rebirth: Kroll, for example, describes how 
the father is a scapegoat ‘invested with the evils of her spoiled history’ whose death 
enables the narrator to free herself from ‘the false self who is in his thrall’.241 The 
rhythmic emphasis on the word ‘bastard’ does suggest a fully achieved expression of 
feeling - the narrator at last declaring that she has no legitimate father - that contrasts 
with the ambiguity and prevarication of the rest of the poem, and the final phrase, ‘ I’m 
through’, brings the previous end-rhymes (a triple autorhyme of ‘you’s ) to a satisfying 
close. Yet the desperate cry of ‘Daddy, daddy’ complicates the outward sense of 
psychological and narrative resolution; and again, her being ‘through’ implies both a 
break-through - something that she’s finally finished with - but also disillusionment or 
resignation. In its most extreme sense, the phrase could even suggest that the narrator is 
contemplating another suicide attempt. 
Alvarez, who recalled that Plath often spoke about suicide with ‘wry 
detachment’, describes in The Savage God (1971) how the ‘history of suicide in 
Christian Europe is the history of official outrage and unofficial despair’.242 He 
continues: 
 
Blackstone [an Elizabethan legal authority] wrote that the burial [of the suicide] 
was ‘in the highway, with a stake driven through the body’, as though there was 
no difference between a suicide and a vampire. The chosen site was usually a 
cross-roads, which was also the place of public execution, and a stone was 
placed over the dead man’s face; like the stake, it would prevent him rising as a 
ghost to haunt the living.
243
 
 
This particular passage seems highly pertinent to the final stanzas of ‘Daddy’, in which 
a stake is driven through a psychological vampire - but perhaps only by way of the 
narrator’s own suicide. One of Plath’s most significant theoretical influences, Sigmund 
Freud, regarded suicide as an act of aggression that is always aimed at more than one 
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person: a kind of transposed murder.
244
 A Freudian reading of the poem might thus hold 
that the stake in the heart that kills the vampire slayer’s daddy is also a stake through 
her own heart: in this way, suicide and vampire become symbolically united, just as they 
were in Elizabethan times. Before this stanza, father and daughter have not come into 
any form of direct contact: the father has only ever been represented by massively over-
determined symbols, such as an ocean-straddling statue, a sky-filling swastika, a devil-
schoolteacher and a voodoo model. As a Nazi, he is a fantasised amalgam of every 
available stereotype: at once a Hitler (with a ‘neat moustache’), the epitome of German 
volk (‘your Aryan eye, bright blue’), a Luftwaffe member and a ‘Panzer-man’. But in 
this final death scene, as the narrative moves into the present tense - ‘They are dancing 
and stamping on you’ - the two at last occupy a shared moment of space and time. 
Admittedly, he is still a vampire, a kind of inverse imago; but they ‘lie back’ as one. 
As the narrator moves ‘through’, the reader, however, is simultaneously pushed 
back and excluded from a ghoulish family reunion whose ultimate significance remains 
unclear. The reference to ‘the villagers’ belies the fact that there has been no previous 
mention of either a village or villagers in the poem. The reader is perhaps made mindful 
of ‘the Polish town’ mentioned in the fourth stanza, where the narrator sought to locate 
her father, and which, it is implied, might be the scene of his past Nazi crimes. Yet ‘the 
name of the town’ was ‘common’ (like the atrocities which might have been committed 
there), and she never found the place she was looking for. What is clear is that even the 
unidentified villagers are privy to some form of knowledge, by way of their positive 
identification of the detested father, that escapes the reader. Plath’s italicisation of the 
word ‘knew’ in the penultimate line emphasises their familiarity with the father’s real 
historical identity, intimating access to the ‘inside’ of an event denied to those who look 
back on it from the ‘outside’. 
This concluding stanza supports my reading of ‘Daddy’ as a poem that is 
centrally concerned with questions of historical knowledge - if anything, this is a poem 
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about its narrator’s inability to get to grips with what the Holocaust actually was - and 
with issues of historical representation, above all through its exploration of the 
alienation of language, or at least the English language, from the genocide. A 
conceptual distance between the inside of history and the ‘outsideness’ of those forms 
of memory and discourse that return to the event retrospectively is maintained 
throughout a poem which constantly flaunts its own artifice. The interplay between a 
tragic historical subject and the poem’s breezy aesthetic form allows for a ‘serious’ self-
critique, wherein aesthetic effects generate a rigorous self-commentary: this is how 
‘Daddy’ exposes the spuriousness of the narrator’s identifications with the Jews, for 
example. While the poem names the locations associated with the inside of the 
Holocaust - and thus evokes the crimes which the narrator’s father may or may not have 
been involved in - it never threatens to cross their borders. Repeatedly approached but 
never fully grasped, atrocity, like the unconscious, resists full representation, and the 
historical actuality of genocide remains outside the poem’s representative capabilities 
(and indeed outside its representative aspirations). 
Yet by drawing the reader’s attention to the alienation of the Holocaust from the 
poem’s stylised form, and from the narrator’s consciousness, ‘Daddy’ is able to disclose 
something of the silence (a silence that it both mediates and produces) that lies within 
its margins. When representing the ‘disaster’ in this way, to write is perhaps, in Maurice 
Blanchot’s formulation, ‘to bring to the surface something like absent meaning’.245 In so 
doing, the inside and the outside of history are brought into an uneasy co-existence by 
and through the event of the poem itself, held in place (which is to say apart) through 
counteractions of language and form. As a result, the poem occupies what Shoshana 
Felman, describing Claude Lanzmann’s film Shoah (1985), has termed an ‘impossible 
position’, which is ‘neither simply inside nor simply outside, but paradoxically, both 
inside and outside’. In assuming such a position, the poetic event, the ‘black phone’, 
facilitates a ‘connection that did not exist during the war and does not exist today 
 122 
between the inside and the outside’, and manages ‘to set them both in motion and in 
dialogue with one another’.246 
There is a sequence in the second part of Art Spiegelman’s graphic novel about 
his father Vladek’s survival of the Holocaust, Maus II (1991), which seems to illustrate 
precisely this need for contemporary Holocaust artworks (and especially those depicting 
the relationship between parents involved in the Holocaust and their children) to 
incorporate into their representative logic that which resists representation. In this 
passage, the mouse Art - an alter ego of the cartoonist - goes to see his psychiatrist, 
Pavel, who is a survivor of Terezin and Auschwitz.
247
 As they talk into the night about 
Art’s inability to tell the story of his father’s experiences, Pavel grows disillusioned, 
doubting that anyone can ever make sense of the genocide, and questioning whether any 
lessons can be learnt from it. He warns Art that ‘the victims who died can never tell 
THEIR side of the story, so maybe it’s better not to have any more stories’. Art replies: 
‘Uh-huh. Samuel Beckett once said: “Every word is like an unnecessary stain on silence 
and nothingness.”’ There is then a frame - the only one in the entire Maus story - in 
which there are no words: neither dialogue, nor written narrative, nor any other sign 
denoting discourse. There is just silence as Art and his therapist sit facing each other, 
smoking, each seemingly deep in contemplation. In one sense this frame seems to 
embody Beckett’s maxim, but as Young writes: ‘this is not silence as an absence of 
words but silence as something that passes actively between two people’.248 Their 
silence is given shape and meaning by the dialogue which has taken place between 
patient and therapist, and also by the panel provided by Spiegelman’s cartoon strip 
format. The therapeutic and artistic framing of this silence is drawn out in the following 
panel when, with reference to the Beckett quotation, Art points out: ‘On the other hand 
he SAID it’. Pavel’s reply exemplifies Spiegelman’s self-referential aesthetic: ‘He was 
right. Maybe you can include it in your book.’ 
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This exchange, and the distinction which is made between the kind of silence 
that is, in Young’s phrase, an ‘an absence of words’, and the kind of silence which is 
more dynamic and voluble, ‘something that passes actively between two people’, neatly 
summarises the rationale behind the self-reflexive ethos of Holocaust representation 
advocated by writers such as Spiegelman and Plath. For both artists, there is a silence 
which stems, much as Pavel initially argues, from the utter incomprehensibility of the 
Holocaust. For Pavel, this silence, and the total absence of any suitable discourse to 
describe what happened, points the way to the only possible response to the Holocaust 
by Art (both the character and his trade). But by contrast, Maus and ‘Daddy’ insist that 
even if a horrific past is inaccessible in a direct or fully present form, this 
inaccessibility, at least, can be represented. ‘Daddy’ describes how the voice of the 
narrator’s father ‘can’t worm through’ to the present; similarly, the central event of 
Maus is Art’s discovery that Vladek has destroyed his dead mother’s notebooks, and 
with them his only chance of hearing her version of her imprisonment in Auschwitz. 
These works acknowledge that the authentic voices of many of those who were there (as 
both perpetrators and victims) are lost to us; but historical voicelessness is made visible 
indirectly, and in a negative fashion, in texts that constitute necessary stains on silence 
and nothingness - texts which do not represent the past as it was, but which instead 
explore the ways that it endures in the lives of those who came after. 
 
 
 
‘Lady Lazarus’ 
 
‘Lady Lazarus’ is, as Kroll has noted, a companion piece to ‘Daddy’. Both poems were 
written in October 1962 and, along with their provocative use of Nazi imagery and their 
evocations of the Holocaust, they share similarities of form (the dramatic monologue), 
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voice (with the manic voice of ‘Daddy’ maturing into the twisted braggadocio of ‘Lady 
Lazarus’), and narrative structure, each moving from an obscure birth scene or initiatory 
scenario towards a final, if ambiguous, point of transcendence.
249
 The narrative is 
similarly paced in both poems; if anything, ‘Lady Lazarus’ achieves a slightly greater 
narrative speed than its predecessor, with the occasionally jarring imagery in the 
clustered pentains of ‘Daddy’ being abandoned in favour of more stark and imagistically 
uncomplicated tercets. The acceleration towards a final crescendo, achieved through 
rhythm and autorhyme in ‘Daddy’, is brought about in ‘Lady Lazarus’ through the 
gradual paring down of line length, until we are left with just single-word dimeters 
(‘Beware/ Beware’) in the final two lines of the penultimate stanza. As with ‘Ariel’, in 
which the horse-riding narrator is ‘the arrow,// The dew that flies/ Suicidal, at one with 
the drive/ Into the red// Eye, the cauldron of morning’, ‘Lady Lazarus’ is designed to be 
read at a gallop.
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 Despite its many similarities to ‘Daddy’, ‘Lady Lazarus’ nonetheless stands 
apart from the ‘German Trilogy’ of ‘Little Fugue’, ‘Daddy’ and ‘The Munich 
Mannequins’. I have argued that these three poems can be read as Plath’s 
chronologically developed meditation on Holocaust representation: each is set in the 
austere landscape of postwar Europe, and links to the others geographically, stylistically 
and imagistically (most obviously through the symbol of the black telephone). In this 
trilogy, through meticulously constructed arguments of imagery and form, a scaffolding 
for the reconstruction of poetry after Auschwitz is tentatively set in place. ‘Lady 
Lazarus’, on the other hand, with its razzmatazz and big top setting, offers a more 
straightforwardly savage critique of the artistic commodification of genocide, and of the 
amoral representative practices of the ‘Holocaust industry’. In this poem, the 
scaffolding carefully erected in the German Trilogy is kicked straight back down.
251
 
 125 
 Like the hero of Kafka’s story ‘A Fasting-artist’, on which, as Kroll observes, 
‘Lady Lazarus’ seems to have been loosely based, the poem’s narrator prides herself on 
a self-destructive theatrical act which she believes she has elevated to an art form:
252
 
 
Dying 
Is an art, like everything else. 
 I do it exceptionally well. 
 
 I do it so it feels like hell. 
 I do it so it feels real. 
I guess you could say I’ve a call. 253 
 
If, for Lady Lazarus, dying is an ‘art’, then it is at once a cultured form of expression 
and also, more prosaically, a task that requires a particular skill or knack. Her suicide-
show is thus a slightly tricksy activity, and when claiming that it ‘feels like hell’, and 
that it ‘feels real’ (my emphasis), she is implicitly conceding that in reality it is neither 
of these things (much as when the narrator of ‘Daddy’ states that she ‘may well be a 
Jew’). Lady Lazarus seems wryly to accept the fact that her performance - in which she 
drapes herself in the material traces and mutilated body parts of the murdered European 
Jews - is both an art form for which she has a ‘call’, and also a commercial enterprise. 
Unifying the language of art and that of show business, the ‘theatrical// Comeback in 
broad day’ suggests both her return from the dead and also the revival of her career. 
Later the ‘charge’ for her show - and presumably also the sexual ‘charge’ generated by 
it - is mentioned four times, suggesting that she and her audience each profit from a 
performance that is figured as a kind of prostitution. 
Al Strangeways notes that the period between Plath’s first poem about the 
Holocaust (‘The Thin People’) in 1957, and the next poems that she wrote about the 
genocide in 1962 and 1963, saw  
 
in addition to the ‘real-life’ drama of the Eichmann trial, a number of star-
studded Hollywood films - often adapted from successful books, plays, or 
television presentations - that brought the Holocaust to the forefront of the 
popular imagination, including Judgement at Nuremberg (1961), starring 
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Spencer Tracey; Exodus (1960), starring Paul Newman and Sal Mineo; and The 
Diary of Anne Frank (1959).
254
 
 
Neil Roberts has gone so far as to characterise Plath’s first-person narrators in terms of 
the film stars they most closely resemble: ‘If “Every woman adores a Fascist” is 
Marlene Dietrich, “I guess you could say I’ve a call” may be Lauren Bacall.’255 A ‘big 
strip tease’ that the ‘peanut-crunching crowd/ Shoves in to see’, Lady Lazarus’s act is, 
as Roberts suggests, far from being an illicit peep-show. Rose has described how the 
appeal of voyeurism ‘rests on exclusion, on a position that remains firmly outside’.256 
The reader is placed in such a ‘voyeuristic’ position when tuning-in to the private 
psychodrama of ‘Daddy’; the point of ‘Lady Lazarus’, on the other hand, is to display 
the Holocaust as a licensed (if not respectable) public spectacle. With heavy irony, the 
narrator addresses her audience as ‘Gentlemen, Ladies’. 
Roberts also shows how Plath’s ‘smart-talking film noir “dames”’ generate a 
complex addressivity.
257
 He notes that ‘explicit address is of course characteristic of the 
dramatic monologue, which is normally thought of as a narrative genre’.258 In ‘Lady 
Lazarus’, however, we have a more general ‘adversarial addressivity’, where the 
narrator accosts a masculine ‘enemy’ who thereafter appears in several different guises, 
asking him to ‘peel off the napkin’ that covers her ghastly face.259 This addressivity also 
seems to implicate the reader; indeed, if a dominant paradigm of the poem is the 
suspense-filled and intricately plotted Hollywood film noir, its readers are in for a twist 
that they could never have anticipated. The anonymity of the crowd who watch the 
show, and the poem’s self-conscious understanding of addressivity as a kind of 
performance, mean that distinctions between the addressee of the poem (‘my enemy’), 
the audience within the poem (‘the peanut-crunching crowd’), and the poem’s 
readership blur. As a result, readers who would more usually expect to be left on a 
poem’s outside are implicated in its general indictment through their ‘consumption’ of 
the text. The poem turns on them. As Strangeways observes:  
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To apply Teresa De Lauretis’s theorizing of the cinematic positioning of women 
to Plath’s poem […] the speaker’s consciousness of her performance for the 
readers […] works to reverse the gaze of the readers so that they become 
‘overlooked in the act of overlooking’.260  
 
‘Lady Lazarus’ sets out to shock and provoke its readers through its ‘adversarial 
addressivity’, its brassy approach to a sensitive historical subject, and what Britzolakis 
has described as its ‘patently alienated and manufactured language, in which the shock 
tactic, the easy effect, reign supreme’.261 This belligerent aesthetic has led some critics, 
such as Helen Vendler, to criticise Plath for failing to exert sufficient control over her 
material: 
 
Poems like ‘Daddy’ and ‘Lady Lazarus’ are in one sense demonically 
intelligent, in their wanton play with concepts, myths and language, and in 
another, and more important, sense, not intelligent at all, in that they wilfully 
refuse, for the sake of a cacophony of styles (a tantrum of style), the steady, 
centripetal effect of thought. Instead, they display a wild dispersal, a centrifugal 
spin to further and further reaches of outrage.
262
 
 
Such criticisms bring to mind Alvarez’s account of Plath reading him an earlier version 
of ‘Lady Lazarus’: 
  
There was one line I picked on in particular: 
 
 Gentleman, ladies. 
 
 These are my hands 
 My knees. 
 I may be skin and bone, 
 I may be Japanese… 
 
‘Why Japanese?’ I niggled away at her. ‘Do you just need the rhyme? Or are 
you trying to hitch an easy lift by dragging in the atomic victims? If you’re 
going to use this kind of violent material, you’ve got to play it cool….’263 
 
This extra line mischievously probes the limits of lyric acceptability. However, by 
assuming a correspondence between Plath and her obviously dramatised first-person 
speaker, neither Alvarez nor Vendler can account for the control that is exercised over 
this particular ‘centrifugal spin to further and further reaches of outrage’ through the 
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poem’s monologue form, which generates the critical intelligence of an artwork which 
does not necessarily advocate the flamboyant rhetoric of its speaker. The classic 
strategy of the dramatic monologue is to allow a narrator to reveal a truth about 
themselves that they had hoped to conceal: in the case of Lady Lazarus, this is the 
spuriousness of her concept of ‘art’, and the fundamental dubiousness of her atrocity 
exhibition, for which there is a ‘very large charge’. Plath did not ‘just need the rhyme’, 
as Alvarez suggests - as though it rectified some deficiency in her original versification; 
but by using it - and especially in the form given by Alvarez, where it forms the fourth 
line in a quatrain, making it stick out from the surrounding tercets like a sore thumb - 
she unambiguously points out that it is there, it exists as an aesthetic possibility. In 
contrast to the poetics of ‘awkwardness’ that Rowland identifies in the poetry of Tony 
Harrison and Geoffrey Hill, Plath’s point is to show that the ‘not quite relevant 
allusion’, as Alvarez put it, is in fact a very easy one to make.264 
If Plath had retained Lady Lazarus’s reference to her possibly being Japanese, 
our sense of the following line, ‘Nevertheless, I am the same, identical woman’, would 
also have been dramatically altered. Lady Lazarus cannot claim to be a victim both of 
Hiroshima and of Buchenwald (the reference to ‘a Nazi lampshade’ recollects the 
ornament supposedly owned and commissioned by the ‘Bitch of Buchenwald’, Ilse 
Koch),
265
 and her bewildering and obviously forced attempt to suggest that they and she 
are ‘the same, identical woman’ would have disclosed the essential artifice of the 
metaphorical figure of prosopopoeia (the dead speaking through the poet, who acts as a 
vessel to allow the transmission of posthumous voices), and its rhetoric of presence, of 
which ‘Lady Lazarus’ is an ironic parody. The line would also have problematised the 
idea that Lady Lazarus is some kind of coherent and unified emblem of all historical 
victims: it is indeed a bewildering archetypal victim who must, with such drawling self-
satisfaction - ‘I may be Japanese’ (my emphasis) - resort to ‘dragging in the atomic 
victims’. 
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 The poem’s addressivity is further complicated, and historicised, when the 
anonymous ‘enemy’ turns into, or is displaced by, an ‘Herr Doktor’, recalling the 
infamous Nazi doctors, such as Josef Mengele, and perhaps also the Austrian Sigmund 
Freud (one can easily imagine Lady Lazarus humouring her analyst when she assures 
him, ‘Do not think I underestimate your great concern’). Lady Lazarus describes herself 
as this man’s ‘valuable’, before transforming into ‘The pure gold baby// That melts to a 
shriek.’ In figuring herself as a ‘pure’ symbol of suffering, Lady Lazarus duplicates the 
language that the Nazis used to describe their racial supremacy; much as in ‘Letter in 
November’, the word ‘gold’ here conveys an ideal of purity that is both a desirable and 
a tainted state. It suggests a need for pure representation, even the idea that 
representation is itself precious; but it also evokes the thieving and melting of gold - 
often extracted from the teeth of the Jewish victims - which was standard Nazi practice. 
Lady Lazarus, however, has already made reference to her ‘full set of teeth’: an anomaly 
which exposes the non-equivalence between herself and those victims whom she claims 
to represent - even the violence that she does to them. 
As Lady Lazarus ‘melts to a shriek’, a sound, she herself disappears: 
    
Ash, ash 
You poke and stir. 
 Flesh, bone, there is nothing there 
 
A cake of soap, 
 A wedding ring, 
A gold filling. 
 
Kroll suggests that here Plath is parodying a poem, ‘Inventory’, by Gnter Eich, which 
she would have very likely known in translation.
266
 Written in 1948, ‘Inventory’ 
tabulates the few possessions owned by a prisoner of war: 
 
 This is my cap, 
 this is my coat, 
 here is my shaving kit 
in a linen bag 
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  … 
 This is my notebook, 
 this is my groundsheet, 
this is my towel, 
 this is my thread. 
    
Hans Magnus Enzensberger has described how, in Eich’s poem, ‘paralysis has itself 
become language’, arguing that ‘the poet is staking a claim to the absolute minimum 
that remains; to a material, spiritual and linguistic remnant’.267 While the list in ‘Lady 
Lazarus’ has a certain structural and syllabic unity, lending it a superficial coherence, 
and even creating a tangible sense of the materiality of the articles described, the 
harmonising aesthetic effect is undermined by the actual artefacts named: the ‘wedding 
ring’ and ‘gold filling’ intimate that Lady Lazarus is some sort of jackdaw of history, 
attracted to bright, shiny objects, rather than a Benjaminian angel, possessing genuine 
historical insight. Moreover, the last line of the preceding stanza suggests that these are 
items, like ‘flesh and bone’ (of Lady Lazarus, of the dead), that are not there, or that 
they are merely the ‘nothing’ that is there. 
The reference to ‘a cake of soap’, in particular, highlights the ambiguous 
physicality of these material remains, for having come to symbolise the lunatic excesses 
of Nazism in the years immediately after the war, it was discovered that no documentary 
evidence exists to prove that the Nazis ever turned their Jewish victims into soap.
268
 As 
Gubar observes: 
  
That no consensus exists among contemporary historians about whether the 
Nazis made cakes of soap out of their victims […] drive[s] home the bitter irony 
propelling the poem, namely that imaginative approaches to the Shoah may 
distort, rather than safeguard, the dreadful but shredded historical record.
269
 
 
Whether or not Plath knew that the soap story was unsubstantiated, the poem, with its 
lexicon of representative ‘purity’ and its magical vanishing tricks, implies that the kind 
of ‘imaginative approaches’ to the Holocaust practised and advocated by Lady Lazarus 
might contribute to the construction of an insidious form of anti-memory that services 
 131 
the specific historical and political ideals first ‘prophesied’ by the architects of the final 
solution: the sort of thing that Himmler was talking about when he referred to the 
Holocaust as ‘a glorious page in our history, and one that has never been written and 
never can be written’.270 Indeed, Lady Lazarus becomes precisely such a (non)page in a 
history written by the persecutors when she says to the Nazi Doktor that she is his self-
erasing ‘opus’.  
In the penultimate stanza, the ambitious addressivity of the poem alights on the 
ultimate auditors:  
 
Herr God, Herr Lucifer 
Beware 
Beware. 
 
This aggressive challenge to Christianity’s moral structure could be read as a parody of 
Nazism and its pseudo-Nietzschean ideology. Eugen Kogon observes that Hitler saw 
himself as the ‘Messianic preincarnation’ of a new era of rule represented by the 
Millennial Reich, noting that religious imagery was deeply ingrained in the ideology 
and aesthetics of party and state, and that the SS was conceived as a ‘sacred order’ 
whose insignia took the form of lightning flashes designed to resemble ancient runic 
characters.
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 Lady Lazarus also sees her show as being potentially threatening to 
existing hierarchies. Her repeated use of the prefix ‘Herr’ - which in German means 
both ‘master’ and ‘the Lord’ - to describe each of ‘Herr Enemy’, ‘Herr Doktor’, and, in 
a reading, ‘Herr Professor’, as well as ‘Herr God’ and ‘Herr Lucifer’, unites these 
figures, and suggests that each is a different element of one and the same order against 
which she rebels: patriarchy.
272
 
‘Lady Lazarus’ concludes with a stanza which clarifies her objectives for those 
who were in any doubt, while at the same time triggering a deluge of possible allusions: 
   
Out of the ash 
I rise with my red hair 
And I eat men like air.  
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Gubar has noted, along with many others, the ‘ironic echo’ of Coleridge’s ‘Kubla 
Khan’: ‘Beware! Beware!/ His flashing eyes, his floating hair!’273 Given that Britzolakis 
sees ‘Lady Lazarus’ as a parody of ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’, whilst also 
detecting allusions to The Waste Land, it is unsurprising that these final lines also 
reference another favourite work by Eliot: Four Quartets.
274
 This time the allusion is to 
the first stanza of the second part of ‘Little Gidding’, which ends with the couplet: ‘The 
death of hope and despair,/ This is the death of air.’275 In Plath’s poem, as in Eliot’s, the 
death or consumption of ‘air’ comes about when the dialectical framework of a 
Christian moral universe collapses; in ‘Lady Lazarus’, this airless anti-world is sketched 
in three swift, almost breathless, lines. The stanza also seems to allude, once again, to 
Celan’s ‘Todesfuge’, in which the ‘golden hair’ of Margarete - namesake of Goethe’s 
apotheosised representative of the ‘eternal feminine’ in Faust  - contrasts with the 
‘ashen hair’ of Shulamith, who is named after the princess in ‘The Song of Songs’ who 
traditionally symbolises the tribe of Israel.
276
 Nelly Sachs’s ‘O the Chimneys’ considers 
the impact of the death camps on traditional forms of religious belief, and concludes 
with a tercet which also seems to lie behind this final stanza: 
 
O you chimneys, 
O you fingers 
And Israel’s body as smoke through the air!277 
 
These references add a specifically Holocaust-related dimension to Britzolakis’s 
perception that ‘Lady Lazarus is an allegorical figure, constructed from past and present 
images of femininity […] She is a pastiche of the numerous deathly or demonic women 
of poetic tradition’.278 
Celan famously wrote that ‘No one/ witnesses for the/ witness.’279 Lady 
Lazarus’s hubris, then, is precisely that she leaves the ‘grave cave’ once a decade to 
bear witness for the witnesses, graphically displaying the remains of the victims on her 
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own body. Plath’s hubris, on the other hand, is not that she is Lady Lazarus, but rather 
that she seems to have no qualms about placing survivor texts in the mouth of such a 
flawed speaker. The poem’s broad aesthetic of shock and sensationalism - with its Nazi 
lampshades, gold fillings and bars of soap - has led critics to question the extent to 
which the poem is able to repudiate the representative practices of its narrator. Drawing 
on Saul Friedlander’s Reflections of Nazism: An Essay on Kitsch and Death (1993), 
which warns of a disturbing ‘new discourse’ about Nazism dominated by sensationalist 
images and an obsession with death, Rowland argues that Plath deploys an iconography 
that she cannot transcend. What he terms her ‘camp poetics’, which reproduce the 
‘exaggeration’, ‘artifice’, and ‘extremity’ of the Camp movement, ‘do allow for a self-
conscious investigation of spectacle, but, unlike the reflexivity of awkward poetics in 
[Geoffrey Hill’s] The Triumph of Love, they highlight and reflect the post-Holocaust 
writer’s reception of “spectacular” history, rather than rigorously challenging it’.280 
Unable to undermine affected gestures of empathy or identification, the poems risk 
repeating them, with the result that, in Young’s words, the images used in the poems 
‘feed on the same prurient energy they purportedly expose’.281 
Yet by contrast, one could argue that the poem’s kitschy aesthetics, and the 
subversive allusions to canonical Holocaust texts, only service the ends of a poem 
whose guiding impulse is overwhelmingly satiric. As a parody of the crass 
sensationalism of the Holocaust industry, and of the way that women are represented as 
‘deathly or demonic’ by a predominantly male poetic tradition, the poem is able to 
question the iconography and allusions that its speaker exploits. Harold Bloom has 
described how ‘every poet is a being caught up in a dialectical relationship 
(transference, repetition, error, communication) with other poets’, with the ‘strong, 
authentic poets’ creating an imaginative space for themselves through 
 
a misreading of the prior poet, an act of creative correction that is actually and 
necessarily a misinterpretation. The history of fruitful poetic influence, which is 
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to say the main tradition of Western poetry since the Renaissance, is a history of 
anxiety and self-saving caricature, of distortion, of perverse, wilful revisionism 
without which modern poetry as such could not exist.
282
 
 
‘Lady Lazarus’ makes a ‘perverse, wilful revisionism’ its working mode; however, the 
poem challenges Bloom’s positive assessment of the development of poetic tradition 
through misreading, by way of its speaker’s cynical belief that art is simply a form of 
prostitution - a degrading way of making money - and by the fatuousness of her turn in 
attention away from the Jewish victims of the Holocaust (the subject of the poems she 
‘misinterprets’), and towards the many men who have wronged her. In some senses, the 
aggressive feminist position that she assumes in the final stanzas is not a total distortion 
of the concerns of Holocaust verse, and could be justified by the insight that the 
Holocaust was an event which was, for the most part, conceived and perpetrated by 
men. Here the poem arguably develops a refrain from ‘Todesfuge’, where ‘death is a 
master from Germany’. However, this reading is at odds with the indirect reference to 
Ilse Koch, by way of the Nazi lampshade. Moreover, as with the omitted line ‘I may be 
Japanese’, where poetic form (and obvious irony) allowed for a pointed critique of the 
narrator’s hypothesised identity as historical victim, a self-conscious undermining of 
Lady Lazarus’s rhetoric occurs in the concluding stanza, through the double entendre of 
the last line (wordplay which mirrors the pun on being ‘through’ at the end of ‘Daddy’). 
For, as Gubar points out, to ‘eat men like air’ is an ambiguous simile, which could mean 
that Lady Lazarus eats men as easily as if they were air - namely the German Herren, or 
‘masters’, who ordered the deaths of women such as Shulamith - or that she eats men 
who are themselves already like air: the victimised men who, in ‘Todesfuge’, dug their 
‘graves in the air’, and whose deaths Sachs laments when describing ‘Israel’s body as 
smoke through the air’.283 Here wordplay and allusion help to unmask the speaker: as 
the prostitute-poet rises from the ashes in the guise of what Kroll calls a ‘triumphant 
resurrecting goddess’, we are actually left with a much less palatable taste of what Lady 
Lazarus’s opportunistic imagination really feeds off.284 Just as her assault on God and 
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Lucifer parodies Nazi aspirations, Lady Lazarus is here positioned as the victimiser, not 
the victimised. Through the suggestion that her strip show is an act of historical 
cannibalism - both at the level of its performance and its language - Plath offers a 
critique of her speaker in terms no less strong than those used by Jean Baudrillard when, 
with reference to the mini-series Holocaust (1978), he claimed that television produces 
a forgetting that ‘is part of the extermination’.285 
 
 
 
‘Mary’s Song’ 
 
‘Mary’s Song’ is described by Tim Kendall as the end-point for many of the thematic 
preoccupations of Plath’s late work. He notes that the ‘conflict between maternal love 
and Christianity is most startlingly portrayed’ in this poem, and also that it ‘marks the 
culmination of her [Plath’s] identification with the Jews’.286 But while historical and 
theological material do come together in surprising and unsettling ways in the poem - 
above all, through the Berryman-esque use of Christian viewpoints and icons to portray 
Jewish suffering - it distinctly diverges from the voice and style of Plath’s earlier 
Holocaust monologues. As Rowland notes, ‘a restrained tone indicates the suffering of 
the narrator, as opposed to the camp railing of the earlier piece [‘Lady Lazarus’]’.287 
And far from offering any culminating authorial ‘identification with the Jews’, the poem 
presents the relations between its narrator, its historical subject matter, and its 
metaphysical schemas, in terms of their evident incompatibility. 
 The first stanza is similar to the first stanza of ‘Daddy’, in that it poses, through 
a dense economy of expression, a weird sort of conundrum that would at first seem to 
resist any kind of interpretative unravelling: 
 
The Sunday lamb cracks in its fat. 
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 The fat 
 Sacrifices its opacity.
288
 
 
As we later learn that this is a poem about the genocide of the Jews, and because the 
poem makes reference to other ghostly passover scenes, the ‘lamb’ could be a reference 
to the paschal lamb sacrificed annually at the Jewish Passover. Yet the phrase ‘The 
Sunday lamb’ places it in a more overtly Christian frame of reference (Sunday being the 
Christian Sabbath), as does the poem’s title, and the fact that Christ was Agnus Dei 
(John the Baptist calls Jesus the ‘Lamb of God’, and ‘the Lamb’ is used throughout 
Revelation as a symbol for Christ).
289
 The possible Jewish significance of the lamb is 
thus, in a sense, ‘passed over’. Any direct symbolic association of the lamb with a 
religious figure or narrative is, moreover, undermined by the fact that it is not actually 
the lamb that is being sacrificed here; rather it is the surrounding fat which ‘sacrifices 
its opacity’. A lamb’s fat becomes molten when cooked, and hence more transparent; 
but the sacrifice of the fat’s opacity, and the bizarre personification, even agency, that is 
hinted at (the suggestion is that ‘opacity’ is a quality that the fat itself is reluctant to 
give up), only brings us to a point of interpretative opacity. About all that is clear is that 
this is not a benign evocation of Christian feeding habits, or a sympathetic 
representation of Hebraic ritual. Rather, there seems to be something savage going on 
here, something more like murder than Sunday cookery: Kendall notes the ‘hissing 
sibilance of “Sacrifices its opacity”’, and the ‘mesmerised loathing in the assonantal 
repetition’ that we find throughout the stanza.290 The lamb does not ‘crackle’ in its fat, 
as we might expect; instead it ‘cracks’. 
 In the second stanza, the speaker refers to a ‘window, holy gold’. This could be 
the oven window, or a kitchen window through which the speaker is looking (kitchens 
and their windows are charged emblems in Plath’s poetry: see, for example, ‘Cut’ and 
‘Lesbos’, the latter with its portrayal of ‘Viciousness in the kitchen!/ The potatoes 
hiss./It is all Hollywood, windowless’).291 More paradigmatically, this line perhaps 
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intimates a passage of meaning that is about to emerge within the poem itself: following 
the opaque representation of an act of ritual violence, now, in the second and third 
stanzas, a ‘window’ opens more clearly onto a vast panorama of human slaughter: 
 
 A window, holy gold. 
 The fire makes it precious, 
The same fire 
 
Melting the tallow heretics 
 Ousting the Jews. 
 
The description of one and the same fire ‘melting’ the heretics and ‘ousting’ the Jews 
links the victims of the Nazi genocide with the victims of the Spanish Inquisition, who 
were burnt at the stake, with the phrase ‘tallow heretics’ recalling the lamb’s fat in the 
first stanza (tallow is made from animal fat).
292
 The ‘holy gold’ window looks onto a 
historical continuum littered with the burnt victims of various types of fanaticism; the 
suggestion is perhaps that the Jews, like the Spanish heretics, were ‘ousted’ in 
Auschwitz in order to vindicate the belief systems of their persecutors, before being 
conveniently converted into useful by-products (tallow is used to make candles and also, 
ironically, soap). 
Despite having become a ‘burnt offering’ (Plath plays on this original meaning 
of ‘holocaust’ in the final stanza), these Jews retain a kind of substantiality, even after 
their deaths: 
 
 Their thick palls float 
 
 Over the cicatrix of Poland, burnt-out 
Germany. 
 They do not die. 
 
The term ‘thick palls’ evokes the palls of smoke that came from the crematoria of the 
death-camps, in which the dead were shrouded instead of their rightful funeral palls. 
Through this pun the dead are conceived of as both an absence - those not even 
accorded the dignity of a proper burial - and a kind of presence, with their smoke still 
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clogging the sky. The poem as a whole, and this stanza in particular, seems to have a 
pictorial analogue in Marc Chagall’s painting White Crucifixion (1938), whose broad 
relevance to Holocaust poetry has been discussed at length by Gubar in Poetry after 
Auschwitz (2003).
293
 Chagall’s provocative image shows Judaic figures and scenes of 
destruction dotted around the glowing, central figure of the crucified Christ, and 
‘Mary’s Song’ makes extensive use of similar historical and theological juxtapositions. 
The ‘thick palls’ floating above Poland in Plath’s poem are uncannily reminiscent of the 
spectral Jewish characters that drift through the smoke-filled heavens at the top of 
Chagall’s canvas. However, despite the evident similarities between the two works, 
Plath’s poem is not a direct literary response to the painting (as some of her earlier 
poems were to other visual works of art).
294
 If anything, it is an inversion of it; for while 
Christ takes a central position in Chagall’s picture, the centre of Plath’s poetic canvas 
remains empty, with the poem and all its images circling about the central void of 
‘burnt-out Germany’, which forms a thematic and structural axis (‘Germany’ being the 
sole word in the middle line of the middle stanza). 
The nothingness at the heart of this poem might suggest a pervasive nihilism, 
even a debilitating amnesia resulting from the social unwillingness to confront the 
contemporary significance of the Nazi annihilation of the Jews. Poland is described as a 
‘cicatrix’, a healed wound, intimating a suturing of past and present that is historically 
and morally objectionable, especially when we consider that this poem was written less 
than twenty years after the genocide. Yet the knowledge that the dead ‘do not die’, and 
also the fact that a cicatrix represents a kind of eternal mark of damage (or at least a scar 
that will never heal over), offset the possible encroachment of historical forgetfulness. 
In a final carbon typescript of the poem, Plath changed the line ‘Over the cicatrix of 
Poland’ to ‘Over scoured Poland’; the latter version, with its play on the word 
‘scoured’, brilliantly suggests the ineradicable contradiction of a country that has been 
artificially ‘cleansed’, but which is still being keenly ‘watched-over’ from elsewhere.295 
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‘Mary’s Song’ refuses to conceive of the Holocaust as an event that has come to 
an end, its proper narrative temporality being the ‘ongoingness’ (I use this word in the 
special sense that Gubar gives it, as a counterbalance to the ‘principle of discontinuity’ 
that Lawrence Langer believes separates victims from their offspring and other non-
victims) of the present tense.
296
 In this way, Plath concurs with Claude Lanzmann: 
 
When does the Holocaust really end? Did it end on the last day of the war? Did 
it end with the creation of the state of Israel? No, it still goes on. These events 
are of such magnitude, of such scope that they never stopped developing their 
consequences.
297
 
 
In ‘Mary’s Song’, the consequences that develop from these events are both collective 
(the dead haunt entire countries), and also intensely personal to the narrator. Indeed, it is 
as though a necessary corollary of the assertion ‘they do not die’ is that she, the speaker, 
almost does: 
 
 Gray birds obsess my heart, 
Mouth-ash, ash of eye. 
 They settle. […] 
 
Precisely who this afflicted speaker is remains unclear: she seems to be part modern-day 
woman in a suburban kitchen, part Virgin Mary in Paradise. What is evident, however, 
is that her interiorisation of the event occurs not simply because she wills it as a 
particularly empathetic individual (be she a domestic or a divine goddess); rather it is, 
following Lanzmann, a development that is a quality or characteristic of the event itself. 
The ‘gray birds’, redolent of the dead Jews in their ‘thick palls’, themselves ‘obsess’ her 
heart: ‘to obsess’ is a passive verb construction, so the heart is here figured as an object 
that is being obsessed over, rather than the origin of an individual emotion. This reversal 
of the more traditional dynamic of mourning - Mary does not mourn the dead as lost 
companions, but instead they actively return to mourn themselves, in her and through 
her - precipitates the disintegration of her individual subjectivity: the ‘ash of eye’ 
suggests a macabre covering over of the eyes of the speaker, like the closing of the lids 
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of the dead, and is therefore also the ash of ‘I’. Through such pointed double meanings, 
‘Mary’s Song’ displays an ‘ironic friction between the lyric’s traditional investment in 
voicing subjectivity and a history that assaulted not only innumerable sovereign subjects 
but indeed the very idea of sovereign selfhood’.298 
 The concluding stanzas describe a crucifixion scene that has been revised and 
transported to an apocalyptic nuclear age, as the ‘gray birds’ now ‘settle’: 
 
[…] On the high 
 
Precipice  
 That emptied one man into space 
 The ovens glowed like heavens, incandescent. 
 
The basic narrative of the Passion is debased by a series of terminological replacements 
that derive from the secular language of Hollywood, NASA and nuclear technology: 
Golgotha becomes a ‘precipice’, the Ascension becomes an ‘emptying’, Christ becomes 
‘one man’, and Heaven is merely ‘space’, and then a sinister simile for ‘the ovens’ 
(Plath may have known that the ‘funnel’ at Treblinka was referred to by the Nazis as 
‘the road to heaven’, and a common euphemism for the gas chambers and crematoria 
was ‘heaven blocks’).299 The lineation of  the fifth and sixth stanzas invites the reader to 
infer that the human ashes that settled on the mouth and eye of the poem’s speaker also 
settle ‘On the high/ precipice’ where, according to Christian doctrine, the human body 
of God incarnate was immortalised. The remains of dead European Jews here weigh 
down on the Ascension, tainting the hope of eternal salvation that Christians believe 
Christ offered to humankind. 
A ‘precipice’ means both a steep rock-face and a dangerous situation, and a 
sense of impending disaster rings through these final stanzas of ‘Mary’s Song’, recalling 
Walter Benjamin’s contention that ‘to articulate the past historically does not mean to 
recognise it “the way it really was” (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it 
flashes up at a moment of danger.’300 For Benjamin, authentic acts of historical 
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representation were linked to a metaphysical ideal: ‘The past carries with it a temporal 
index by which it is referred to redemption.’301 Plath’s poem, however, suggests that the 
moment of danger is generated by the demolition of redemptive promise: in contrast to 
the present tense time-frame used throughout ‘Mary’s Song’, the satirical crucifixion 
scene is told in the past tense.  
In its pervasive scepticism, and its avoidance of consolatory narratives, ‘Mary’s 
Song’ displays many of the characteristics of what Young has termed ‘antiredemptory 
literature’: a genre of post-Holocaust writing which refuses affirmatory explanations of 
art’s purpose after atrocity, and of atrocity itself.302 This genre is not in any way an anti-
memory literature - the dead ‘do not die’ - but an antiredemptory work is concerned to 
refute the idea that any positive values or meanings can be salvaged from such 
memories. The final stanza does not, therefore, seek to allay the repercussions of the 
disaster; rather, through further switches in verb tenses, it extends them into the future:  
 
 It is a heart, 
 This holocaust I walk in, 
 O golden child the world will kill and eat. 
 
The fact that the speaker walks in ‘this holocaust’, and not ‘the Holocaust’, encourages 
the reader to interpret the word in its original etymological sense. Kendall notes that 
‘Plath underlined “holocaust” in her Webster’s dictionary, along with its two 
definitions: “A sacrificial offering the whole of which is consumed by fire”, and 
“Hence, a complete or thorough sacrifice or destruction, esp. by fire, as of large 
numbers of human beings.”’303 The poem evokes a sense of ‘holocaust’ that is not, now, 
limited to a single event that occurred in a specific place and time: it is a global 
condition, and one specifically rooted in the human heart. The resumption of the present 
tense narrative and the phrasing of the penultimate line mean that Mary either always 
walks in this holocaust, or that holocaust is a place, a realm even, that she now walks 
into. In the last line the banality of the world’s evil, to paraphrase Hannah Arendt, is 
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rendered rhythmically through the monotony of the iambic pentameter. Again, the 
syntax is ambiguous here: the ‘golden child’ could either be a bystander being warned 
of the world’s murderousness, or else a future victim of anthropophagy (the child that 
‘the world will kill and eat’). The unbreakable nature of humanity’s genocidal mentality 
is emphasised by the way that the line begins with an exclamatory ‘O’ and ends with the 
word ‘eat’, creating a circular narrative which refers us back to the ‘Sunday lamb’ of the 
first line of the poem, which now becomes suggestively overlaid with the original sense 
of ‘holocaust’ as a ‘burnt offering’. The symbolic logic of animal sacrifice and the 
sacramental consumption of food is thereby roundly debased, and replaced with the 
more brutal animus of the slaughterhouse, where the death of animals proves only that 
‘the world will kill and eat’. 
 In Robert Lowell’s earlier poem ‘The Holy Innocents’, the nativity scene is 
transferred to Nazi-occupied Europe, where the ‘Lamb of the shepherds’ finds himself 
in a time when ‘The world out-Herods Herod’.304 Similarly, the Christian narratives and 
figures used in ‘Mary’s Song’ suggest that the ‘golden child’ is Jesus, Mary’s son, 
transported into an age of atrocity. The Christ-child is a common figure in Plath’s late 
poems, especially those about her children (see, for example, ‘Nick and the 
Candlestick’, which ends with the line: ‘You are the baby in the barn’). In ‘Mary’s 
Song’, however, this ‘golden child’ is just another Jewish victim who, like the infant of 
Lowell’s poem - described by Jonathan Raban as a ‘Buchenwald Jesus, without dignity 
or divinity’ - is divested of rank and purpose by the occurrence of the Holocaust.305 
The failure of the biblical analogy is a central feature of Plath’s antiredemptory 
approach to Holocaust representation. As Gubar notes: ‘Given their implicit promise of 
a redemptive salvation or wisdom born of painful sacrifices […] biblical analogues fail 
to capture the horror of child-survivors [and] of children of survivors.’306 Refusing to 
harbour any hope of salvation, poems such as ‘The Holy Innocents’ and ‘Mary’s Song’ 
operate through a logic of inversion, where meaning is created negatively, by depriving 
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Christian figures and icons of their metaphysical, and even their literary, significance. 
In The Divine Comedy, for example, Mary is the Queen of Heaven, a supreme matriarch 
who intercedes with God for Dante, so that in the final Canto of the Paradiso he is able 
to look into the Eternal Light and see the vision of Infinite Goodness. In this vision three 
circles explain the mystery of the Incarnation and grant Dante salvation; but the purity 
and overpowering meaningfulness of the vision is such that he simply cannot remember 
it fully, or find an adequate language with which to describe it:  
 
   From that point on, what I could see was greater 
than speech can show: at such a sight, it fails 
and memory fails when faced with such excess.
307
  
 
Plath’s ‘Mary’, on the other hand, is only able to mediate a vision of personal and 
universal collapse about the centre of ‘burnt-out/ Germany’, where events took place 
that are shrouded in darkness, placing them beyond representation and memory in a 
manner diametrically opposed to the illuminative excess that we find in Dante. 
Another probable poetic influence on ‘Mary’s Song’ appears to be, once again, 
a work by Nelly Sachs, this time ‘O the Night of the Weeping Children’, with the last 
line of ‘Mary’s Song’ reproducing the formal lament of Sachs’s Holocaust poem: ‘O the 
night of the weeping children!/ O the night of the children branded for death!’.308 Rather 
than simply being a work of retrospective mourning, Sachs’s work is imaginatively 
situated within a historical time and place from where its narrator bemoans the future 
fate of the children. There is a similar disruption of chronology in ‘Mary’s Song’ which, 
while not redeeming the child’s death, does at least manage to delay it by transporting 
us ‘inside’ history to a moment that came before the murder of a Jewish infant who, like 
Sachs’s ‘weeping children’, seems ‘branded for death’. Here Plath creates another 
impossible temporality, suggesting that the only authentically antiredemptory time-
frame within which to locate our contemporary relation to the dead is that of an eternity 
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- again, a religious concept - in which we are confronted with the infinite expectation 
not of salvation, but of loss. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: ‘Getting There’ 
 
In my introduction I argued that ‘Letter in November’ figures history as an oblique 
category that is internally divided from itself: specifically, the study of ‘History’ proper 
is differentiated from the relationship between the living and the dead, and the past is 
represented as both unreachable in, and contemporaneous with, the present. Readings of 
Plath’s Holocaust verse suggest that an understanding of the past as both lost and ever-
present informs her representation of the Holocaust as an event which both resists and 
demands imaginative configuration within an aesthetic medium such as poetry; as such, 
it is not made known through a spurious rhetoric of representative wholeness, but 
through provocative monologues which highlight the deficiencies of their speakers, and 
through ghostly encroachments on the style and form of more lyrical works such as ‘The 
Munich Mannequins’ and ‘Mary’s Song’ (employing what Rowland terms the ‘regular 
irregularities of awkward poetics’).309 I have used the terms ‘history’ and ‘Holocaust’ 
almost interchangeably throughout my commentary; but this begs the question of the 
true relation between the two in Plath’s work: is her representation of the Holocaust 
governed by considerations deriving specifically from the Nazi genocide? Or does it 
originate in a much broader understanding of history as a whole?  
The poem ‘Getting There’, composed less than a week after ‘Lady Lazarus’, is 
significant in this regard, for like ‘Mary’s Song’, it combines specific references to the 
Holocaust with frequent gestures of imaginative generalisation. The first-person narrator 
is locked in a boxcar full of injured and mutilated bodies: 
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The gigantic gorilla interior 
Of the wheels move, they appal me 
The terrible brains  
Of Krupp, black muzzles 
Revolving, the sound 
Punching out Absence! like cannon. 
It is Russia I have to get across, it is some war or other.
310
  
 
Despite the speaker’s evident disorientation, and her comment that ‘it is some war or 
other’, the reference to the German industrialist and armaments manufacturer Krupp 
would suggest that the backdrop to the action is the Second World War, as would the 
boxcar full of misplaced persons traversing Russia, which brings to mind the 
geographically dizzying journey that many survivors were forced to undertake after their 
liberation (famously described by Levi in The Truce (1963)). The principal themes of 
the poem - dehumanisation and the collapse of identity, the failure of memory, the 
impossibility or undesirability of factual representation - are also characteristic features 
of Plath’s handling of the Holocaust, which she portrays as an event surrounded by 
silence. The wheels of the train are described as ‘black muzzles’ (recalling the ‘dark 
funnel’ of ‘Little Fugue’, and the ‘black phones’ of ‘Daddy’ and ‘The Munich 
Mannequins’) which carry their victims to an uncertain destination, and they are 
‘Punching out Absence! like cannon’, with the capitalisation of the word ‘Absence’ 
placing graphic emphasis on a key term in the poet’s Holocaust vocabulary. 
Historical voids consistently emerge in Plath’s Holocaust verse as both a central 
justification for writing and a representational restraint: the battle being fought within 
these works is not with the author’s suicidal inclinations, but with those of history itself. 
Developing a central trope of Plath’s Holocaust writing, ‘Getting There’ suggests that 
absence was an inherent characteristic of an event which, in Felman’s terms, constituted 
a ‘radical deception’ through its assault on the capacity of survivors to bear witness. As 
Felman notes, it was ‘impossible to testify from inside otherness, or from […] inside 
amnesia, or from inside deception and the delusion of coercive self-deception’, and so 
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the Holocaust ‘occurs as the unprecedented, inconceivable historical advent of an event 
without a witness’.311 In the final lines of ‘Getting There’, having been reduced to a 
primal state of existence - ‘I am dragging my body/ Quietly through the straw of the 
boxcars’, ‘Will there be fire, will there be bread?’ - the narrator undergoes an unsettling 
metamorphosis: 
   
The carriages rock, they are cradles. 
And I, stepping from this skin 
Of old bandages, boredoms, old faces 
 
Step to you from the black car of Lethe, 
Pure as a baby. 
 
The boxcar is figured as Lethe, the underworld river of forgetfulness that cleansed the 
memory of sin from those passing through purgatory, with the narrator unable to 
remember, and clearly not wanting to remember, anything about the experiences she has 
just been through. Kroll argues that this chthonic lustration forms the necessary 
precondition for the speaker’s symbolic transcendence of history, purifying her of ‘false 
encumbrances’.312 Yet Plath’s lines, much like Kroll’s assessment of them, are in actual 
fact rather sinister; above all, they suggest, following Felman, that the Nazi genocide 
had an inherent capacity for self-erasure, for ‘covering its own tracks’. Marjorie Uroff 
also observes that a boxcar that is a ‘cradle’ risks nurturing ‘a new generation of killers; 
the pure baby who steps from it will perpetrate murder because she has forgotten the 
world’s past history of murderousness’.313 This said, the speaker’s contention that she 
leaves the hell of the boxcar having been cleansed of her past remains partially 
unconvincing - it could even be regarded as a deliberate, desperate affectation - as her 
amnesiac exit is shot through with memory-traces. The claim that she is ‘pure as a 
baby’, for example - and with it the suggestion of innocence regained - is undermined 
by an earlier reference to the sick and the dead being gathered in a ‘hospital of dolls’: an 
image which conflates innocence and wounding, and which perhaps alludes to the 
Holocaust novel House of Dolls (1956), written by a survivor who published the work 
 147 
under his prisoner number, Ka-tzetnik 135633, and whose anonymity, in turn, mirrors 
that of Plath’s speaker. 
 ‘Getting There’ clearly owes much to Marx’s definition of war as the 
‘locomotive of history’, and the metaphoric suggestiveness of the train is not limited to 
a Holocaust-specific frame of reference; in its relentless search for destination, and in its 
appetitive destructiveness that is both animalistic and mechanistic, the train also 
allegorises the broad teleology of modernity as a whole. Drawing on Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), Britzolakis reads the poem as Plath’s 
ambiguous negotiation with Enlightenment rationality, with the train representing the 
divided feelings of a poet who is at once critical of, and enthralled by, the drive towards 
mastery which, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, made the advance of the 
Enlightenment ‘a narrative of violence which tends to annihilate otherness in the name 
of an implacable principle of identity’.314 The destructive logic of ‘othering’ is inflicted 
on a speaker who is a nameless facet of a mechanised social process that she is unable 
to control or decipher: 
 
 What do wheels eat, these wheels 
 Fixed to their arcs like gods, 
 The silver leash of the will 
 Inexorable. And their pride! 
 All the gods know is destinations. 
 I am a letter in this slot 
    
Here Plath’s critique of history as an assault on the sovereign selfhood of ‘the other’ 
seems to entail an explanatory expansiveness whose meaning cannot be limited to any 
single event or historical period. Yet for Horkheimer and Adorno, the ‘destination’ of 
the Enlightenment project as a whole was, specifically, Auschwitz, where reason - 
which had sought to eradicate otherness, and to overcome irrationalities such as 
religion, sympathetic magic and myth - turned against itself and transformed into 
irrational violence. As Britzolakis puts it, the ‘oppressive tendency’ of the 
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Enlightenment’s will to power ‘culminates in the catastrophe of the Holocaust, in whose 
wake the entire heritage of European high culture appears discredited or exhausted’.315 
Such an understanding of the past is also advanced in ‘Getting There’, in which, much 
as in ‘Mary’s Song’, history is a process (its wheels ‘fixed to their arcs like gods’) 
whose meaning is understood retrospectively, after Auschwitz, as holocaust:  
 
 The train is dragging itself, it is screaming 
 An animal 
 Insane for the destination, 
 The bloodspot, 
 The face at the end of the flare. 
 
The specific historical period obliquely identified in the poem gives history as a whole a 
final meaning which, up to that point, it did not have, becoming an endpoint, or 
‘bloodspot’, which casts its shadow over the whole spectrum of the past, darkening all 
previous eras with its suggestion that human progress - an insanity ‘for the destination’ - 
was only ever getting there: to dehumanisation, to bodies packed into boxcars, to Krupp 
and industrialised mass-murder, to Auschwitz. 
 This analysis of history is articulated through a poetic discourse whose precise 
relation to the social processes it describes, however, remains vexed (a problem which 
parallels the controversial use of Holocaust spectacle in ‘Lady Lazarus’). As Britzolakis 
points out, the ‘engine’ which represents the relentless, and ultimately disastrous, 
progress of the Enlightenment is also one of Plath’s favourite figures for poetic 
language, drawing the poem and its subject into an uneasy conjunction. Contrasting it 
with the equestrian imagery used in self-reflexive ‘poems about poems’ such as ‘Ariel’, 
which evoke the Platonic emblem of the ‘noble rider’ of rhetoric, Britzolakis notes how 
Holocaust poems such as ‘Getting There’ and ‘Daddy’ use the figure of the engine to 
show language brutally dominating its users, acting as ‘a metaphorical machine which 
conveys the “I” into a historical and ideological “other” space not of its own 
choosing’.316 (Significantly, in this regard, Plath’s poem ‘Metaphors’ actually ends with 
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metaphor describing itself as having ‘boarded the train there’s no getting off’ - perhaps 
a ‘train of association’ that sets its own course, beyond the will or control of the 
individual, and which ultimately leads, like the ones in ‘Daddy’ and ‘Getting There’, to 
Auschwitz.)
317
 
The question to ask of these texts is to what extent the engine metaphor reflects 
the praxis of the poems themselves: do they simply represent the coercive, authoritarian 
dimension of post-Holocaust language use, or do they possess, or willingly exploit, a 
kind of will to mastery over their own speakers? In one sense, ‘Getting There’ and 
‘Daddy’ clearly avoid this latter hazard: by highlighting the damage done when an 
instrumental language turns subjectivity into a reified aspect of a violent social process, 
the poems are inherently reflections on that social process. But in another sense, as 
Britzolakis observes of ‘Daddy’, this does not offset the way in which they activate, 
through sound and rhythm, a ‘daemonic […] or nihilistic side of the auditory 
imagination’, where language, just like the Enlightenment rationality it would purport to 
critique (what ‘Getting There’ calls ‘The terrible brains/ Of Krupp’), acts as a 
‘technology which violently, if exhilaratingly, wrests the body to its own ends’.318 For 
as Britzolakis points out, in ‘Daddy’ it is ‘the metrical parallelism of rhyme’ that 
produces the persecutor-victim metaphor which runs through the poem, with ‘you’ 
finding a natural corollary in ‘Jew’. It is the poem’s own engine-like language that 
yokes together ‘historical and subjective crisis in manifestly unstable metaphorical 
conjunctions’.319 There is thus a sense in which poetic language is implicated in the 
creation of the victim identity of the narrator of ‘Daddy’, and in the ‘othering’ of the 
abject narrator of ‘Getting There’. As a result, these poems could be judged to play out 
‘a deep complicity with the drive towards mastery that Adorno sees as central to 
Enlightenment’, staging a ‘“dialectic of enlightenment” in the arena of metaphor, 
rhythm, and sound’ by ‘drawing upon the ambiguously incantatory and oral powers of 
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poetic language itself’: the very irrational ‘powers’ which, according to Adorno and 
Horkheimer, made Auschwitz possible.
320
 
For Adorno, the task of the artwork would not, however, be to resolve the 
contradiction of using aspects of the irrational forces unleashed when reason turned 
against itself in Auschwitz to articulate a critique of the rationality that led to 
Auschwitz: a successful work is not one which superficially overcomes social and 
aesthetic contradictions, but one which is able to embody them ‘pure and 
uncompromised, in its innermost structure’.321 Monologues such as ‘Daddy’ and ‘Lady 
Lazarus’ might, therefore, use incantatory rhythms and parody voodoo ritual in a way 
which invokes the mythic and irrational elements that Enlightenment rationality had 
outwardly opposed (and which were later turned against it), or appropriate a kitschy 
Holocaust aesthetic for a self-dramatising death show - but only when their stylistic 
excesses are held in check by structural and imagistic counter-arguments which point to 
the paradoxes or ironies of their language use. This kind of interplay between form and 
content, advocated by Adorno, also generates the internal intelligence of ‘Mary’s Song’, 
in which signifiers of religious understanding spiral around a structural centre - ‘burnt-
out/Germany’ - that empties them of iconic meaning. These poems all operate through a 
logic of self-reflexivity: they employ a metaphorical language which threatens to violate 
the legitimate memory of the Nazi genocide, but the comparisons between self and Jew 
in ‘Daddy’, the self-aggrandising appropriations of ‘Lady Lazarus’, and the discourse of 
religious sacrifice in ‘Mary’s Song’, are each subjected to structural negations within 
the poems themselves. ‘Getting There’ also contains the ‘threat’ element: it points to the 
mechanicalism of its own language, shows subjectivity being appended to the 
instrumental logic of Enlightenment rationality, and ends with a moment of putative 
transcendence in which a survivor celebrates the onset of amnesia. This is not a 
completely reified artwork, where culture becomes indistinguishable form its object, 
society, as ‘to say that consciousness of society is completely reified implies that no 
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critical consciousness or theory is possible’, and ideas about the relation between the 
individual and society are clearly entertained in the poem.
322
 However, it lacks a probing 
formal critique (through, say, structure, sound or allusion) of its dominant engine 
metaphor, and of its philosophy of history as holocaust, to match the ironic meta-
commentaries of the earlier monologues. In this way, ‘Getting There’ does not clarify, 
but rather deviates from, Plath’s more normative historical poetics; for her most 
‘serious’ Holocaust poems articulate the specific contradictions of Holocaust 
representation through their form. 
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3 
The Poetics of Regeneration: 
W. D. Snodgrass’s The Fuehrer Bunker 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Following his inglorious return to Berlin from his western command centre in 
Ziegenberg in January 1945, Hitler transferred his living quarters to an underground 
bunker beneath the Reich Chancellery; with the territorial boundaries of the Reich 
rapidly contracting, and the Russians closing in on the capital, the dictator now sought 
an escape from the constant air raids that were disrupting his sleep and distracting him 
from his work.
323
 The bunker to which he withdrew was created by the extensive 
reconstruction of an old bomb shelter - a lengthy project which had been completed in 
the summer of 1944: the original shelter had been deepened, with a whole second tier 
added, and encased by a sixteen and a half feet thick shell of reinforced concrete.
324
 
Hitler occupied the lower, and slightly larger, of the two storeys, which subsequently 
became known as the Fuehrer Bunker. It consisted of eighteen small, dimly lit rooms 
built either side of a central passage. By April, as the German military position 
deteriorated even further, Hitler was also holding his twice-daily staff conferences in the 
bunker. Immured in this tenebrous complex, he now emerged into daylight only to walk 
his dog, Blondi, in the crater-filled Chancellery gardens, or to have lunch with his 
secretaries.
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 For those members of Hitler’s inner circle who had joined him underground, 
life was chaotic and strained. As Alan Bullock puts it in his biography Hitler: A Study in 
Tyranny (1952): 
 
The physical atmosphere of the bunker was oppressive, but this was nothing 
compared to the pressure of the psychological atmosphere. The incessant air-
raids, the knowledge that the Russians were now in the city, nervous 
exhaustion, fear, and despair produced a tension bordering on hysteria, which 
was heightened by propinquity to a man whose changes of mood were not only 
unpredictable but affected the lives of all those in the shelter.
326
 
 
Hitler continued to live an increasingly bizarre subterranean existence throughout April, 
deploying battalions of non-existent troops, clinging to a long-held belief that a split 
among the Allies was inevitable, and ordering extempore dismissals, executions and 
promotions, until he shot himself on April 30. 
In W. D. Snodgrass’s cycle of poems The Fuehrer Bunker (1995), a series of 
dramatic monologues spoken by prominent Nazis during the last days of the Reich, the 
tumultuous atmosphere of the bunker becomes the backdrop for a poetic exploration of 
the genocidal mentality, with the underground chamber standing as a central symbol for 
the buried histories and repressed psychological energies that the poems unearth. Oliver 
Hirschbiegel’s compelling film Downfall (2005), which also retells the story of Hitler’s 
final days in the bunker, deploys a realist aesthetic to portray key events in the fall of 
the Reich; while the film is a character study of Hitler and his secretary, Traudl Junge, 
the style means that it lacks inwardness, and viewers are left with no real insight into the 
main characters’ past histories or motivations: the point is to show as closely as possible 
what happened, not to ask why. In The Fuehrer Bunker, on the other hand, the besieged 
hideout is, in the words of the fictional Goebbels, less a representation of a real 
historical space than a kind of ‘confession booth/ Where liars face up to blank truth’.327 
 
 
The Origins and Objectives of The Fuehrer Bunker 
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Snodgrass had long aspired to dramatise events in the Fuehrer Bunker, and to recreate 
the personalities of the highest-ranking, most infamous Nazis. He has commented:  
 
As soon as the war was over, I began reading the Nazi books and memoirs. I 
really wanted to know what the hell could somebody think, or feel, that would 
make them feel those acts were necessary. How could they even think they were 
possible?
328
 
 
In the late 1940s he tried to write a play based on Hugh Trevor-Roper’s investigative 
report into the death of Hitler, The Last Days of Hitler (1947). The play was never 
completed (by Snodgrass’s own admission, at the time he ‘wasn’t very good’), but its 
grounding in Trevor-Roper’s documentary report, and above all its overt theatricality, 
were to become central elements of the ambitious poetic cycle on which he began work 
in the early 1970s.
329
  
Trevor-Roper has himself described the events leading up to Hitler’s death as ‘a 
carefully produced theatrical piece’ consistent with the dictator’s whole previous 
history, which had been ‘consciously theatrical, perhaps even operatic’.330 The dramatic 
character of the last days in the bunker was reflected in Snodgrass’s chosen poetic form, 
what he has called an ‘oratorio or speech cantata’.331 Like Dylan Thomas’s Under Milk 
Wood (1954), the cycle is a kind of ‘play for voices’ (though Snodgrass does not make 
use of Thomas’s dialogic technique). For this form Snodgrass has frequently registered 
his indebtedness to Henri Coulette’s The War of the Secret Agents (1966), another series 
of dramatic monologues set in World War II and based on real-life events. Coulette’s 
poly-voiced poem tells the story of the betrayal of a group of secret agents by the British 
government: sent to Paris, where many of them were eventually murdered by the 
Gestapo, the agents were unaware that they were being used to distract the German 
intelligence forces, so that the real secret agents - the ‘underground beneath the 
underground’ - would not get caught.332  
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Not only the form of The War of the Secret Agents, but also its themes of 
political intrigue and personal betrayal, influenced The Fuehrer Bunker. In its elaborate 
narrative plotting, its focus on court intrigues and rivalries, and its depiction of the 
downfall of flawed over-reachers, Snodgrass’s volume might even be said to resemble a 
Jacobean tragedy. Paul Gaston has termed The Fuehrer Bunker ‘a tragedy of evil’, and 
Snodgrass has himself compared his technique of juxtaposing highly stylised passages 
with more realistic scenes to King Lear.
333
 There are also elements of Greek tragedy in 
the poet’s use of a formal chorus, and in his concerted exploration of the relation 
between political events and family life; and Snodgrass draws extensively on Freud’s 
theoretical reading of the ‘family drama’ played out in Sophocles’s Oedipus Rex to 
explore the unconscious motivations of his characters. In an interview with Gaston, he 
explained this eagerness to give military events a domestic context: ‘We create our 
political systems and our armies in the terms that the family has set out for us. The same 
drives that make us make families make us make nations.’334 
 While The Fuehrer Bunker has been performed on the stage on several 
occasions, it should not, however, be thought of as a play; this is very much a verse 
cycle, and its drama is most elaborately performed on the page.
335
 For the volume 
Snodgrass created what he termed ‘a compendium of verse forms’, whereby ‘each 
speaker has a kind of verse form that is typical of his or her personality’.336 The result is 
one of the most elaborately stylised and inventive aesthetic representations of Nazism, 
with the form, mise-en-page, and even the typography of the poems embodying the 
differing psychological states of the main characters. The monologues of Heinrich 
Himmler, for example, appear on a square grid, with each capitalised letter occupying 
one box, every word separated by a dot, and each line comprising exactly thirty 
characters. This layout suggests a telegram, and evokes the programmatic nature of the 
Reichsfuehrer’s psyche; more extremely, the Himmler poems bear a strong resemblance 
to concentration camp blueprints, with their symmetrical rows of identical oblong 
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barracks. At the same time, there is something rather childish about the squared page, 
which seems to mimic the notebooks in which schoolchildren practise their handwriting 
and spelling. The impression of a psychology which combines infantile simplicity, 
heinous criminality and a kind of inhuman mechanism is reinforced by the fact that 
every poem is an acrostic of the alphabet, the first letters of each line progressing from 
A to Z in unfaltering succession. Similarly, the technocratic mind-set of Albert Speer is 
reflected in a form which consists of a series of right-angled triangles. As she prepares 
to commit infanticide, the monomania and rigid resolve of Magda Goebbels are figured 
through the compulsive repetitions of the villanelle. Not all the forms, however, share 
this structural tightness: Hitler’s poems are incredibly varied in layout - including one 
which alternates lines of a spleen-filled interior monologue with passages from a 
masochist’s sex manual - and the Goering poems employ an expansive, flatulent 
language to match the corpulency and crudeness of the real-life Reichsmarschall. 
Snodgrass regards the complete cycle of The Fuehrer Bunker, which was over 
two decades in the making, as his most accomplished piece of work.
337
 But despite the 
author’s belief in the cycle, it has met with a largely hostile response from critics and 
readers at each stage of its long publication history. A common charge is that the 
volume humanises the senior Nazis, transforming moral monsters into people with 
feelings and personalities (a charge also levelled at Hirschbiegel’s film).338 Many also 
argue that by attempting to understand these murderers, one makes the first step towards 
forgiveness.
339
 Yet these criticisms originate in precisely the sorts of biases that The 
Fuehrer Bunker purposively sets out to counteract. As Snodgrass has commented, the 
Nazis were human: ‘If you desire to believe that they were not human, then you are 
guilty of exactly their worst crime, which is what they tried to do to the Jews, to believe 
that they were not human.’340 For Snodgrass, those who demonise the Nazi leadership, 
and who believe their crimes to be wholly foreign to themselves, and to their country 
and culture, miss the most important lessons of the genocide: ‘one of the real, basic, 
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terrible paradoxes of being alive [is] that your enemy is human and not so different from 
you’.341 In the poems this observation is concretised by the fact that Snodgrass’s Nazis 
speak a slangy American. 
If readers of The Fuehrer Bunker were to appreciate the basic similarity 
between themselves and the perpetrators of genocide, then, as well as sharing the same 
vernacular, Snodgrass felt they would have to be brought into a hazardous, even 
unwelcome, psychological contact with evil:  
 
The aim of a work of art surely is to stretch the reader’s psyche, to help him 
[sic] to identify with more people, with more life than he normally does. He is 
only going to be able to do that if you get him past his beliefs about right and 
wrong which keep him from seeing what ways in which he is like certain other 
people. And, of course, he is going to object to that when you do it.
342
  
 
Any attempt to understand the Nazis would equally demand a deconstruction of the 
elaborate mythology that the murderers concocted about themselves and their party: by 
‘exposing these people for what they really were, not allowing them to be seen as they 
wanted to be seen’, the cycle would reveal the human characteristics that permitted the 
conception and execution of inhuman acts.
343
 
The overarching explanatory purpose of the cycle was also embodied in its 
structure, with the form of the dramatic monologue reflecting Snodgrass’s conviction 
that individual psychology can be a determining  force in history. The monologic 
framework meant that the speakers were ‘not talking to anyone outside themselves’ (the 
reader excepted), allowing Snodgrass to describe past actions, or to portray dimensions 
of character, unknown to anyone but the speaker.
344
 As I noted in the previous chapter, a 
generic trait of the classic dramatic monologue - Robert Browning’s ‘My Last Duchess’, 
for example - is that the speaker must, even when talking to some other character, give 
something away. Snodgrass also believed that in certain instances the monologue form 
could be used to create added levels of self-awareness: his Hitler, for example, was 
made ‘much more conscious of his own destructiveness than he ever appeared to be’.345 
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Poetic form is thus the enabling principle of the cycle’s interrogatory technique, 
allowing the poet to fashion a strangely unshackled form of reality in which ‘the 
speakers say things they never would have said to anyone, perhaps not even to 
themselves’.346 
 
 
History and Poetry 
 
Snodgrass’s anti-Nazi agenda is indubitable; yet the psychological realism to which he 
lays claim - whereby poetic technique allows historical characters to understand 
themselves even better than they seem to have done in reality - is frequently belied by 
the poems themselves, which operate more at the level of satire and vaudeville. The 
extravagant, instrumental form that Snodgrass uses to represent a figure such as 
Himmler, for example, suggests that the man was anything but human. Moreover, it 
should be noted that when crafting the volume, Snodgrass’s fundamental approach to 
historical factuality was highly selective. While many of the events described, and even 
individual lines, were recorded in historical documents, he also, in his own words, 
‘made up some episodes’; in particular, he doubted the legitimacy of his portrayal of 
Magda Goebbels’s promiscuity: ‘I have put things in that I don’t believe happened. Or 
in some cases I have accepted an interpretation of a character which I do not believe to 
be historical fact.’347 His justifications for such alterations are poetic, not historical: ‘A 
true fact which doesn’t feel true in the poem is no good at all. The poem has to feel 
authentic. That is much more important than anything so shallow as documentary 
evidence.’348 Clearly then, when deciding what to include or exclude, what to represent 
or invent, Snodgrass’s principal criterion was the production of a satisfying aesthetic 
piece.  
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Snodgrass had always felt that the originality of, and necessity for, his project 
lay in its poetic form: when he started the cycle, ‘more books were being written about 
the Nazis than just about any other thing […] But nobody was talking about them in 
poems.’349 This was probably the case because any attempt to identify and explain the 
origins of historical atrocity would more normally be attempted in a medium such as 
prose, which demands that veracity take pre-eminence over the ‘feel’ of a fact, and 
where documentary evidence is anything but a ‘shallow’ concern. Yet Snodgrass 
believes that it is poetry, rather than prose, that is the intrinsically historical form. In a 
discussion of the classic works of Homer and Aeschylus, he observed: ‘People want to 
separate history and poetry. Or history and drama. I think that the art doesn’t demand 
that separation.’350 Regretting poetry’s dissociation from song - and with it the sense of 
‘epic’ poetry being a memory bank for significant episodes in history - he hoped that in 
his volume the two would be partially reconnected.
351
 What The Fuehrer Bunker 
ultimately lacks, however, at least as far as its success as a contribution to historical 
understanding goes, is precisely prose’s formal capacity to investigate the complex 
sociological and economic factors that underlie historical events. The many 
monographs, biographies, and historical studies of Hitler and Nazism suggest that 
individual psychology alone cannot account for the totality of the genocide. Broader 
political, historical and socio-economic factors determine why the destructive 
psychological forces and ‘horrifying powers’ which Snodgrass associates with the Nazi 
period, and which he feels we ‘hold […] in check only very tentatively’, might erupt 
with such deadly consequence in one particular place and time.
352
 In The Fuehrer 
Bunker, however, the rather unsatisfying assumption seems to be that genocide can 
break into the world merely as a result of one man’s destructive volition.  
 The era in which the poetic saga was the only medium for the cultural 
expression and retention of historical data has long passed, and poetry should not be 
judged by the criteria we set for works of history. As the verse of writers such as 
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Berryman and Plath shows, poetry after and about Auschwitz has become characterised 
by the absolute division that rends it from the experience of the past as it was. If art does 
not demand the separation of poetry and history, then history most certainly does. 
Fortunately, however, this is a truth that Snodgrass seems to have stumbled on despite 
himself in The Fuehrer Bunker - a volume which, through its selective approach to 
historical fact, its Americanised first-person voices, and its innovative manipulation of 
form, actually tends to exaggerate the gulf between historical reality and aesthetic 
experience that its author had claimed to suture. In doing so, The Fuehrer Bunker forces 
us to reassess the exact nature of the relation between history and poetry.  
If we accept that when its subject is an event such as the Nazi genocide, a poem 
does not, and indeed cannot, be expected to attain historical significance through its 
transmission of factual data, then a work such as The Fuehrer Bunker begs the 
questions: what can poetry tell us about atrocity? What is its function? And, by 
extension: can a compelling aesthetic experience ever have a serious historical purpose? 
In this chapter, through close analysis of the central monologues of the sequence - those 
of Speer, Hitler, Goebbels and Goering - I will argue that The Fuehrer Bunker is a work 
of formal and linguistic experimentation whose most important theme is the postwar 
survival of poetry, even of language itself. In the volume, poetry becomes the principle 
by which language is salvaged from political and ideological processes that had 
threatened to overwhelm it - a recovery that is portrayed as the necessary precondition 
for cultural, political and personal regeneration; and it is this, rather than any putative 
mimetic function, that makes The Fuehrer Bunker one of the most significant 
explorations of aesthetic possibility and purpose in the wake of the Nazi period. 
 
 
 
Albert Speer: Forms of Not Knowing 
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Albert Speer, Hitler’s architect protégé, and later his spectacularly efficient Minister of 
Armaments and War Production, is commonly portrayed as an anomalous figure within 
the upper echelons of the Nazi hierarchy, with his lucidity and obvious intelligence 
setting him apart from the obtuse opportunists, such as Bormann and Goering, who 
comprised the majority of Hitler’s inner circle. Hugh Trevor-Roper, for example, 
described him as an ‘extraordinary’ man, ‘perhaps the ablest and most interesting of all 
the Nazi government’.353 When writing The Last Days of Hitler, Trevor-Roper drew 
extensively on statements that Speer made while imprisoned by the Allies after the war, 
and also on his defence at Nuremberg: 
 
His conclusions are never naïve, never parochial; they seem always honest; they 
are often profound. If he seems sometimes to have fallen too deeply under the 
spell of the tyrant whom he served, at least he is the only servant whose 
judgement was not corrupted by attendance on that dreadful master; at least he 
retained the capacity to examine himself, and the honesty to declare both his 
errors and his convictions.
354
 
 
At Nuremberg the articulate and smartly dressed Speer was the only defendant to accept 
some degree of responsibility for those orders from Hitler that he had personally carried 
out. He also repeatedly emphasised his belief - to the consternation of Goering and the 
‘loyalist’ members of the party - that all senior members of the Nazi leadership shared a 
‘collective responsibility’ for the atrocities committed by the regime.355 During the 
course of the trial, Speer even outlined a plan he had conceived to assassinate Hitler and 
his closest confidantes, and disclosed how, when this tentative plot became unworkable, 
he systematically disobeyed the Fuehrer’s ‘Scorched Earth’ policy, which had directed 
retreating German forces to destroy the industry and infrastructure of Reich territory 
before it came under the control of the Allies.  
During the twenty years of imprisonment in Spandau to which he was 
eventually sentenced, Speer read voraciously, and worked on his memoirs, Inside the 
Third Reich (1970), in which he detailed his intimate, but markedly ambiguous, 
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relationship with Hitler (famously stating that ‘if Hitler had had any friends, I would 
certainly have been one of his close friends’).356 He also reaffirmed his unswerving 
penitential stance: ‘it is not only specific faults that burden my conscience, great as 
these may have been. My moral failure is not a matter of this item and that; it resides in 
my active participation with the whole course of events.’357 Following his release, Inside 
the Third Reich became an international best-seller, and Speer became a media figure. 
Throughout the 1970s he made frequent television appearances and gave numerous 
newspaper and magazine interviews in an attempt to play out the public role he had 
forged for himself as, in the words of Gitta Sereny, ‘the one apparently sane and 
repentant voice from the Third Reich’.358 
Here I quote from Sereny’s probing study of Speer’s character and political 
career, Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth (1995); but it is precisely Speer’s self-
characterisation as the exemplary penitent that Sereny questions in her book, insisting 
that his media profile, and his outwardly laudable acceptance of culpability at 
Nuremberg, were in fact an evasion of his personal responsibility for Nazism’s worst 
crimes. For Sereny, neither his testimony nor his later written depositions sufficiently 
account for ‘the specific faults’ that led to his own particular moral failures. Above all, 
they did not reflect Speer’s guilt over what the psychologist Alexander Mitscherlich has 
termed his Lebenslge, the ‘Great Lie’ of his life: that from around the time of 
Himmler’s infamous Posen speech to the Nazi Reichsleiter and Gauleiter on 6 October 
1943 - which Speer may have attended in person - he undoubtedly knew that Hitler was 
executing his long-planned genocide of the European Jews.
359
  
In The Fuehrer Bunker Snodgrass uses poetic form as a diagrammatic 
representation of Speer’s turbulent psychological state during the final months of the 
war - as Gaston puts it, ‘form becomes almost hieroglyphic, a kind of picture of the 
poem’s content’ - and Snodgrass, like Sereny, is centrally concerned with the place of 
the Jews in Speer’s conscience.360 The basic building block of the Speer poems is a 
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twelve-line stanza that has the shape of a right-angled triangle (what Snodgrass calls 
‘pyramids’).361 The repetition of this geometric form clearly highlights the rigidity of 
Speer’s technocratic mind-set. In his Gaston interview, Snodgrass, who had visited 
Speer in 1972, pointed out that the fact that each line is slightly longer than the previous 
one makes the poems resemble an arrangement of steps - ‘like the steps [of the bunker] 
Speer is going down and coming up in the poem’ - while also forming an ‘imitation of 
his compulsion for growth, for size’: a compulsion that Speer had channelled into his 
Pharaonic architectural designs.
362
 The fact that the triangles are mirrored, so that an 
inverted triangle sits beneath each upright one, gives the fictional Speer a touch more 
humanity: the lower triangles, often set in a lighter typeface, tend to contain his worries 
and doubts, and show a more ambiguous, perhaps even unconscious, underside to his 
personality. These reflected triangles also make visible his emphatically divided 
relationship with Hitler. Nonetheless, the overriding impression created by the structural 
logic of the monologues is that of a man who digests all outside information by way of 
the exact same cognitive pathways, regardless of its content. 
There is a sudden change, however, in the fourth Speer poem, where the 
triangular form is unexpectedly disrupted. In the previous monologues Speer has 
described his subversion of Hitler’s ‘Scorched Earth’ policy; now, climbing the bunker 
steps into the Chancellery garden after Hitler’s birthday ceremony, and growing 
increasingly disenchanted with his leader, he falls into a disturbed reverie, asking: 
‘What was it/ Hanke saw there in the East?/ And warned me not/ to find out, not to 
see?’363 The reference here is to a conversation that Speer recounts in Inside the Third 
Reich, which took place when his friend Karl Hanke, the Gauleiter of Lower Silesia, 
came to visit him in the summer of 1944: 
 
Sitting in the green leather easy chair in my office, he seemed confused and 
spoke falteringly, with many breaks. He advised me never to accept an 
invitation to inspect a concentration camp in Upper Silesia. Never, under any 
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circumstances. He had seen something there which he was not permitted to 
describe and moreover could not describe.
364
 
 
In the retrospective narrative of Inside the Third Reich Speer goes on to make the 
connection between Hanke’s oblique reference to a camp in Upper Silesia and 
Auschwitz; in Snodgrass’s monologue, however, Speer’s memory of the haunting 
conversation is enveloped in the silence of the place his friend was neither permitted nor 
able to describe, and he does not appear to pursue his enquiry to its logical conclusion. 
The stanza tails off: ‘What/ are the Russians digging up? the sort of things I saw in the 
camps / forced labour, wretched conditions…’ While the content of these lines 
suggests that Speer is unwilling to answer his own question, the syntax and layout 
actually imply that he has an unacknowledged or unconscious understanding of his 
friend’s full meaning. The non-capitalisation of the definite article that follows his 
question ‘What/ are the Russians digging up?’ suggests that not only is he recalling 
what he had seen in other camps - the emaciated ‘forced labourers’ who were kept in 
‘wretched conditions’ - but also that he is in effect answering his own question: what 
the Russians were digging up were precisely these ‘things’. In this unwitting 
depersonalisation of the slave labourers, Snodgrass’s Speer betrays the inhuman attitude 
that Speer himself admitted characterised his approach to the workers who fell under his 
administration: 
 
the desperate race with time, my obsessional fixation on production and output 
statistics, blurred all considerations and feelings of humanity. An American 
historian has said of me that I loved machines more than people. He is not 
wrong. I realize that the sight of suffering people influenced only my emotions, 
but not my conduct. On the plane of feelings only sentimentality emerged; in 
the realm of decisions, on the other hand, I continued to be ruled by the 
principles of utility.
365
 
 
Snodgrass further intimates that Hanke’s faltering testimony may have troubled 
Speer’s conscience more than he himself wanted to acknowledge - reminding him of 
things he had hoped to forget, and thus engaging him in a repression that was at the root 
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of the Great Lie of his life - through his deviation from the triangular stanzaic structure 
of the previous monologues. Instead of a regular geometric shape, the layout transforms 
briefly into an irregular quatrain as Speer describes how his sleep has become troubled 
by an etching by Kthe Kollwitz called The Guillotine (a copy hung in a hotel room 
Speer had stayed in during January 1945), and then disintegrates altogether as he recalls 
Hanke’s warnings, imploding into a swimming form with no coherent structure.366 The 
shape of the stanza almost resembles a cloud of smoke (a technique that William Heyen 
uses in his Holocaust poem ‘Blue’), and thus poetic form here literally draws out a truth 
- that of the gassing of the Jews - which the speaker of the monologue remains blind 
to.
367
 In the following stanza the triangular structure is reinstated; but now there is a 
confusing alternation between a bold and a regular typeface, and the actuality of the 
camp crematoria becomes horrifically implicated in Speer’s everyday life: ‘Time for a 
cigarette./ He forbids us all to smoke/ then sends us all up the chimney./ (What 
chimney? Where?).’ But Speer, unlike the reader, is unable to obey his own injunction - 
‘Idiot, use your/ eyes’ - and instead, as he reverts to worrying about whether or not 
Hitler knows of his betrayal, he consciously chooses to ‘neglect his knowing’. 
 For Snodgrass, as for Sereny, Speer’s ultimate inability to recognise his direct 
complicity in Hitler’s plan to murder the Jews was not simply a question of a lapsed 
memory: it was a moral struggle, and one in which he failed. This is most strikingly 
demonstrated in the penultimate Speer monologue where, with the Russians descending 
on Berlin, and being concerned for his own safety in a newly conquered Reich, Speer 
flatly denies his knowledge of the genocide: the killing of Jews by gas now becomes 
‘our/ Enemies’ propaganda’, and the shootings, mass graves and medical experiments 
are dismissed as ‘too absurd/ To think of’.368 In this stanza a huge bold-faced triangular 
form is redeployed, as though to represent the clumsy triumph of willed self-delusion 
over those more nebulous forms of unwanted knowledge that had already seemed 
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psychologically and structurally precarious in previous passages: ‘(What Chimney? 
Where?)’.  
This representation of a deep rift in Speer’s psyche, of a man who has actively 
to fend off his innate capacity for moral self-questioning (‘I evade my better self’, he 
concedes), very much accords with the picture of Speer that was to emerge in Sereny’s 
Albert Speer. It is even possible to see the whole of Sereny’s investigative labour in that 
work as an attempt to help Speer break down exactly these kinds of inflexible, 
pyramidic structures of cognition and memory in which his genuine knowledge of the 
murder of the Jews had become entombed.
369
 For Sereny, this was a necessary 
precondition for Speer’s personal moral regeneration - a journey which she hoped and 
believed he would one day undertake; and the possibility that Speer, despite his 
shortcomings, might be the one Nazi who was capable of genuine remorse, even rebirth 
(the first line of Speer’s first monologue reads, ‘So/ I am/ Reborn?’), is hinted at in the 
final two Snodgrass poems.
370
 Above all, the sudden amorphousness of these 
monologues suggests that at least Speer - unlike, say, Himmler - can change (although 
one might equally say ‘adapt’, which would suggest a sort of ingenious capacity for 
survival, and an altogether more bleak prognosis). 
Speer’s final monologue concludes with the minister reflecting - apparently for 
the first time - on the impact that the war has had on his family, and on the postwar life 
they might face, possibly in his absence: ‘How will my wife, my unshaken/ wife, 
survive? I have seen too little/ of my children…’.371 Up until this point, Speer’s hopes of 
survival have tended to be scuppered by his belief that an individual’s fate - and indeed 
history itself - is governed by a biological paradigm (implicitly suggesting the 
continuance of a certain type of Nazi mindset, even if he and his fellow executioners are 
now figured as the victims), whereby the internal maladies of the present predetermine 
the future. The last four of his six monologues are saturated with the fatalistic language 
of cancerous growth, contamination and physical contagion. In one poem, just before he 
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goes down into the bunker, Speer pauses in the Chancellery and remarks of an ‘old 
schoolmate’ called Paul, who, as a doctor, is able to diagnose every disease apart from 
his own cancer: ‘he may/ Escape the guns, escape acknowledging/ What it is his cells 
have been preparing,/ Step, by step, in darkness, beyond all control’.372 The implication 
is that Speer is himself, by deliberately ‘neglecting his knowing’, trying to ‘escape 
acknowledging’ a future in which his past acts (and omissions) and inner corruption will 
steadily infect and consume him - but this attempted evasion cannot offset the fact that 
at some level he knows it.
373
 
 
 
 
Hitler and Goebbels: The Brat and Emperor Zero 
 
The Hitler monologues are a series of abrasive philippics yelled at the reader by the 
archetypal crazed dictator. Snodgrass’s Hitler is at once a psychopathic megalomaniac 
(‘More than fifty millions. More./ Who killed as much; who ever?’), a sexual deviant 
(he recalls an unnamed woman’s plea: ‘“I just can’t do those…acts/ You want me to…I 
get no pleasure….”’), and a physical freak (‘This left arm shaking, pinned down/ By the 
right’).374 Again, the predominant characteristics of the monologist’s thought and 
temperament are given pictorial reflection through poetic form; but the raucous Hitler 
poems lack the structural coherence of the Speer monologues. Indeed, they lack shape 
even at the level of the sentence. Snodgrass has commented: 
 
It seems to me that, above everything, he [Hitler] had a mind that was 
exceedingly brutal and powerful, but crude, really crude. One of the ways I was 
trying to catch that was by letting him be much more elliptical - using chunks of 
language like a hammer, with less worry about the civilized side of language, 
grammar and syntax and so forth - letting him have the kind of simple, brutal 
language which a child might have.
375
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As Jack Gladney, Don DeLillo’s fictional professor of Hitler studies, observes in White 
Noise (1984): ‘Wasn’t Hitler’s own struggle to express himself in German the crucial 
subtext of his massive ranting autobiography, dictated in a fortress prison in the 
Bavarian hills? Grammar and syntax. The man may have felt himself imprisoned in 
more ways than one.’376 
 Snodgrass’s Hitler is also a man most extravagantly imprisoned by his past. The 
monologues repeatedly make reference to Hitler’s turbulent childhood, with the reader 
being encouraged to infer that his infantile relationships with his parents and siblings 
formed the template for his later development. To repeat Snodgrass’s view (which can 
be regarded as a central credo of the cycle): ‘We create our political systems and our 
armies in the terms that the family has set out for us.’ The psychodynamics of this 
philosophy are given direct expression in an early monologue, in which Hitler’s 
biological and political families become interfused: 
 
          […] Let them, 
           My own half-brother, Alois, let them 
 
 …my brother-in-arms, Ernst Roehm, who 
 stood against me, slip away.
377
 
 
Alois was the son of Hitler’s father, by an earlier marriage, and had his father’s 
forename and good favour; intensely jealous, the young Hitler schemed with his mother, 
Klara (who preferred Adolf, her own child), and conspired against Alois, until he 
eventually managed to get his sibling rival thrown out of the house. Snodgrass has 
argued that ‘being able to manipulate her [his mother] to get what he wanted with regard 
to the step-brother may have set the pattern that goes right through his life’.378 In the 
passage above, the young Hitler’s malevolent treatment of Alois - a response to familial 
insecurity - forms a precise precedent for his adulthood, and his handling of political 
insecurity. As with Alois, he recalls how he let his ‘brother-in-arms’, his Nazi party 
comrade Ernst Roehm - who led the SA in its early days, and whom Hitler had 
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suspected of plotting against him - ‘slip away’ (Roehm was shot, on Hitler’s orders, in 
1934). 
 Hitler’s unusual relationship with his mother is also given sexual undertones: 
for example, in the same monologue in which he refers to his ousting of his step-
brother, Hitler calls himself a ‘brat fed sick on sugartits’ and his ‘mother’s cake-and-
candy boy’. In The Fuehrer Bunker this deviant sexuality becomes, like the elimination 
of brothers, a characteristic feature of Hitler’s later life. In the most striking and bizarre 
of the Hitler monologues, which comes in the section dated ‘20 April 1945: HITLER’S 
BIRTHDAY’, Hitler’s ruminations on his past successes and his present predicament 
alternate with lines attributed to the legendary knight Lohengrin (The Grail already 
calls its wanderer!), and passages from a sex manual that outline how to perform 
masochistic acts involving the ingestion of faeces. Snodgrass claimed, in an afterword 
to an early, incomplete edition of the Fuehrer Bunker, that Hitler really did have 
coprophiliac fantasies; but contemporaneous historical sources, such as Trevor-Roper 
and Bullock, tend to suggest that Hitler’s sex life was either an enigma, or else non-
existent.
379
 Historical factuality is thus a little stretched in this monologue; the 
explanatory strands of Snodgrass’s psychological portrait of Hitler, on the other hand, 
are deftly woven together. 
 Hitler compares his bleak situation in the bunker to that of his victims. With 
only ‘bare concrete’ surrounding him, he laments that he is the ‘Same as any/ Jew 
degenerate in Auschwitz.’380 His direct likening of the suffering he brings on himself to 
that which he has inflicted on the Jews suggests a link between executioner and victims 
that figures the actual concentration camps as outward projections of Hitler’s inner 
desire for self-abasement. In this way, Snodgrass conceives of the genocide of the Jews 
as an extreme act of transference. The poet expanded on this viewpoint in his interview 
with Gaston: 
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Here’s a quote I once used: ‘A hurtful act is the transference to others of the 
degradation which we bear in ourselves.’ In doing what he did to the Jews, he 
must really have thought he was deflecting to them the punishment he thought 
he needed. But he also made sure that he got punished. He ended up living on 
nothing but chocolate cake and injections, living an utterly insane life in the 
bunker, where he had absolutely no freedom, no spare hours. He finally made 
the bunker a kind of concentration camp for himself.
381
 
 
Following the tenets of the Freudian theory in which Snodgrass’s portrait of Hitler is 
deeply grounded, the dictator’s sexual perversion and impulse towards self-destruction 
(both directly and by proxy) are, in this poem, again linked back to traumatic events in 
his childhood. Firstly, Hitler recalls the death of his biological brother, Edmund, when 
he was eleven, and refers to the fact that only he, out of his mother’s four children, 
survived infancy. This early experience of loss lies behind his determined exhortation, 
‘Live on; only live’. Throughout The Fuehrer Bunker, Snodgrass suggests that the 
memory of this tragedy animated the dictator’s ruthless drive towards personal and 
political mastery. The chorus, for example, introduces him in the first part of the cycle 
as a tyrant whose murderousness was an attempt to counteract the preoccupation with 
mortality that came about after his brother’s death: 
 
      He soon made a profound 
Discovery what his life was worth: 
      One hole, deep in the ground. 
Still if enough men, for his sake, 
Passed into cold clay first, he’d make 
      His name live on, renowned.
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Snodgrass has referred to Hitler as a man who hated being born, and has argued 
that this desire to attain omnipotence through annihilation pointed back to a ‘shocking 
misview of the birth trauma’.383 In the monologues, Hitler’s relationship with his mother 
is made openly erotic; but his sexual fascination is mingled with biological repulsion, as 
he blames her parturition for the fact that he will one day have to die. In the first Hitler 
poem, written in the ‘simple, brutal’ language to which Snodgrass referred, this conflict 
is resolved through the extermination of the depersonalised Other: 
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 With my mother, my own way. She 
  Rammed it down the old man’s throat. 
 Her open grave’s mouth, speaking: 
  Did I choose I should die? 
 
 Then, then, we hacked them down like trash rats. 
 All who’d learned too little. Or too much. 
 In sewers, ditches, let them lay. Let them be seen. 
 
  And this ground would devour me. 
  So shall I swallow all this ground 
  Till we two shall be one flesh.
384
 
 
An obsession with incest, orality and with ‘gifts’ - in the Freudian, excremental sense of 
the word - forms the thematic glue for the diverse fragments of the fetishistic birthday 
monologue: ‘She made a special cake for me’, recalls Adolf fondly. The idea of a birth 
trauma, and of Hitler’s conflicted loving-resentment of his mother, provides the 
psychological foundation for Hitler’s symbolic descent into the Fuehrer bunker itself, 
where his perception that birth marks the introjection of death is finally resolved 
through a regression, whereby the tomb-like cell becomes both a ‘concentration camp’ 
and ‘a kind of womb’.385 The birthday poem ends with Hitler deciding to ‘Crawl back/ 
Into the cave’. 
 Snodgrass’s portrait of Joseph Goebbels is written in the same slangy, 
American vernacular used for the Hitler monologues, and is similarly grounded in 
events in the propagandist’s childhood - and, in particular, his Freudian relationship 
with his mother. Crippled since the age of seven (‘something sucks the marrow/ From 
your left shin’), in one monologue the Nazi Minister brands himself ‘Swellfoot the 
Tyrant’: an epithet which registers both his lameness and the Oedipal origins of his will 
to power.
386
 He initially seeks compensation for his physical deformity through 
licentiousness: ‘Joe the Gimp’ transforms into ‘Runty Joe, the cunt collector’, and, as a 
result, he unconsciously propagates the psychodynamics of the Freudian family drama, 
which forbids enduring sexual attachment to the desired partner (in the first instance, 
the mother).
387
 Goebbels’s other outlet is the Nazi party, which invitingly preaches the 
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racial and biological supremacy of all Aryans, even of ‘Clubfoot Joe’.388 While he never 
finds the answer to the psychological Sphinx of his unresolved Oedipus complex, he 
realises that he has the ability to ‘riddle/ Men’s minds away’, and becomes the 
machiavellian spokesperson for a regime which he increasingly masterminds.
389
 As 
such, Goebbels is a kind of arch-enemy for the writer of The Fuehrer Bunker, with his 
wilful distortion of language through propaganda presenting a paragon of misuse for the 
poet who seeks to reactivate language morally, in order that it might provide a 
wellspring for individual and cultural regeneration. Goebbels is the central figure in the 
cycle: his poems begin and end the sequence (aside from the choral introduction and 
epilogue), and only Himmler, who has ten monologues, comes close to Goebbels’s 
eleven. (Hitler has only five poems.) 
 Trevor-Roper has described Goebbels as ‘the intellectual of the Nazi Party - 
perhaps its only intellectual’, with the ‘Latin lucidity of his mind’ and the ‘suppleness 
of his argument’ making him an ideal preacher for the Nazi cause.390 The historian notes 
that for Goebbels, however, the life of the mind was not the gateway to any kind of 
higher truth; he believed that ideas were expendable - units of ‘currency, never objects 
of value’ - and he would manipulate them in such a way as to ensure that he could 
‘always prove what he wanted’.391 In The Fuehrer Bunker, Goebbels is portrayed as 
having a calculating, eristic streak from an early age. In one monologue he recalls how, 
as a young man studying for the priesthood, he would capriciously vacillate in debates 
with his peers: 
 
 When we talked politics, I’d chose 
 Whichever side seemed sure to lose; 
 I’d win. Then I’d switch sides to oust 
 Every credo I’d just espoused.392 
 
Lacking any genuine values to hold fast to, and finding that ‘no church’s doctoring did 
the least good/ Against this mind’s sulfuric’, Goebbels recounts how he eventually 
abandoned his theological training and changed university eight times as he ‘tried out 
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the full diversity/ Of heroes, lovers, fields of study,/ Beliefs.’ Finally, having written 
‘fifty Socialist essays’ that ‘got turned down by the Jews’, his feverish search for 
meaning gave way to an amoral pursuit of political power, and he turned to ‘the one 
force left to chose:/ The far Right.’ 
Ironically, his subsequent political career took the outward form of a religious 
mission, as the new ‘minister’ self-consciously set about shaping the Nazi party into a 
sectarian version of a Christian cult, with the messianic Fuehrer serving as its public 
figurehead. But as he assumed yet another of his myriad public identities, Goebbels 
became not only a ‘High Priest of Laymen’, but also a ‘Prince of Lies’ who discerned 
the ideological vacuity of his own rhetoric:
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 I, who can’t help but see how hollow 
 That Fuehrer is I can’t help follow, 
Create in him the eucharist they’ll all swallow.394 
 
A series of predictable end-rhymes here replicate sonically what Goebbels regards as 
the German people’s fundamental gullibility, and their willingness to be drawn into the 
‘hollow’ patterns of thought that he prescribes for them. The sardonic tone also reflects 
what Snodgrass has described as the ‘waspish’ humour and style of the Goebbels 
monologues - a style which was aptly intended to parody the speech of a controversial 
religious figure of the period: ‘In a way he [Goebbels] was much like the Pope [Pius 
XII], although, of course, much more vicious. But, basically, both of them were 
crippled, so that perfection of form becomes terribly important in a poem or 
statement.’395 
For Goebbels, the entire Nazi philosophy is an embittered parody of Christian 
salvationist narratives. As the Allies advance, Goebbels sends his ‘poor old mother’ 
away from his villa on the Wannsee, and, as is his habit in the monologues, imagines a 
newspaper headline: ‘FAREWELL TO THE PEASANT MOTHER/ WHOSE SIMPLE 
FAITH INSPIRED HIM’.396 He then quotes Christ’s injunction: ‘Leave both father 
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and/ mother and follow after me’. An orthodox Christian, such as Goebbels’s mother, 
would interpret Jesus’s call for believers to abandon their parents as a necessary 
precondition for enlightenment; not a rejection of the family, but the means of entry into 
the brotherhood of Man; but for Goebbels, the leave-taking of the one person for whom 
he seems to feel any genuine affection has no positive meaning, and his reference to the 
Gospels is entirely ironic. He says to a picture of his mother, before throwing it into a 
fire of the book-burning, rather than the purgative, type: ‘Go. Take the time that’s left 
you. It is right: you can believe. I doubt. I doubt.’ This sacrificial scene encapsulates the 
way that Goebbels, in a nihilistic twist on the Satanic proposition ‘evil, be thou my 
good’, makes negation a supreme value in itself.397 Expulsion and rejection become 
second nature to him; but they have no higher significance or redemptive purpose. He 
prays to a God whose only meaning is meaninglessness - ‘Our Father who art in Nihil’ - 
and becomes a regent figure disseminating his own brand of caustic disbelief: a ‘no one/ 
Who’s true to Nothing’, a self-proclaimed ‘Emperor Zero’.398 Trevor-Roper has 
described how an ‘essential nihilism […] had inspired the Nazi movement in its early 
days’, adding that when, in the last days of the Reich, the party ‘had nothing positive to 
offer any more, it was to this nihilism that it returned as its ultimate philosophy and 
valediction’.399 Snodgrass’s Goebbels recognises precisely this relapse into philosophic 
nihilism as he moves into the private lower level of Hitler’s bunker: 
 
 I come back to my first Ideal  
 The vacancy that’s always real. 
 I sniffed out all life’s openings. 
 I loved only the holes in things.
400
 
 
Annihilation and nothingness form a ‘first Ideal’ to which Goebbels returns, an anti-
value that lies behind his contempt for the German people as a whole, whom he has 
manipulated with apparent ease (in one monologue he compares propaganda to 
‘Reading preposterous folk tales/ To children’), and also his casual misogyny and 
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brutish sexuality; for while he goes on to claim that ‘all abstractions smell’, in 
describing his love for ‘the holes in things’ he has no qualms about rendering his female 
lovers into bloodless ciphers.
401
 For Goebbels, the personal and the political conform to 
the selfsame negative principle, which he expresses through a pun: ‘In politics, in bed,/ 
We learn the cant that can be said’.402 
The cynical orator’s lust for conquest, for political and sexual domination, is 
portrayed as an abiding and congenital character trait, and in an extension of his central 
perception that ‘We pant for, but we’re scornful of,/ What we can screw’, Goebbels 
even likens one of his ‘godless, hellfire sermon[s]’ to an act of sexual mastery: 
 
 Just last year at the Sportpalast, 
 I diddled thousands to one vast 
Insane, delirious orgasm; 
Stone cold, my mind controlled each spasm, 
Teased them so high, so hot and mad 
That they’d take everything I had 
To give them. They could only roar 
‘Ja!’ and ‘Ja!’ and ‘Ja!’ once more, 
Begging me: let them have it  total war.403 
 
For Goebbels, the public speech conforms to a sado-masochistic dynamic: in a 
protracted, and typically chauvinistic, analogy, he likens himself to a domineering male 
lover who ‘teases’ his submissive female partner, contrasting his ‘stone cold’ mind and 
icy control with the ‘hot and mad’ passions of the crowd. For the master rhetorician, the 
‘surly, bastard / Idiom’ of the German language enables him to clinch what he terms his 
‘possession on these vermin’; meaning is offered and then deferred in a tantalising play 
on the frenzied crowd’s expectations, until he ‘let[s] them have it’ in a final orgasmic 
triplet which climaxes with the words he believes they have all been longing for: ‘total 
war’. 
This bullying, pseudo-sexual model of communication between an ideologue 
and the mob is, however, subtly recast over the course of the Goebbels monologues. As 
military defeat becomes inevitable, and the tide of public opinion turns against Hitler, 
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Goebbels considers the public memory of Nazism. But rather than seeking to create a 
suitable rhetoric - what he has identified as an art of linguistic possession - he adeptly 
switches, in typically protean fashion, to a praxis grounded in an alternative 
communicative model, one of dispossession, wherein events are whitewashed, and 
language is systematically divested of its referential function, in order to create the 
silences which will form the precondition for an elaborate future mythology.  
The propagandist knows that above and beyond anything else, the timing and 
manner of the death of Hitler will determine the extent to which he will be able to erase 
the regime’s atrocities, errors and defeats from history, and so he sets out to stage-
manage a theatrical finale - which is to say a drama of manifest unreality. He is content 
to claim only a minor role for himself, allowing Hitler the centre stage. As Trevor-Roper 
has observed of the bunker hierarchy: ‘As a tribal chief, Hitler might enjoy a 
spectacular, symbolic funeral; but Goebbels, as a secondary figure, would follow him, at 
a decent interval, unobtrusively to the shades.’404 In a central section of the cycle, 
‘IDENTITIES’, members of Hitler’s inner circle who have not comprehended the 
irreversibility of the military situation grow frantic, and urge Hitler ‘to escape, fly/ 
South’.405 Conversely, Goebbels understands that the Fuehrer will only promulgate Nazi 
ideals by dying a glorious death (or rather, by dying a death that will be perceived to be 
glorious in years to come). He sings an appropriately mythic-sounding folk song, ‘Brave 
king, wait yet a little while…’ (his monologues are replete with such revelatory verses, 
nursery rhymes and quotations), and judges that ‘Berlin’s the place to die’. His only 
concern is that ‘the Chief’ does not ‘give up hope/ Too soon’, and that he holds out 
‘Until the Russian tanks arrive’: 
 
Here we can say he perished with 
His front-line fighters. Then our myth 
Takes root […] 
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By dying the right death, Goebbels believes that Hitler will ensure that he is later reborn 
in a new, godly form, rising like Christ ‘to reign in glory’ in a time when the early Nazi 
conquests will inspire future fascists and ‘become their fairy story’.  
In the final, mass-suicidal section of the volume, ‘WAYS OUT’, which takes 
place in the aftermath of Hitler’s death, Goebbels and his wife Magda, who has 
poisoned their children the previous evening, prepare to kill themselves. As they slowly 
but deliberately climb the bunker steps to the chancellery garden, Goebbels reflects on 
his legacy: 
 
 The rest is silence. Left like sperm 
 In a stranger’s gut, waiting its term, 
 Each thought, each step lies; the roots spread. 
 They’ll believe in us when we’re dead. 
 When we took ‘Red Berlin’ we found 
 We always worked best underground. 
 So; the vile body turns to spirit 
 That speaks soundlessly. They’ll hear it. 
 
This stanza is self-consciously literary: the reference to Hamlet emphasises the overt 
theatricality of this final act of the Nazi era, and perhaps suggests that ultimately 
Goebbels saw his own fate as that of a tragic hero. Alternatively, he may just be 
enjoying one last, and characteristically sardonic, laugh at both himself and the millions 
of credulous Germans whom he has so easily gulled, and who may even one day be 
prepared to think of these last events in the bunker as tragic. Whichever interpretation 
we choose, Hamlet’s dying words seem peculiarly apt coming from a monologist who 
is, throughout the cycle, as the poet has observed, ‘getting closer to silence’.406 The 
minister’s final thoughts also contain traces of the bio-philosophy of Speer; hoping that 
his exit will ‘infect history’, he intimates that Nazism has raped the German nation and 
simultaneously destroyed the memory of the crime, with a pregnant silence ‘Left like 
sperm/ In a stranger’s gut’. 
 Snodgrass has responded to the charge that in this final Goebbels poem the Nazi 
makes a prophecy that The Fuehrer Bunker itself fulfils, arguing that what he presents 
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the reader with is not the rebirth of ‘the mythologized Nazis at all, but the real ones’.407 
While the author’s distinction between ‘mythic’ and ‘real’ literary characters depends 
on a rather unhistorical concept of ‘authenticity’ (see my Introduction), the poet was 
clearly intent on incorporating the prophesies of Goebbels into the volume so as to 
expose the propagandist’s attempts to dislocate historical acts from linguistic 
representation. In philosophical terms, Goebbels is a kind of extreme postmodernist, for 
whom the past exists in a radically unverifiable state of flux. He does not believe that 
language has any inherent relation to events, and sees history as a wholly political 
concept which can be appropriated and recast in whatever manner proves expedient to 
the rulers of the present, who simply ‘use’ the past ‘when they need some lie or excuse/ 
To do exactly what they choose’.408 For Snodgrass, on the other hand, one basic 
objective of writing about Nazism was to expose the ideologies that shaped a genocidal 
reality. The Goebbels poems are thus sites of conflict for competing historiographical 
agendas, with the Nazi’s revisionist proclamations, and Snodgrass’s mode of 
representation of those proclamations, becoming dramatically counterpointed within 
each individual poem. In one crucial monologue, Goebbels argues:  
 
 We whose lives, whose writings came 
 To nothing  we’ll script their lives’ aim. 
 We failures are the texts they’ll read. 
Nay-sayers who’ll become their creed.409 
 
By outlining Goebbels’s plans for the survival of his ideas after his bodily death in 
straightforward couplets, Snodgrass ironises the minister’s prediction, reflecting on the 
fact that Nazism has never been vindicated in the way he imagined, even as his life 
becomes, as he forecasts, ‘the text they’ll read’. To represent Goebbels’s historical 
aspirations is, the monologues suggest, the only possible way of refuting them; only a 
failure to represent these prophecies could allow for their historical fulfilment. The 
Fuehrer Bunker thus offers its own internal rejoinders to the questions raised by the 
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insidious theories of communication outlined in the Goebbels poems. The monologue 
form, whose primary orientation is towards the disclosure of intention, combines with a 
straightforward language and form, and the strategic, often ironic, use of intertexts (such 
as the Bible, propaganda headlines and folk songs), to trace the contours of the silences 
that Goebbels had hoped would transform the Nazi terror into myth. 
 
 
 
Hermann Goering: Narrative and Recognition 
 
As the cycle draws to a close, the actions of the leading monologists start to complicate 
Goebbels’s claim that the Fuehrer Bunker acts as a ‘confession booth/ Where liars face 
up to blank truth’. For in their final hours, the majority of the senior Nazis manifestly do 
not confront the errors of their ways; rather they cling ever more steadfastly to the 
standard Reich mindset of counter-rationality and wilful self-delusion: Hitler finally 
poisons himself but declares he is ‘winning’; Speer makes a deliberate effort to ‘neglect 
his knowing’; Himmler, who has been expelled from the party for negotiating for 
surrender with Count Bernadotte of the Swedish Red Cross, considers either falling in 
with the refugees heading west, or joining Admiral Doenitz’s successor government in 
Flensburg as head of police; and Martin Bormann flees the bunker while planning an 
incognito escape to Denmark or South America.
410
 Even Goebbels himself, who 
habitually arrives at a far more realistic assessment of his predicament than the others, 
faces only a relative ‘truth’ in this ‘confession booth’: one that remains resolutely 
‘blank’, as it can always be potentially redrawn after his death. In fact it is, somewhat 
surprisingly, only the Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering - who never actually enters the 
bunker in Snodgrass’s cycle - who seems wholly capable of facing up to the reality of 
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the military situation, the ineradicable nature of his past actions, and the just retribution 
that is coming to him.  
In his final monologue, dated 1 May, Goering is at his castle in Mautendorf, 
where he has been under house arrest and guarded by the SS ever since Bormann and 
Goebbels, wanting him sidelined as a potential successor to the party leadership, had 
accused him of trying to usurp Hitler on 26 April. He ‘stands naked before a full-length 
bedroom mirror’ and addresses himself with typical bluntness: ‘You’d featherbed your 
life out on some pension?/ Fat chance of that, Fat Man! You’re here to die.’411 
Dismissing the likes of Speer and Funk, who at the end would ‘whimper and whine 
repentance’, Goering resolves to ‘Keep some honour’ by standing by his actions. He 
decides not to feign ignorance to the Allies, and commands himself: ‘Own your own/ 
Decisions’. At the very least, Goering has at the end a belated dignity, even some claim 
to the reader’s admiration; he does not attempt to escape the repercussions of his 
wrongdoing, and in many ways, by not ‘trying to fink out on his own past’, as he puts it, 
he shows more rectitude than any of his cohorts. That is not to say that this final 
Goering monologue is an errant slip into a potentially redemptive portrayal of a dubious 
new Hollywood staple: the Good Nazi. On the contrary, the volume routinely calls into 
question the partially sympathetic conclusions to which it deliberately guides its 
readers.  
The Fuehrer Bunker is an overtly narrative work, both at the level of its 
individual monologues, and in terms of the cycle as a whole; but if the subject of this 
master-narrative is the last days of the Nazi regime, it is also, at the same time, the 
reader, who is subtly cajoled into self-scrutiny by a text that requires him or her to 
become a monitor of his or her own response. By the time we come to read this final 
Goering monologue, we have been repeatedly chastened, and our appraisal of the 
Reichsmarschall is influenced by what we now recognise as Snodgrass’s didactic 
method, whereby our susceptibility to rhetoric, charisma and other forms of persuasion 
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is strategically harnessed, and then devastatingly exposed, in order to probe the specious 
concept of the ‘cult of personality’, and to illustrate how the process of narration 
involves a psychological engagement between reader and text that can obscure the kinds 
of meanings that are being produced. In this way, the work draws out a moral message 
which is not simply an historical condemnation - or not only an historical condemnation 
- but, more importantly, a warning shot which highlights the reader’s own potential 
culpability.  
In his seminal work of reception theory, Surprised by Sin (1967), Stanley Fish 
describes the reader of Paradise Lost as being ‘simultaneously a participant in the 
action and a critic of his [sic] own performance’.412 He or she is given cause to admire 
Satan’s rhetoric, but is then rebuked for that very admiration in a ‘programme of reader 
harassment’ that leads him or her through a series of interpretative crises which have as 
their object ‘the reader’s humiliation and his education’.413 In this way, argues Fish, 
Milton’s subject - the fall of Adam and Eve, and the redemption promised to humankind 
through Christ - becomes integrated into the actual experience of reading the poem. 
Snodgrass’s exploration of the rise and fall of Nazism is posited on the identical idea 
that the genocidal mentality can best be understood by drawing readers into an 
awareness of their own shortcomings. As key players in the drama, readers do not 
simply have their own capacity for moral cowardice, even evil - which Snodgrass, much 
like Milton, regards as ‘innate and universal’ - explained to them: more radically, they 
get to experience it firsthand.
414
 The poet has noted, with regard to his use of the 
villanelle form in the Magda Goebbels monologues, that ‘to be told that somebody is 
tense and repetitive is not the same thing as experiencing somebody’s tenseness and 
repetitiveness’.415 Equally, to be told that other ordinary people acted imprudently is not 
the same as being coerced into a series of (mis)judgements which reveal one’s own 
capacity for moral error. 
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The central role that the reader will have to play in construing moral meaning in 
the cycle, and the Christian origins of the poet’s concept of the enduring co-existence of 
inner good and evil, is hinted at in Snodgrass’s epigraph: ‘Mother Teresa, asked when it 
was she started her work for abandoned children, replied, “On the day I discovered I 
had a Hitler inside me.”’416 This reference to the self-acknowledged capacity for 
evildoing of Mother Theresa ushers the volume’s readers away from an attitude of 
casual moral complacency. The epigraph also implicitly attacks postwar triumphalism, 
and the self-righteousness of America’s demonisation of the German nation; for much 
as one might wish to condemn the popular support the German public gave to the Nazis 
before they came to power, and the subsequent lack of organised opposition to a 
bellicose regime, one does so with the benefit of hindsight. As Snodgrass argued in his 
interview with Gaston:  
 
One of the things that is part of the process of maturing is admitting that at least 
some of  the intelligent people (and some of the moral people) were on the other 
side. And that you might have made a choice similar to theirs, if you had been 
in that place at that time. To appreciate the work of art, you have to give up the 
judgmental sense, at least partly […] It is easy to say now that you would have 
voted against Hitler. But you really don’t know.417  
 
In a similar vein, Snodgrass has observed, with reference to Randall Jarrell’s poem 
‘Protocols’, in which dead children describe their journey to Birkenau, where they were 
murdered in gas chambers: 
 
To write this poem, you must first be willing to imagine yourself as a child in 
the situation - a real child, who might even enjoy parts of the trip. Then, you 
must be willing to imagine yourself a guard - this is the real test - and see how 
you would act. You must admit that moral weakness could lead you into such a 
position, could at least strongly tempt you. Until you are willing to admit that 
you share some part of humanity’s baseness and degradation, you cannot write 
about humanity’s dignity and gentleness. Of all the ulterior motives, none is 
more common, none more debilitating, none more damning, than the pretense to 
moral superiority.
418
 
 
These passages convey the poet’s belief that genuine historical understanding, and its 
figuration in a work of art, demand both a concerted effort of the imagination and a 
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withholding of retrospective moral judgements: a conviction which lies behind the more 
performative aspects of The Fuehrer Bunker, in which readers are encouraged to 
sympathise with a leading Nazi figure for an instructive purpose. 
 Snodgrass’s Goering is at first presented as a charismatic, almost likeable 
figure; and this accurately reflects the Reichsmarschall’s broad popularity in Nazi 
Germany before his decline into drug addiction and profligacy during the war. In his 
first monologue, which takes the form of an internal dialogue, he is characterised as a 
lovable buffoon, dubbing himself an ‘April Fool’, mocking his own failures as head of 
the Luftwaffe, and cutting a tragi-comic figure. As he quizzes himself, he fills in the 
answers to his own bizarre riddles: 
 
 Pray, could an old, soft football be 
 Much like a man in deep disgrace? 
 They don’t kick back; don’t even dare 
 Look up  the British own the air! 
 So, stick a needle in someplace; 
 Pump yourself full of vacancy.
419
 
 
Goering’s self-parodic tone sets him apart from Hitler and Goebbels and their more 
hysterical language. The rhyme scheme also differs; whereas Hitler and Goebbels tend 
to speak in a series of clanging couplets, the abccba rhyme scheme in the standard 
Goering sestet revolves around one central couplet, after which the rhymes move further 
apart - the fifth line referring back to the line that preceded the couplet, and the sixth 
line offering a distant echo of the first - in a sonic expansion that reflects the ebullience 
of the Reichsmarschall’s character and the rotundity of his physique. This bloated form 
is complemented by extreme linguistic grotesquerie: 
 
Herr President, can we tell apart 
An artful statesman from an ass? 
Fat chance! One spouts out high ideals; 
One makes low rumblings after meals. 
But that’s the threat of leaking gas 
That all men fear! Right  that’s a fart!420 
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Potentially disturbing references to the reality of the Nazi terror and the ‘threat of 
leaking gas’ are lost in a breezy flow of anarchic put-downs, italicised exclamations and 
word games. Goering’s coarse language and his fixation on the excreta of the lower 
body in many ways recall Rabelais’s flatulent giants Gargantua and Pantagruel - in 
particular, Mikhail Bakhtin’s reading of Rabelais through the concept of degradation, 
which he outlined in Rabelais and His World (1965), would seem germane to 
Snodgrass’s technique in the Goering poems. For Bakhtin, degradation involved ‘the 
lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer to the material level, 
to the sphere of earth and body’.421 The desire to mock authoritarian figures and to 
debunk governing ideals permeates the Reichsmarschall’s monologues, as does a 
preoccupation with ‘the lower stratum of the body, the life of the belly and the 
reproductive organs’.422 Yet while Goering brings the abstract edifice of Nazi ideology 
clattering down to earth with his derisive jokes and parodic riddles in true Rabelaisian 
fashion, his monologues lack the essential connection to rebirth that was, for Bakhtin, 
the essential counter-principle of degradation, which ‘has not only a destructive, 
negative aspect, but also a regenerating one’.423 Rabelais’s crudely humorous style of 
writing - what Bakhtin termed ‘grotesque realism’ - focused on the lower body as the 
figurative site for the suspension of existing hierarchies, the overthrowing of ruling 
classes and official culture, and also the arrival of a second order of social being 
grounded in the ‘laughing chorus of the market place’.424 In contrast, Snodgrass’s 
adoption of the Rabelaisian style offers little by way of remedy for the stink it unearths.  
While the anarchic humour and playfulness of the early Goering monologues 
appeal to the reader, offering a start juxtaposition to the hysterical self-justifications of 
the other monologists, we gradually learn that the man whom Goebbels calls ‘Fat 
Hermann’ disseminates little more than hot air.425 Having fallen out of favour with 
Hitler, he has lived the life of a voluptuary, becoming an ‘effete aristocrat’ who spends 
his days carousing and gourmandising in his gothic castle; however, his formidable 
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bodily bulk and ‘glittering gear/ And costumes’ cannot mask his inner vacuity, even to 
himself.
426
 In one monologue he looks through his vast wardrobe, recalling his splendid 
parties and the many outfits he wore; yet when he searches for the human being beneath 
the outlandish public personas, he finds only emptiness. The poem ends: 
 
Who wears this thick flesh, layer on layer  
Loose outposts of a weakening heart? 
Who seems a one-man population 
Explosion, or expanding nation; 
But at showdown gives you a start: 
He lifts his mask and no one’s there. 
 
Throughout the cycle the chameleonic minister is constantly contemplating 
interrogation by the Allies, and in another monologue he imagines a prisoner 
questionnaire that he fills in four times - but in four entirely different ways. Even the 
name that he gives ranges from ‘Hermann von Epenstein’ to ‘Herr Reaktion’; his fate is 
initially ‘Successor to the Chief’, but by the end it has become ‘The lime pit and the 
rope.’427 These four questionnaires chart the gradual deflation of the ego and 
expectations of ‘the Last Renaissance Man’ - a change that has taken place over a 
period of years. The segregation of Goering’s self into a multiplicity of incongruous 
written forms also suggests a radical relativity of truth and a jarring discontinuity 
between who a man is, and the written representation of that man: he could be all of 
these Hermann Goerings, or he could be none. 
Goering’s ideological corruption and spiritual bankruptcy thus shape a vacuous 
conception of representation, much as in the Goebbels monologues. His poems are full 
of puns, riddles and word games whose effect is to collapse conceptual opposites and to 
undermine stable linguistic meanings. In one poem, he makes a typically crude 
observation: ‘Enemies; enemas  much the same?/ Both rid you of collected matter.’428 
This analogy finds a point of comparison in the theoretical and physical ways in which a 
body - be it politic or human - can be drained of inner substance. The next riddle shows 
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how voids can be filled, but the principle is identical: ‘Are soccerballs like an ideal?/ 
You pump them full of emptiness’.429 At the end of this metaphor-mangling monologue, 
Goering asks himself ‘What’s left you can still depress?’ and offers the reply: ‘Yourself. 
You come down to what’s real.’ But as the poems progress, and the masks of his multi-
faceted personality are gradually peeled away to reveal the absence of any stable sense 
of selfhood, and a language stripped of its capacity for meaningful referentiality, the 
only reality Goering can conceive of is death. In a heavily ironic monologue, he takes a 
single bullet from his pocket and inserts it into his revolver; but in a pragmatic swipe at 
his own cod philosophy he hurls the gun at the door, observing: ‘Logic doesn’t go that 
far.’430 
The minister’s philosophising here hints at a hermeneutic drama unfolding in 
The Fuehrer Bunker as a whole - a drama in which, as I noted, the reader plays a lead 
role. Again, to quote Fish on Paradise Lost, the reader of the cycle ‘is drawn into the 
poem, not as an observer who coolly notes the interaction of patterns […], but as a 
participant whose mind is the locus of that interaction’.431 While Snodgrass does not 
suggest that his readers are as morally and spiritually vacant as Goering, he does involve 
us in a Miltonic struggle with temptation and error that exposes our susceptibility to the 
so-called ‘cult of personality’, and to narrative structures which override our ability to 
make sound ethical judgements. As in  Paradise Lost, the structural and rhetorical 
game-play of The Fuehrer Bunker compels us to re-evaluate our entire relation to the 
meaning-making process, both as readers who become aware of the perils of first-person 
narratives in which ‘the mere presence of the speaker’s voice may win him more 
sympathy than his actions deserve’, and as subjects for whom narrative is, following 
Fredric Jameson, an ‘all-informing process’ that constitutes ‘the central function or 
instance of the human mind’.432 This latter, very broad definition of narrative gives the 
textual operations of The Fuehrer Bunker real ethical significance, suggesting that 
narrative is not only a literary experience: it is the definitive human experience. As the 
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key structural link between historical and psychological material, narrative is 
manipulated by the poet to dupe the reader in a way which replicates the Nazis’ duping 
of a whole nation. The literary work becomes a kind of simulating machine which offers 
a textual reproduction of the narratives that were operative within the historical 
processes that it describes, placing the reader in a position of unique responsibility. As 
Snodgrass has observed, the form of the volume gives the reader an important 
interpretative freedom (even as the poet seeks to guide that free choice), which is ‘the 
freedom to make a mistake. If that isn’t included in it, it isn’t free. The work of art […] 
ought to be free and freeing. At the same time it involves the possibility that, for 
instance, you might choose Nazism.’433 
The ‘free and freeing’ aspect of a work such as The Fuehrer Bunker derives 
from the author’s perception that a reader’s response to literary narrative is not 
governed by political precepts or predetermined moral positions: deep-rooted 
psychological material also orders a reader’s pursuit of textual meaning. As Peter 
Brooks observes in his study of narrative dynamics, Reading for the Plot (1984): 
 
Narratives portray the motors of desire that drive and consume their plots, and 
they also lay bare the nature of narration as a form of human desire: the need to 
tell as a primary human drive that seeks to seduce and to subjugate the listener, 
to implicate him [sic] in the thrust of a desire that never can quite speak its 
name - never can quite come to the point - but that insists on speaking over and 
over again its movement toward that name.
434
 
 
In his study, Brooks combines traditional narratology with Freudian psychoanalytic 
theory in order to ask not simply what narrative categories exist (the focus of a formalist 
approach to narrative), but how narratives work on the reader to generate particular 
models of understanding.
435
 A detailed exploration of the process of psychological 
exchange that, according to Brooks, drives narration, lies beyond the scope of this 
present thesis; but his conceptualisation of narration as a ‘form of human desire’ clearly 
tallies with a reading of the heuristic method of The Fuehrer Bunker - a work which 
shows how psychological energies produce meaning in literary texts independently of 
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moral governance, in order to draw out probing historical parallels. Brooks’s definition 
of narration as a force that ‘seeks to seduce and to subjugate the listener’ also fits well 
with Goebbels’s gleeful dissection of the erotics of the party rally, where the speaker 
teases an audience through a controlled exploitation of their psycho-sexual investment 
in his narrative. 
 The importance of the Goering monologues, and indeed the key insight of The 
Fuehrer Bunker as a whole, is thus to be found not so much in what the poems tell us 
about the Nazis (with all their absent fathers and amorous mothers), than in what the 
reader’s response to these Nazis’ lengthy monologues tells us about the all-involving 
process of narration. In the Goering poems, Snodgrass does not, despite his 
protestations to the contrary, hold up a mirror to history; if these poems hold up any 
kind of mirror, it is more likely to be one in which the reader sees his or her own face 
(much as in Denise Levertov’s ‘During the Eichmann Trial’, where the ‘witness-stand 
of glass’ is described as ‘a cage, where we may view/ ourselves’).436 These stanzas 
formally implicate the reader in their caustic self-assessments: they frequently take the 
form of dialogues, and pose riddles and questions in an incessant play of call and 
response. In the final Goering monologue, when the minister stands naked before a full-
length bedroom mirror, the reader is not simply presented with a Nazi who is staring at 
himself, but with a text which is examining our own deficiencies as readers, actively 
indicting our subservient relation to narrative pathways and forms of understanding 
which it dictates. The suggestion is, perhaps, that if we are not vigilant, then narrative 
can achieve a dominance that borders on the totalitarian, making the volume both a 
representation of fascism and, to borrow Gillian Rose’s phrase, an exploration of the 
‘fascism of representation’.437 
For Brooks, ‘the need to tell’ is ‘a primary human drive that seeks to seduce and 
to subjugate the listener’; in the final Goering poem, Snodgrass reverses this logic and 
points an accusing finger at that listener, addressing our complicity in the process of 
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narrative seduction. The monologue begins: ‘When I speak to you, you stand to 
attention./ Straighten that back up. Lift up your damn head.’438 Goering is here 
manifestly talking to himself, but these lines also seem to inculpate the reader; his 
admissions of historical guilt then fuse with the language of literary exegesis as he 
laments the loss of his father’s ‘good name’ and makes the observation that ‘You signed 
on for your sentence/ You’re in so deep, there’s no out left but in’ (my emphasis). 
Again, the Reichsmarschall describes the textual experience of the reader; his self-
chastisement is, uncannily, our own. As he stares into his mirror, the Nazi monologist 
thus becomes a kind of doppelgnger for the troubled conscience of a reader who is 
also the implied addressee: 
 
 […] you let yourself be mastered 
 By someone you sucked up to  who used your blind 
 Faith, used your worst impulses, then the bastard 
 Defiled your name. 
 
In this light, the opening injunction to ‘lift up your damn head’ can be thought of as a 
statement of moral instruction for the reader of the poem: at some point we must stop 
reading and relate this humiliating demonstration of our internal susceptibility to 
narrative control to those textual configurations that subjugate us in the real world. 
In some senses, the didactic objectives of The Fuehrer Bunker depend on its 
readers having an innate capacity for moral self-correction: first to perceive, and then to 
counteract, the way in which we have been drawn from the straight path. Snodgrass 
does not simply point out his readers’ folly: he provides us with the means to discover it 
for ourselves, hoping to awaken the Mother Theresa who, as the epigraph describes, 
cohabits every human heart with a Hitler. Nonetheless, the poet was clearly aware of the 
risks involved in this strategy - particularly that of giving the reader so much freedom to 
misread the cycle as a partially favourable representation of Nazism. In an interview 
with Philip Hoy, he admitted: ‘I knew perfectly well that people were going to hate me 
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for doing these poems. I didn’t know how long they’d hate me, or how intensely’.439 The 
incomplete version of The Fuehrer Bunker, published in 1977, included an afterword 
which outlined the degree to which the cycle rested on fact, while also offering 
justifications for any deviations from the historical record. When the full version was 
published in 1995, however, Snodgrass had removed the afterword, conceding that it 
was used to ‘bludgeon’ him.440 In particular, the Dictionary of Literary Biography 
suggested that in this afterword Snodgrass had admitted to making the Nazis more 
attractive than they actually were, leading Jon Silkin to remark of this DLB entry: ‘If I 
read that about someone, I’d never read another word the son-of-a-bitch wrote.’441 
Snodgrass believed that the afterword was unnecessary as ‘it wasn’t possible to 
write anything that didn’t seem like a defence’.442 It is also the case that he had made 
significant attempts to offset the possibility of such misreadings in the poem itself: by 
withdrawing the afterword, he ensured that form remained the poem’s ultimate 
authority. Above all, the tone of the final chorus is unmistakably accusatory, its subject 
matter more overtly the reader. These two short stanzas are spoken by a mock-folk 
character called Old Lady Barkeep, who is a kind of Zeitgeist for Germany under 
National Socialism, a cynical Mother Courage figure for the Herrenvolk: 
 
Old Lady Barkeep squealed with laughter 
When told she’d be forsaken after 
     Her people’s sorry loss. 
She said, ‘They’re always mobs to swallow 
Lies that flatter them and follow 
     Some saviour to the cross. 
 
‘Don’t kid yourself  I don’t play modest; 
As Greed and Cowardice’s goddess, 
     I thrive on just such ruin. 
While humans prowl this globe of yours 
I’ll never lack for customers. 
     By the way, how you doin’?’443 
 
Drawing attention to the ubiquity of the Christian salvationist narrative that Goebbels, 
for one, had self-consciously exploited, and suggesting that rather than carrying any 
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deeper metaphysical meanings, this narrative merely satisfies basic human needs (and 
the Goering monologues suggest this is the case with all narrative), Old Lady Barkeep 
concludes The Fuehrer Bunker by expressing her fervent hope that the reader might 
succumb - indeed she intimates that the reader has already succumbed - to modes of 
understanding that brought about the moral paralysis of a nation, and which effectively 
sanctioned genocide. The ironic, combative addressivity of the final line indicates that 
readers, rather than directing their outrage at The Fuehrer Bunker or its author, would 
do better to direct it at themselves. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The final chorus of The Fuehrer Bunker suggests that to read the cycle is to suffer 
opprobrium: a suitable note on which to end a didactic drama whose subject matter is 
not simply historical calamity, but, more fundamentally, the reader’s wayward moral 
instinct. The chastening admonitions of Old Lady Barkeep - along with various critics’ 
failures to heed them, or to register their own implication in a volume which can be 
understood as a drama of identification - also highlight what is a vexed issue for any 
heuristic text: that of control, of how the poem asserts its authority. If the cycle deploys 
narrative both as a means to forward the plot and as a kind of textual snare, then it is 
vital that the poet places a series of checks on his own charismatic first person 
narrations. I have described how Snodgrass created a dialogic framework for the 
Goering monologues: close reading highlights how reflective imagery and the language 
of textual exegesis bring the reader into an uneasy connection with a Nazi minister - a 
connection that refocuses the locus of the drama, encouraging us to consider how our 
own response involves conflicting impressions and judgements. However, Snodgrass’s 
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control of his narrative excesses is not always dependent on imagery or intricate 
wordplay; his poetic language is in fact, for the most part, very simple, and is designed 
to be read quickly, thus facilitating the narrative flow which is so central to his method. 
Consequently, control is more usually exerted through poetic form, which is used to 
provide a structural corrective to the pull of plot. In short, the dynamic, experimental 
forms of the monologues provide an ongoing critique of the cycle’s narrative content. 
For example, I noted how, in a key Speer monologue, the regular pyramidic form of the 
stanzas suddenly dissolves into a billowing, smoky column, giving the reader a graphic 
illustration of a truth that Speer himself refuses to recognise: that which ‘Hanke saw 
there in the East’. Although the Hitler poems tend to be more irregularly structured, 
subtle alterations in their rhythm and layout allow Snodgrass to ironise the dictator’s 
utterance. The lineation in the last stanza of the final Hitler poem shows how form can 
undermine a sentiment that the poet might have otherwise risked affirming: 
 
 I pick my time, my place. I take 
 This capsule tight between my teeth… 
 Set this steel cold against my jaw… 
 Clench, clench…and once more I am 
 Winning, 
  winning, 
   winning…444 
 
The splintering of the last three words across three lines makes them fall away into 
nothingness, showing that rather than ‘winning’, the dictator is doing the exact opposite. 
 As I have argued, it is not Hitler, however, but Dr. Goebbels, who is the central 
figure in The Fuehrer Bunker. The ideological dogma and anti-historical principles 
articulated in the Goebbels monologues (above all, those which concern the 
transformation of the Nazi party into a mythic order, and its atrocities into silence) are 
the very principles against which the volume is written, making these poems the sites of 
competing representative criteria. A typical Goebbels monologue is saturated with the 
antagonistic tensions of a verse format in which the poet is the theoretical nemesis of his 
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own protagonist. Snodgrass is, however, able to deconstruct Goebbels’s rhetoric without 
disrupting the coherence of his first person narrations by deploying formal poetic 
devices which offer critical counterpoints to the doctor’s statements. 
In one poem, in which Goebbels reflects on a birthday message that he had 
recorded for Hitler the previous evening, an antiphonal structure allows rhyme to sound 
out chimes of truth that counteract Goebbels’s distortions of political reality. Even 
though Goebbels believes himself to be conscious of what he ‘dared not say’, it is in 
fact poetic language that produces a series of clarifications which emerges from just 
beneath that which was said, dismantling propaganda through concordances of sound: 
 
 […] Last night I made 
 My final radio tirade: 
 A tribute for the Chief’s birthday  
 Just think how much I dared not say: 
 
 Never before did matters stand on 
            Never before did a master abandon 
 A razor’s edge so cruel as this; 
            A nation’s crazed fools to the abyss 
 Still, the majesty of these dark times 
            Till pride, false strategy and stark crimes 
 Finds its true essence in our Fuehrer. 
            Makes senseless ruin each hour surer. 
 
 We owe our thanks to Him alone 
            If Russian tanks break stone from stone 
 Our own dear homeland still stands fast 
            Blown down by shellburst or bomb blast 
 And the radiant culture of the West 
            While raping, killing, laying waste, 
 Is not yet swallowed by the pit. 
            Benighted hordes swarm over it. 
 
 If our Folk still believe in Him 
            Who’d choke their lives off from mere whim 
 And He still stands by His deep vow, 
            To strangle, starve or hang them now, 
 That means we’ve won true victory 
            We’ve mined new depths of idiocy 
 Which may inspire an age unborn; 
            With mad desires, blind rage and scorn 
 
 Our spirit must come to birth again 
            That spurs blood lust in earthly men 
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 A phoenix rising from its own ashes 
            To finish things as this world crashes 
 From the rubble of temporary loss; 
            Tumbling them in their burial foss. 
 Over the ruins that vandals burned 
 Our people’s noble aims will have returned. 
            These stunted cripples who have learned 
            Nothing except how vile a death they’ve earned.445 
  
Despite having been travestied by the lies and propaganda that were spread through the 
Reich, language somehow retains a capacity to critique and expose: a capacity which is 
dependent, however, on the Americanisation of Nazi discourse, and on poetic form, 
which can create subversive meanings - and indeed, as here, distinct counter-narratives - 
through devices such as rhythm and rhyme. In this sense, what Snodgrass frequently 
terms ‘the music’ of poetry - ‘the way the words rub against one another, the way the 
levels of diction rub against each other’ - is not an aesthetic affectation that traduces 
history: rather, it is the only way of exploding the silences which, as the Goebbels 
monologues make clear, the Nazis had hoped to plant within postwar discourse.
446
 As 
such, the regenerative aspect of The Fuehrer Bunker is both moralistic (hoping to draw 
the reader into a greater awareness of the thin dividing line between good and evil) and 
linguistic. And by restoring to language its critical capacity for negation, and thus 
offsetting the possibility of reification, Snodgrass’s volume as a whole does come to 
share the animating connection to cultural and social rebirth that Bakhtin discerned in 
the comic novels of Rabelais. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Much of my commentary has been concerned with representative poetics, examining 
how Berryman, Plath and Snodgrass each employed innovative poetic techniques to 
give written form to an atrocity thought by many to be unrepresentable - though this has 
often meant focusing on how they documented silences, with these poets frequently 
figuring the unrepresentability of the event, rather than the event itself, and asking 
questions about how the genocide is remembered, as opposed to recounting what 
actually happened. Taking poetic form as a work’s ultimate authority, I have looked at 
how meaning resides in the interplay between a poem’s content and its structure, and at 
how sonic and visual features shape sense. It does not follow, however, that by asking 
such questions about a poem’s form, one divests these works of their human content; 
rather, this approach reveals the ways in which poetry offers distinct ways of thinking 
about, and of remembering, human lives. Poetry has its origins in mnemonics: as Don 
Paterson observes, rhythm and rhyme mean that, unlike other artworks, a poem ‘can be 
carried in your head in its original state, intact and perfect […] Our memory of the poem 
is the poem’.447 In the works I have been looking at, the representation of memory is 
wholly bound up with complex questions concerning how we identify with those whose 
lives shaped, and those whose lives were destroyed by, the Holocaust; to commit one 
such poem to memory, is thus, in a way, to remember how to remember. 
While an overarching objective of my thesis has been to demonstrate that taking 
poetry seriously as an authority means doing away with the idea, popularised by 
proponents of ‘confessionalism’, that the speakers of these poems (especially those 
written by Plath and Berryman) are transparent embodiments of their authors, it is also 
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important not to lose sight of the ‘existential’ edge that such critics rightly noted in their 
work. In their preoccupation with issues of memory, identity and the extremities of 
experience, all three writers find in the Holocaust not a vehicle for self-examination but 
a demand for self-examination. In Robert Eaglestone’s terms, their poems ask questions 
about ‘“who we are” and “how the world is for us” and how the event of the Holocaust 
has utterly changed this’.448 
In The Holocaust and Postmodernism, Eaglestone argues that while all reading 
is grounded in the often overlooked ‘day-to-day process of identification’, the ‘new 
genre’ of testimony contains individuating traits which mean that its texts ‘eschew easy 
identification and so comprehension by readers’.449 Testimony is unique, as it disrupts 
the normative ways in which we consume literary texts; it does so through its imagery 
and style, and through devices such as interruptions and narrative frames, ensuring that 
incomprehensible events do not appear to be too readily comprehensible. Eaglestone 
quotes Primo Levi’s account of an incident when a schoolboy presented him with an 
adventure-fuelled plan of how he should have escaped from Auschwitz. This causes 
Levi to reflect - though not without good humour - on the general tendency for non-
victims to normalise the Holocaust, illustrating the ‘gap that exists and grows wider 
every year between things as they were down there and things as they are represented by 
the current imagination fed by books, films and myths’. Levi, concerned about this slide 
‘towards simplification and stereotype’, states that in his own writing he hoped ‘to erect 
a dyke against this trend’.450 Holocaust poetry by non-victims is centrally a response to 
testimony; the work of Plath and Berryman, for example, can be understood as 
respectful negotiations with the ‘dykes’ that emerge in testimonial texts, and the sense 
of distance and non-identity that they purposefully produce. Of the poets I have looked 
at, it is only Snodgrass (and not Plath, as many have argued) who really attempts to 
circumvent this impasse, asking in what ways Nazism can be represented, assimilated 
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and even normalised; and this is significant, because in The Fuehrer Bunker it is not the 
victims whom the poet wishes his readers to identify with, but the perpetrators. 
 In his analysis of testimony, Eaglestone focuses solely on survivor accounts. 
There is, of course, every reason to maintain a strict differentiation between literary 
works written by survivors and those written by perpetrators: they are each written for 
different purposes and are read in different ways; as such, they form distinct genres. But 
in contrast to what Eaglestone sees as the broad prohibition against identification in 
survivor testimony, a perpetrator account such as Albert Speer’s Inside the Third Reich 
(1970), for example, which is a widely read work of perpetrator testimony from the 
period, consistently normalises the past (however deliberately or self-consciously). Gitta 
Sereny has praised the ‘remarkable intelligence’ of Speer’s books, and the ‘apparent 
sincerity of his moral self-examination’; it is only through the absence of a clearly 
erected dyke in this writing that ‘we can find out how and why […] essentially decent 
and often talented men and women could become so subject to Hitler and his ideas that 
no doubt of him could be allowed to intervene’.451 
This guiding idea behind Sereny’s philosophical biography of Speer mirrors 
that of The Fuehrer Bunker, which, as a response to perpetrator testimony, argues that 
we can and should identify with people such as Speer - or at least that if we don’t 
already, then we should be made to. In an interview, Philip Hoy drew Snodgrass’s 
attention to Ian Buruma’s contention, in The Wages of Guilt (1995), that in the 1960s 
and 1970s little was written in Germany about the Nazi leaders because of ‘“the fear of 
identification; what Germans call Berhrungsangst, literally the fear of making 
contact”’. Snodgrass replied: 
 
I very much agree with Buruma’s statement about the fear of contact. But even 
stronger, I think, is the fear of recognition […] In other words, it’s not only the 
fear that bad luck, or bad morals, are contagious and may rub off, but also, and 
more importantly, the fear that the disease is general and innate.
452
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While Eaglestone does not address perpetrator testimony directly, the issues that 
Snodgrass raises come to the fore in his chapter on the debate which took place in the 
1990s between the historians Daniel Goldhagen (author of Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (1996)) and Christopher Browning 
(author of Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution (1992)): 
a debate which, according to Eaglestone, came down to fundamental ideas about how 
and whether we can identify with perpetrators. The suggestive titles of these two works 
aptly illustrate their methodologies, as Eaglestone summarises: ‘for Goldhagen the 
human is woven utterly into - and created by - their culture. To explain the Holocaust 
involves understanding this culture then and there, not “people like us.”’453 Conversely, 
‘the question “What would I have done in their place?” underlies all of Browning’s 
work because he presupposes a universal, ahistorical human nature,’ as is also the case 
with Snodgrass.
454
 Eaglestone sees these two distinct philosophies as presenting a 
‘proper aporia: two conflicting understandings that lead to two conflicting approaches to 
the past, the present, and the future, with no grounds for a rapprochement’.455 The 
postmodern position, accepting that there is no way round this, would be ‘to think both 
at once’.456 Eaglestone values Goldhagen’s methodology, as it allows for a more 
Foucauldian ‘archaeology of Nazism’, unearthing the ideologies - and thus the 
conditions of possibility - which govern an individual’s actions in their age.457 It is 
important, however, that Eaglestone retains aspects of Browning’s more ahistorical 
humanist approach; otherwise the ‘dyke’ that is erected in survivor testimony could be 
explained in purely epistemological terms, with foreign social and ideological 
conditions alienating us from the experiences that these works take as their subjects. 
Eaglestone’s focus on the laws of genre, however, presupposes the fact that survivor 
accounts are actually offered by people very much like us: people who we would be 
able to identify with, were it not for the traumatic experiences which shape their 
unassimilable testimony. By the same token, perpetrator accounts which do not describe 
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any totally alien physical or psychological state - such as, say, an ex-Nazi’s genocidal 
hatred of Jews - but which instead recount in simple prose the disintegration of moral 
will within a familiar bureaucratic and technological society, comprise a different genre 
of writing: one which ought to prompt that impulse to identify (‘What would I have 
done in their place?’) which underpins the work of Browning and Snodgrass. As 
Zygmunt Bauman puts it: ‘The most frightening news brought about the Holocaust and 
by what we learned of its perpetrators was not the likelihood that “this” could be done 
to us, but the idea that we could do it.’458 
 Eaglestone’s demonstration of how, conversely, dynamics of thwarted 
identification drive the reading of survivor testimony, offers a new vocabulary and 
interpretative framework with which to approach those imaginative works about the 
Holocaust - including poetry by the likes of Berryman and Plath - which consider our 
relation to history’s victims. A concept of identification circumvents the dry objectivity 
that is implied when we see these texts simply as works of history; equally, it qualifies 
the discourse about memory which is often attached to any contemporary work - be it 
critical or imaginative - which takes an event such as the Holocaust as its subject. This 
particular discourse is potentially misleading when applied to authors who have no 
personal recollection of events, or else it has to be couched in paradoxical terms - as in 
Susan Gubar’s subtitle, Poetry after Auschwitz: Remembering What One Never Knew 
(2003) - which suggests that ‘memory’ is not really what is being talked about at all. 
The fact is one can’t remember what one never knew; but one might try to grasp it in 
other ways.
459
 
 Geoffrey Hill’s ‘September Song’, like Berryman’s ‘from The Black Book (iii)’ 
and Plath’s ‘Daddy’, approaches historical victimhood through gestures of identification 
- though not in terms of a non-participant’s ‘empathetic identification’, but through 
more oblique exclusions, through failures of the imagination.
460
 To empathise is to find 
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common ground, and thus to comprehend; a poet such as Hill, however, is more attuned 
to that uncommon ground which separates the living from the dead: 
born 19.6.32   deported 24.9.42 
 
Undesirable you may have been, untouchable 
You were not. Not forgotten 
or passed over at the proper time. 
 
As estimated, you died. Things marched, 
sufficient, to that end. 
Just so much Zyklon and leather, patented 
terror, so many routine cries. 
 
(I have made 
an elegy for myself it 
is true) 
 
September fattens on vines. Roses 
flake from the wall. The smoke 
of harmless fires drifts to my eyes. 
 
This is plenty. This is more than enough.
461
 
 
The poem begins by memorialising the death of a ten-year-old child murdered by the 
Nazis, taking the form of a tombstone - though the flagrant pun in the epigraph-epitaph, 
where the Christian language of loss (‘departed’) morphs into Nazi euphemism 
(‘deported’), already exposes something of the poem’s lyric impropriety. More than 
simply remembering the dead child, ‘September Song’ wants to make contact with 
them: the first stanza is all about touching children. But another series of puns, relating 
to paedophilia (‘undesirable’) and social caste (‘untouchable’), implies that the poem’s 
elegiac endeavour constitutes a grave taboo violation, while ‘not forgetting’ is figured 
as a Nazi trait.
462
 
The poem’s queasy addressivity is rendered by an adult ‘I’ calling upon an 
infant ‘you’; at every stage, however, attempts at communication are blocked, with 
metaphor, in particular, proving unable to connect the two worlds of ‘here’ and ‘there’, 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’. In as much as the poem has a narrator (the second stanza uses an 
even more overtly Nazified language, but the tone softens in the third), this narrator 
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seems to possess the kind of ‘mind engraved with the Holocaust’ described by Norma 
Rosen, for which ‘gas is always that gas. Shower means their shower. Ovens are those 
ovens.’463 In the penultimate stanza, the line ‘Roses/ flake from the wall’ can be read, as 
Antony Rowland observes, as ‘a terrible metaphor for the flaking skin of burnt victims; 
even such a seemingly innocent signifier as “wall” is infected by the history of Nazi 
incidents in which “dissidents” were lined up and shot’.464 Similarly, the negative 
adjective used to describe the ‘smoke/ of harmless fires’ only very thinly conceals its 
opposite: the harmful fires lit at the sites of mass murder.
465
 As the narrator undertakes 
some unidentified but clearly prosaic activity, his memory is activated metaphorically, 
dredging up the past through a process of association (this particular line brings to mind 
the scene in Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah (1985), where fires burning in a forest in 
present-day Israel form a suggestive backdrop for a discussion of the murder of the 
Vilna Jews which took place in a forest in Lithuania). Here ‘smoke’ provides the 
twentieth-century equivalent of Proust’s madeleine; but the next step, the mind being 
flooded by things past, is missing. 
Rosen has explained that as ‘an analogy[-]making species’, ‘what we connect 
and how we connect it are vital keys to our understanding and can be discussed and at 
times corrected. That we connect is a given.’466 Even when one’s own suffering cannot 
approximate to that of another, ‘the law of human communication is unchanged. We 
must still work from what we know and try to connect it to what we do not.’467 In other 
words, we must somehow force ourselves to identify with the experience of victimhood. 
This structure or ‘law’ survives in ‘September Song’ (the speaker wants to connect), but 
in a damaged form, as the unfamiliar reality of the Holocaust, and thus the child’s 
ultimate fate, seems to lie on the far side of language: it is a negative or reversed world 
that words and objects can intimate, but not recreate. As Jahan Ramazani points out, 
‘Hill tweaks himself with constant verbal reminders of the child’s inaccessibility’.468 
Even the date of birth given in the poem’s epigraph is one day before Hill’s own, 
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offering ‘a sickening reminder of their dissimilarity’, and suggesting that while the 
child’s reality existed alongside the young poet’s world of comparative normality, it is 
now unreachable, separated by language, geography, and a small but critical lag in 
time.
469
 Importantly, as Gubar observes, this epigraph also shows that the narrator 
‘knows the date of deportation’, but ‘nothing about the death or death date of the 
nameless child’.470 
The speaker who sets out to describe the life and death of a Holocaust victim 
concedes: ‘(I have made/ an elegy for myself it/ is true)’. The parentheses exaggerate 
the imaginative failure, and the sense that this poem remains somehow beside the point. 
For the speaker, the ‘smoke/ of harmless fires’ is ‘plenty’, implying that the indirect 
contact of metaphor - not the thing itself, the historical reality - is all he can take. 
Ironically, this also suggests that a connection with the Holocaust yields a certain profit 
(perhaps for poetry: as Ramazani points out, ‘every elegy is an elegy for elegy’, and, as 
such, the genre becomes increasingly replete with losses); but this is only the case when 
the poem’s language descends from its initial point of high suggestibility into cliché and 
banality.
471
 Through this one short poem, Hill traces the verbal degeneration later noted 
in The Triumph of Love (1999): ‘Nor is language, now, what it once was/ even in - wait 
a tick - nineteen hundred and forty - / five of the common era’.472 
 ‘September Song’, like Berryman’s ‘from The Black Book (iii)’, is a poem 
which would be a kind of portal, but which only opens onto absence; in both poems, the 
reality of the Holocaust cannot be reached through traditional gestures of elegiac 
commemoration. A stymied gesture of identification, ‘September Song’ also contains 
aspects of the ‘black phone’ motif which recurs in Plath’s Holocaust verse, where 
language is represented as a form of communication that can only transmit 
incommunicability. In such poems, the urge to connect imaginatively with the 
experience of history’s victims persists, but the line (both the metaphorical phone line 
and, in a sense, the real poetic line) is always dead. I have argued, following Eaglestone, 
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that writers of this kind of Holocaust verse pursue an aporia that emerges from the 
reading of testimony, as summarised by Maurice Blanchot: ‘We read books on 
Auschwitz. The wish of all in the camps, the last wish: know what has happened, do not 
forget, and at the same time never will you know.’473 Unable to accept that we will 
never know, these poets create speakers who are consumed by a desire for 
understanding - a desire which often manifests itself in attempts to identify with the 
victims; but identification is continually thwarted by the ‘dykes’ which separate 
survivors’ accounts of the Holocaust from the understanding of those who come after. In 
their work, writers such as Berryman, Plath and Hill thus refuse to sanction the collapse 
of the two logically opposed commands identified by Blanchot. They do not resolve the 
apparent contradiction between knowing and not-knowing in the way that Rosen does, 
for example, when she argues that after Auschwitz identification is still possible (‘the 
law of human communication is unchanged’), and in the way which also occurs when 
we view the Holocaust as an event that one should not even try to imagine or 
comprehend (which is often the gravamen of ‘antirealist’ approaches to the Holocaust). 
These poets suggest that testimony becomes meaningless, its message misunderstood, if 
either injunction is forgotten. 
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